SURVEY

Autumn 1970
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a journal of
Soviet and East European studies

American and African Intellectuals

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The Balkans

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China, Russia, Eastern Europe

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Soviet Dissent

Andrei Amalrik Vladimir Bukovsky
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IMPORTANT ANNOUNCEMENT

The Editor regrets that owing to increased printing and other costs the annual subscription price of *Survey* from number 78 will be increased to 60s per annum (US $8.00). Single copies will be priced at 15s (US $2.00) and the student subscription will become 30s per annum (US $4.00).

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INTELLECTUALS IN AMERICA

Edward Shils

FROM the time of the Jacksonian Revolution until the administration of Franklin Roosevelt, intellectuals in the United States found much to distress them in the actions and culture of the ruling groups of their society. Their long and persistent preoccupation with Europe was part of an attachment to a culture in which they thought intellectuals 'counted'. In literature, in science, in scholarship and in art Europe was the very centre of creativity. European power was exercised with only intermittent challenges throughout Asia, Africa and Latin America, where, paradoxically, the very success of the movement for independence corroborated the superiority of Europe. But although the American intellectuals were awed by these features of cultural creativity and military and economic power of the European metropolis, this should not obscure the Utopian function of Europe for American intellectuals. It was for them a place where intellectuals were respected and taken seriously by those strata of society which exercised power.

When American intellectuals between the American Civil War and the First World War looked at Europe, what did they see? In London, for much of the 19th century, politics and literature moved in the same circles. Disraeli, who was a famous novelist, had been a prime minister; other prime ministers, Gladstone for example, were classical scholars and students of theology. The British universities were the breeding grounds of famous politicians and the training schools for the highest class of the civil service at home and in the Empire. Of France, it was known that Painlevé had been a mathematician, that Jaurès had been a great historian, that Clemenceau had edited *L'Aurore*, that Anatole France, Barbusse and Romain Rolland were prized by party leaders. It was known that men of letters were honoured by official distinctions and by banquets. It was known that in the Dreyfus affair, a small circle of intellectuals had formed a party on behalf of justice, that the individual action of Emile Zola, one of the most important novelists of his time, undid a great injustice.

The American intellectual's image of Germany, vague though it was, was much like that of France. The academic intellectuals seemed to play a crucial role: the universities trained the higher civil service; the *Verein für Sozialpolitik*, crammed with professors, acted as if its declarations were respectfully listened to and seriously considered; learned lawyers sat in the Reichstag. Had not the Frankfurt parliament of 1848 been called the 'professors' parliament'? Was not Lassalle one of the fathers of the German trade union movement? Professors were sometimes nominated to be privy councillors (*Geheimräte*) and they were generally held in awe.

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European artists, too, despite their alienation in their own societies, were regarded, from the obscurity in which American intellectuals thought they themselves were forced to live, as existing within the charmed circle. European artists received commissions to adorn public buildings; there were officially maintained academies of art; modern art had its patrons among the wealthy and influential who were encouraged and educated by able dealers.

Even Russia, barbaric Russia, appeared to give a place to intellectuals which their American counterparts believed the United States did not provide. If it did not honour or patronize them, it at least persecuted them. Persecution was a form of attention. The greatest of all, Tolstoy, a count (which was not forgotten), criticized the Tsarist regime and Russian society for their moral degradation, and because he was so great and so famous internationally, the regime could do nothing to him. Dostoievsky had a halter put round his neck for having attended a meeting of the Petrazhevsky circle. Turgenev was forced to live abroad in exile. All this attention from Tsarist authority was regarded as a sort of honour.[1]

What was true of the Russians was true of other European countries: the revolutionaries were intellectuals. Engagement with the authorities, even subversive engagement, was at least a certain kind of intimacy. American intellectuals did not even have this gratification.

THIS in its roughest outlines was the map of the relations between intellectuals and the European powers as it was perceived by many American intellectuals over the course of nearly a century, but particularly since the end of the Civil War. Looking around at their own situation, what did they find? Public life was a shambles, corruption rampant: mammon enthroned and the muses rusticated, unregarded, disrespected, sometimes even, in spectacular cases, persecuted. The fate of *Leaves of Grass*, of Dreiser's early novels, the trial of Art Young, Max Eastman and the editors of *The Masses*, stood out as characteristic episodes.

American politicians appeared to the intellectuals to be very different from European politicians. Edmund Wilson epitomized a view which was widely held when he wrote: 'Our society has finally produced in its specialised professional politicians one of the most useless and obnoxious groups which has perhaps ever disgraced human history—a group that seems unique among the governing classes in having managed to be corrupt, uncultivated and incompetent all at once. . . .'[2]

[1] This masochistic yearning is still not dead. Only a few years ago, Miss Mary McCarthy wrote in *The New York Review of Books* that the persecution of Sinyavsky and Daniel by the Soviet government was evidence that literature was taken seriously by the Soviet government. She contrasted this with the example of the unworthy United States government which demonstrated its indifference to letters by abstention from interference with the freedom of writers.

[2] 'An Appeal to Progressives', *The New Republic*, 14 January 1931, reprinted in *The Shores of Light: A Literary Chronicle of the Twenties and Thirties* (W. H. Allen, 1952), p. 529.

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The businessmen were of a piece. Among literary men, especially those who made the running from the Civil War onward, businessmen had a very bad press. There were very few like Dreiser who admired power so much that a figure like Cowperwood, the hero of *The Financier*, could be made acceptable by sheer force of character. The Army offered no respectable career; the Church was hopeless; nor was the civil service an object of aspiration to American intellectuals.[3]

Here and there one of them was ingloriously employed in it: Melville as a minor official in the customs service, Whitman a clerk in the attorney-general's office. The diplomatic and consular services, despite the xenotropism of the intellectuals, was tarred with the brush of government and politics. Few intellectuals sought their place in them—there were a few major exceptions, mainly from New England—and in any case the selection of ambassadors through political patronage gave intellectuals little opportunity.

The society at large appalled them. For the most part American scholarly and literary intellectuals lived in a world they never made and for which they took no responsibility. But they were not immune to the claims of the primordial ties. They suffered from their membership in a society to which they were bound by an unexpungible identity and which at the same time revolted them. They were perverted patriots bound to a country from which they could not release themselves and which they could not love. The self-exiled Americans in Paris lived among other Americans. Few were able to denationalize themselves by long residence abroad.

American intellectuals were pained by their membership in a society, the rulers of which seemed to have no need for them. This was partly a misunderstanding. They could not have come into existence in the United States had the government been totally anti-intellectual. Universities were maintained with increasing munificence after about 1880; periodicals with quite large audiences and of a respectable intellectual level existed; publishing firms produced their works and sold them to an American audience. It is true that there prevailed a puritanical attitude in the cultural and intellectual institutions and these were not wholly sympathetic with the 'advanced' views of the new European realism—which for that matter was encountering difficulties in Europe too.

There was a demand for intellectual services in the United States in the latter part of the 19th and the early part of the 20th century. The Federal Government, despite the anti-intellectualism of politicians and the low esteem in which officials were held, probably employed more intellectuals than most European governments. Many intellectuals were hidden away in the Surgeon General's Office, in the Geodetic

[3] One of the major public actions of American intellectuals between the Civil War and the Spanish-American War was the campaign to reform the civil service, to replace the politicians' power of patronage by appointment on the basis of educational qualifications.

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Survey, in the Bureau of Indian Affairs, in the Patent Office and latterly in the Department of Agriculture, which in time became a leading intellectual institution in agricultural economics and statistics. They were, however, obscure and they did not move in the circles of the powerful. They worked peacefully and quietly and they were unknown to the great world. They were specialists and the literary and humanistic intellectuals had little sense of affinity with them. The country was huge and there were many colleges and universities; the literary and humanist intellectuals did not pass through the same institutions as the scientific civil service. But even if a sense of affinity had existed, it would have not overcome the feeling of exclusion. The scientific civil servants were servants. They were not masters, they did not make major policies or associate with those who did. Although progressive politicians in the North-West and in Wisconsin brought academic social scientists into their counsels, the same did not happen on the Federal level to any extent which the intellectuals cared to remark.

It was from the great world that the intellectuals felt excluded. It was in the great world—the centre of society where it appeared that decisions were made and where the regalia reposed—that the intellectuals felt the cold wind of indifference and perhaps contempt. And they were largely correct in this.

THE political élite felt no need for the support or the collaboration of the literary and humanistic intellectuals and did not seek their company.[4] For the most part, the political élite in the United States had come up through long service in the political machines, where in the rough and tumble they had learned the arts of compromise and combination and even more unsavoury things. The American political élite was by and large the product of a populist polity and had not, by origin or by association, acquired the refinements of European political élites drawn from the aristocracy and gentry and the professional classes.[5] By and large, and least of all at the municipal and state levels where political apprenticeships had to be served and support elicited, they did not think they needed the company and still less the services of literary and humanistic intellectuals. Scientists were regarded by politicians as all right—in their place, which was not in the political arena. The intellectuals never did seek to enter politics; party work, the hurly-burly of low company was not to their taste and without a capacity to stand such company the chances of a political career were slight. What a contrast between

[4] Theodore Roosevelt was far more friendly with Rudyard Kipling than he was with any American literary man of comparable quality.

[5] American intellectuals, particularly the humanistic intellectuals and some of the non-bohemian literary men, had for a long time a belief in the superiority of the genteel and the well-born. This lasted until well into the 1920s and faded only with the Great Depression. This naturally nurtured a prejudice against the uncouth politician in his 'long-johns', his galoshes, his string necktie and his chewing tobacco. Long after the respect for gentility has disappeared and the backwoodsman among legislators has become rare, the stereotype persists.

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this and the occasional British practice of patronizing a well-connected young man, freshly down from Oxford, and granting him an opportunity to stand for a parliamentary constituency!

Nor did the big businessmen think they needed university graduates, even scientists, in their firms. Only the chemical industry employed university graduates in large numbers: the chemists were kept in research and in production. But they rose in management only after they had lightened their burden of scientific curiosity. Agriculture too made use of students in the state agricultural research stations. They had a significant part in the advance of American agriculture and they were respected by farmers. The agricultural scientists were, however, specialists. They were local and not national notables and they regarded themselves as scientists and not as part of a larger class of intellectuals. Iron and steel, coal mining and the railways on the other hand—the great industries of the industrial expansion of the half century between the Civil War and the First World War in which the great freebooting capitalists operated—had no use for intellectuals. The technological and managerial innovations which gave these industries their central place in the American economy and which enabled it to come to the forefront of the world, arose from within the industries themselves. They were not the products of research done by university-trained scientists and engineers. The great capitalists who patronized art patronized either long dead painters or society painters, not esteemed by the intellectuals who regarded themselves as custodians of the more advanced 'European' culture. The capitalists had nothing to do with literary men or even scholars.

Banking progressed without economists; the Federal government likewise eschewed their knowledge and wisdom, although Wisconsin and a few other progressive states drew on such knowledge as they possessed. Such social work as there was, was done by local politicians and by amateurs of the prosperous classes, some of whom were strong personalities and outstanding intelligences who became important humanitarian reformers. Only in the press, in the churches and in the reformist politics of certain states among the central institutions, did a certain kind of intellectual exist. In the press, where the reportorial function was regarded as a proper training for a young man aspiring to become a naturalistic novelist, a certain robust class of intellectuals were to be found; in the editorial rooms were to be found intellectuals who felt no kinship either with European intellectual trends or with those Americans who did feel that kinship. The interchange between the press and the literary and humanistic intellectuals between 1890 and 1910 was more pronounced, above all in the muck-raking era, than that between the intellectuals and any other sector of the élite. In fact it was through the press that American intellectuals re-entered the centre of society—but they did so as an active counter-élite, expressing the iniquities of corrupting plutocrats and corrupt politicians. Some of them stayed on to play a part in the reform politics of Theodore Roosevelt

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and Woodrow Wilson. By the 1920s much of this participation had disappeared and was recalled by the generation of intellectuals which came to prominence after the First World War as a failure. All that remained was the reinforcement of an anti-political, anti-civil tradition. At the periphery of the Protestant churches, a certain kind of active social reforming, Christian intellectual was to be found, but on the whole literary and humanistic intellectuals had no affectionate connections with these circles. Theologians and ecclesiastical dignitaries, in so far as they had intellectual roles, were regarded as alien to the valid intellectual tradition. Those who had close connections with the plutocracy and the leading politicians were regarded as traitors to the true cause of the intellect.

THUS, American society, although it was nurturing a vigorous and creative body of intellectuals of many diverse interests and talents, could scarcely be said to have been structurally dependent on their co-operation, and in so far as it actually was dependent, in agriculture, in the chemical industry and in the scientific civil service, these functions were invisible to those parts of the intellectual classes—the literary and humanistic intellectuals—who designated themselves as 'the intellectuals' and who had grievances against American society for its neglect of intellectual things. Through much of this period, many of the most accomplished among them were hostile towards the other sectors of the élite, censuring their indifference towards intellectual pursuits and by implication, towards intellectuals. They disapproved of American society because intellectuals were not actually incorporated into its symbolic ornamentation. They thought that a good society, quite apart from any merits it might have in the relations between rulers and ruled or among fellow-citizens or in the conduct of parents and children or in the accomplishments of the crafts and professions, must, in justice, accord a high status to intellectuals in the circle of rulers. As a result, many intellectuals lived in an 'inner exile' and some lived in actual voluntary exile.

Politicians and businessmen were well aware of this mainly silent, but sometimes harsh, hostility. They paid the intellectuals back in their own coin. They despised them as effete and unmanly, as Anglophile and snobbish. Neither their company nor their services were sought—except in progressive states, most notably Wisconsin. When American universities began to bestir themselves intellectually from the 1890s onward until the 1930s, academics, mainly in the social sciences, were sporadically harassed, threatened and dismissed from their posts, for criticism of existing economic and political institutions and of those who exercised authority in them.[6]

Yet American society prospered, this withdrawal of intellectuals

[6] Cf. my: 'Limitations on the Freedom of Research and Teaching in the Social Sciences', *The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science*, Vol. 200 (November 1938, pp. 144–64).

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notwithstanding. It was a rough and, in many respects, a callow society but it performed great things. It settled the open country, coped powerfully with nature and drew great rewards; it attracted vast populations from among the wretched of the earth, assimilated them to a new way of life which prized individual exertion and accomplishment. Its conflicts—except for the Civil War—were not often deep or long-lasting, although they were frequently violent. New tasks were undertaken continuously and very many were handled with considerable success. Government, despite a long period of pervasive corruption, was brought into increasing responsiveness to popular desires. A common culture was formed out of heterogeneous elements; an inclusive educational system was developed which not only diffused the common culture but also provided the early stages of what later became a prodigious scientific and scholarly creativity.

All this was accomplished with a relatively marginal participation of the highly educated or intellectually most creative. Technological innovation was the work of inventors rather than of scientifically educated scientists the managers of business enterprises drew relatively little from the higher culture of society. The army likewise made little use of the academically trained intellectuals until the Second World War. The growth of the powers of the Federal government owed much to the exertions of very strong personalities among legislators, mainly Middle Western and North Western populists—usually men of no great culture but intelligent and of strong character, guided in two important periods by presidents who were professional politicians of outstanding intellectual propensities—one of them was Woodrow Wilson. Business entrepreneurs, farmers, professional politicians, journalists, amateur social workers and religious and social reformers, labour leaders, civil servants, school administrators and judges were the main architects of the growth of American society. It witnessed a transformation into an urban and industrial society, generally liberal and democratic in its political institutions and increasingly drawing new heterogeneous ethnic segments into a national society and a common culture. Only the rural negroes in the South as a relatively massive minority, and a few small pockets of Red Indians in their reservations, were omitted from this contraction of the space between centre and periphery. The leading agents of this transformation included very few intellectuals in crucial or prominent roles, but men like Theodore Roosevelt and Woodrow Wilson, Herbert Croly and Louis Brandeis, John Dewey and Alfred Mahan were very influential in guiding the policies and providing the ideas which gave American society its new shape. However, this did not affect the image of the anti-intellectual character of American society which dominated the thought of American intellectuals.[7]

[7] The persistence of this view is manifested in Professor Richard Hofstadter's *Anti-Intellectualism in American Life*. Despite Professor Hofstadter's thorough scholarly mastery of the facts, his important book permits it to be believed that the anti-intellectual Yahoos have had the upper hand at all times.

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THE Second World War both hastened and complicated the incorporation of the intellectuals into the centre of American society. The curve which had swung upward in the period of the New Liberalism relapsed, following the First World War, to a trough as deep as any in the 19th century. Then in the 1930s, at a time when the Great Depression was transforming American society in so many significant respects, the intellectuals re-entered the centre. The damage to the puritan ethos which had previously been unchallenged in principle, except by a very small number of reformers and bohemians; the assimilation of Jews into the centre; and the raising of expectations concerning the positive possibilities of governmental action, were among the major effects of the Great Depression. All of these involved the intellectuals, touched on their interests, gave them new opportunities to assert themselves.

Ordinarily, a crisis like the Great Depression disintegrates a society and discredits its élite. In part this is what happened in the United States. The business élite was discredited and so was the incumbent Republican administration. The clergy, associated with the reigning economic and political élites, saw their authority diminished at the top although, at the level of parish and congregation, their devotion and solicitude was a compensation for the diminution of prestige of the higher ecclesiastical authorities. The decentralized character of Protestant ecclesiastical organization in the United States helped to save the status of the religious élite. Municipal and state political élites on the other hand would have suffered a further diminution of their already not very high prestige had the new national administration under Franklin Roosevelt not come to power. As a result of the indomitable personality of President Roosevelt in the face of every vicissitude and every failure of effective action by his administration, the legitimacy of the authority of the state governments was saved—undeservedly.

But undoubtedly the chief beneficiaries of the policies of the Roosevelt administration were the central political élites themselves and the intellectuals. The numerous reforms instituted by or credited to the Federal government—first, and most symbolically, the National Recovery Act itself—the reforms in agriculture which halted and reversed the course of the disasters suffered by the entire rural population, the enactment and implementation of the new social security arrangements, the guarantee of bank deposits, the encouragement and protection given to trade unions of the semi-skilled workers, the various public work schemes, the salvaging of youth through the Civilian Conservation Corps and the National Youth Administration—all of these contributed to the re-stabilization of American society in a new structure emerging from the Great Depression.

The traditional structure of recruitment to the higher civil service and the great expansion of governmental activities permitted and necessitated a very large scale recruitment of new civil servants from outside the existing cadres. In a short time and in a way they did not expect or

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demand, the aspirations of the civil service reformers of the last quarter of the 19th century, were given reality. The British and German practice of recruitment of the administrative élite from the universities—so much admired for so many years by American intellectuals with civic concerns —was given an approximate American counterpart.

The ' Brains Trust ' of the presidential campaign of 1932, which drew primarily on Columbia University social scientists, was a foreshadowing of the role which intellectuals were to play throughout the remainder of the Roosevelt administration. President Roosevelt was a loyal Harvard graduate, and he was always ready to permit himself to be identified with the universities. From the very beginning of his term of office, academic intellectuals, primarily professors from the law faculties of the major universities, economists and political scientists as well, were called to the highest offices in practically every new administrative agency. Professors and historians were sent abroad as ambassadors, the National Planning Board, although its chairman was the President's uncle, was replete with academics. The National Academy of Sciences began to move into the role in which it has been established ever since. There had never been anything like it in the history of American universities, never anything like it in the history of the American intellectual classes since the formation of the Republic and the drafting and promulgation of the constitution.

Some of these intellectuals were given major administrative responsibilities; on the whole, however, they did not become administrators. Many who were appointed as legal counsel to departments and agencies were assigned the tasks of devising substantive policies to be espoused by the President and to be enacted into legislation by Congress. Even where they had administrative posts, their tasks were to think about policy on behalf of the President. They formed an extended, informal personal cabinet around the President, superseding the actual cabinet.

The outbreak of the war in Europe was followed by a gradual movement towards American participation. The ' Lend-Lease ' legislation brought in more academic lawyers and some economists. The entry of America into the war produced a vast proliferation of new organizations. The greatest of these was the Manhattan project which drew scientists of many sorts and of the highest quality into government service on a scale never undertaken before in any country or in any epoch. There were many other major scientific projects. New organizations which drew on intellectuals to fill their ranks were the Office of Strategic Services, the War Production Board, the Board of Economic Warfare, the Office of Price Administration, the Office of War Information. Older departments expanded their activities. The Department of State, the Department of Justice and others added new functions, providing places for intellectuals: university teachers of law, economics, history, geography and even political science and sociology. Anthropologists and linguists, even teachers of French, German and English literature and

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practically every other discipline of the human sciences served in policy-making, intelligence, and administrative capacities in civilian and military organizations. The physical and biological scientists were absorbed probably to an even greater extent—there were more of them and a larger proportion of those available. Mathematicians and statisticians were heavily drawn upon. They were glad of the holiday from teaching and enjoyed the excitement of proximity to great events and to great authority as well as the occasional exercise of power on their own.

The war was in part a contest of industrial strength and skill. Industry and agriculture in the two preceding decades had become much more 'science-based'. From chemistry and agriculture, science extended its dominion into the communications industry and its industrial supplement. Engineering in its various branches was becoming more and more scientific and hence more intellectual. Statistics began to be more widely used in many branches of economic life and in government—the Roosevelt administration greatly increased the scale of statistical services of the Federal Government, although the Hoover administration had already shown the way forward from the stimulus given to it by Hoover himself when he was Secretary of Commerce in the Coolidge administration.

Nonetheless, it was war production itself which extended so much the domain of 'science-based' industry. The war became a contest of mobilized intellect working through or on the basis of research.

The combination of opportunities to carry on work which was a continuation of their peace time activities with immeasurably greater resources (in contexts attractive because of their proximity to power) together with their affirmation of the general purpose of the war, brought American intellectuals into solidarity with the political and even the business and military élites of the country. Many who had been fellow-travellers with the Communist Party in the 1930s rallied to the government after the period of embarrassment which lasted from the signing of the Ribbentrop-Molotov pact in August 1939 to the German invasion of Russia in June 1941. It is true that those with firm Stalinist attachments gave only a conditional affirmation to the government, but they too shared, even if only superficially and hypocritically, in the general consensus of the intellectuals. In contrast with the First World War, when many Americans had expressed reservations about America's engagement in the war, there were few pacifists or conscientious objectors. Isolationism among intellectuals—which had been slight enough in any case—almost disappeared during the war.[8] Those who were pro-German or pro-Japanese or pro-Italian were infinitesimal in number, and those who did not serve the enemy directly, as did Ezra Pound abroad or

[8] Stalinists, prosperous German-American businessmen and Congressmen who remembered the inquiries into the munitions industry and some Irish-Americans were the main opponents of America's aid to Britain after the fall of France. Robert Hutchins and Charles Beard, who stuck to their isolation until the very declaration of war, did not have many sympathizers among intellectuals.

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George Sylvester Viereck at home, did not in any case give public expression to their views.

WHEN the Second World War ended, the unanimity of intellectuals was broken by the re-emergence of the Stalinists and their fellow-travellers manoeuvring for protective cover behind Henry Wallace and by small circles of Trotskyites and miscellaneous anti-Stalinists. Still there remained a very comprehensive consensus. Most of the leading intellectuals in the natural and social sciences and the humanities who had been in governmental and military service, returned to academic life, but they did not lose their sense of being at the centre. Many of them retained an active relationship with the government, either with the Department of Defence or with other governmental or quasi-governmental bodies, which wished to retain the connection with intellectuals formed during the war with such happy results. New research institutions were established, living mainly from government research contracts, and some of them were able to attract natural and social scientists of a very high quality. This too maintained a sense of affinity with the centre.

The end of the war saw the emergence of a new phenomenon in the United States: a pressure group of scientists seeking to influence governmental policy through public agitation, representations to legislators and to the highest levels of the executive branch. The Szilard-Einstein letter to President Roosevelt was the first step in this process. The atomic scientists' movement, of which *The Bulletin of Atomic Scientists* and the Pugwash meetings are the monuments, was a remarkable expression of civic concern from a sector of the American intellectual classes, which, except for a slight rash of Stalinism in the 1930s, had never concerned itself much with politics.

The expansion of the universities greatly increased the opportunities for teaching and research appointments and salaries rose. There were more graduate students to work with and libraries improved. For many university teachers, especially those who had completed their studies early in the Great Depression, and who had, despite the niggardliness of those times, survived, the situation seemed beyond the dreams of avarice. Carrying out scientific and scholarly research did not seem incompatible with serving the government; there appeared to be an identity. It did not seem anomalous that the government should support these activities. Its goodwill towards intellectuals—despite McCarthyism—appeared to be self-evident. Through an elaborate system of Federal government support, scientists at their universities did research in which the military were sufficiently interested to provide financial support—although it should be emphasised that much of this research had only the most tenuous connexion with military practice. The profusion of opportunities and resources turned many heads and bred a state of mind in which all things seemed possible because the reign of scarcity appeared to have ended.

Industry and commerce had learned from the war-time experience of

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the government and from the conduct of the war and they too sought the services of the intellectuals—mainly statisticians and economists. The tremendous expansion of television and advertising absorbed many writers and artists or provided supplementary income for them. The affluence of the country enabled literary men to benefit from the prodigality of private foundations, grants for young established writers became common and the shift of emphasis of the universities to expression rather than learning gave literary men an *entrée* to the universities such as had been unknown for a century.

American intellectuals were now honoured in their own country.[9] They felt honoured. Even literary intellectuals who had not shared in the enormous prosperity of the academic intellectuals felt their tradition of alienation being eroded. Some tried to remind themselves that it was not their calling to affirm the principles embodied in the practices of their society. Others were well aware of the dilemma created by their new functions and of the larger intellectual consensus and the demands of the traditions in which they had grown up. The general revulsion against Stalinist practices in the Soviet Union and the 'people's democracies', endorsed by the Communist Party of the United States, made it easier for intellectuals who had in the past been uncompromisingly anti-capitalist to reconcile themselves to post-war America.[10]

By the end of the 1940s, America had become the centre of the

[9] The two symposia conducted by *The Partisan Review* were expressive of what was happening among the chief heirs of the tradition of alienation among literary and humanistic intellectuals. Arvin, Newton, *et al.*, *America and the Intellectuals*, *PR Series No. 4*, New York 1953 (originally published as 'Our Country and Our Culture' (*Partisan Review* 1952). Cf. also Agee, James et al. *Religion and the Intellectuals* (PR Series No. 3, New York 1950).

[10] By the end of the 1950s the truth about the Stalinist purges had been accepted by most intellectuals in the United States. Khrushchev's revelations of February 1956 at the 22nd Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union were only a final and authoritative confirmation of what had already been generally recognized. Attachment to the centre of American society included awareness of the material well-being and of the value of individual freedom and of the pluralistic structure of society. None of these had been attained in the communist countries where the two latter had been deliberately suppressed on the ground that their suppression was a necessary condition for the attainment of the former, which had nonetheless, remained unattained. The issues raised by the Soviet Union dominated the international perspective of American intellectuals after the war, in part because the communists had mounted a very vociferous intellectual campaign before the war which had touched the conscience and influenced the cognitive maps of many American intellectuals. In any case, the evident superiority of the United States to the Soviet Union in the very categories which communists insisted should be applied to the assessment of the merits of societies, and the disillusionment in the Soviet Union among those who had once been enthusiasts, made for readiness to appreciate American society.

There was one rift in the lute. McCarthyism disturbed the atmosphere of the decade after the war, harrying fellow-travellers, doing considerable damage in a small number of instances, intimidating communists and quasi-communists and discrediting American society in the minds of men who would have wished to reaffirm their connection with it. Much more lastingly damaging was the impediment which it formed to the healing of the breach between American literary and publicistic intellectuals who had grown up in a tradition of alienation and American politicians at a time when so many other factors tended to erode this tradition. McCarthyism reinforced it.

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world. The increasing number of American intellectuals—academic and literary—who went abroad, thanks to the largesse of their government and the private philanthropic foundations—had become aware of this. The bitterness of the anti-Americanism among foreign intellectuals testified to their preoccupation with America. Not only were foreign societies being 'Coca-colonized', but their intellectuals could not resist the fascination of America. American intellectuals were even less able to resist the attraction of the centrality of the United States. From the condition of being peripheral in a society which they believed was culturally provincial, American intellectuals came to see themselves as effective members of the centre of an intellectual metropolis. Their earlier feelings of provinciality had not been experienced as a happy condition, and they embraced with enthusiasm the escape from peripherality.

The gratification over incorporation into the centre probably derives some of its strength from the fact that many of the intellectuals of the generation which came into prominence from the 1930s onwards were of Jewish, mainly East European Jewish origin. They were the first generation of the offspring of the immigrants who came to the United States in such great numbers between the mid-1880s and about 1912. Intellectual aptitude and intellectual passion were coupled with social ambition. The white Anglo-Saxon protestant ascendancy was still unchallenged, and to move in their company was regarded by many Jewish intellectuals, however radical some of them were, as a good thing. The attainment of that aim through intellectual accomplishment could be a cause of self-congratulation.

But at the root of this affirmation was the reality of a strong state. Although the dominant, most visible tradition of American intellectuals of almost all kinds has been that of distrust towards the ruling political and economic powers, it has ever since the 1880s at least been associated with a tradition which asserts that the ills of society could be cured by a strong and virtuous authority. Long before American intellectuals became socialists, Stalinists, Trotskyists, or whatever, they believed that 'the State should do it'. When the idea of planning, very simplistically conceived, came upon the scene, it was seized upon as the right solution. No wonder that at a time when the mythology of planning was at its height, many intellectuals came under Stalinist influence. They were, however, only sharing the common intellectual outlook: a strong state was their ideal. The strong and active state of the long administration of President Roosevelt gratified this desire.

(The second part of Professor Shils' essay will appear in the next issue of Survey.)

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ON BEING AN AFRICAN INTELLECTUAL

Rajat Neogy

ABOUT 1958, we began to receive in East Africa our first note-book and pencil visitors—from the world's universities, research institutes and even magazines. That was the beginning of the trickle that has since become a steady stream of the latter-day counterparts of the early explorers. These new liberals were hunting for an African mind they felt sure was awaiting recognition. They scurried around the countryside interviewing farmers or shopkeepers, talked to students at the high schools or the university, gave tea-parties or otherwise entertained clerks and minor officials of local administrations, pored over Government documents and papers and through a network of expatriate friends began to 'spot' the young men to be watched as potential leaders. When they returned home and wrote up their notes into books they passed on the names of interesting people-to-see to the next wave of seekers. Over the years people one 'had to see' emerged, their names varying only slightly from one diary to another. (With certain minor deviations the list has been a fairly accurate *Who's become Who* guide to East Africa— although given the small number of eligible educated at the time it reflects no great powers of prophecy.)

These men came to be known as the first intellectuals at that time and they make up the Establishment now. Their performance as intellectuals leaves something to be desired, but are they even satisfactory politicians? When they were first 'discovered' there was an unquestioned assumption of the interchangeability of roles between intellectual and politician. If you defined yourself articulately in political terms you were obviously an intellectual; and if you defined yourself in intellectual terms, why, you might make an even greater politician.

Many of the problems of intellectual identity that young men face today can be traced back to this period of blurred roles. Who are these first 'intellectuals' and why haven't even the most gifted of them fulfilled their early promise? Can they even be called intellectuals at all? The answer to the latter question, a decade later, is: No. For the former question it is necessary to go back to the early days, when sought after and paid court to, their every word noted down by outside visitors, these young men began to acquire a self-awareness that was previously missing. For one thing, through their interviewers they often learned of the existence of their compatriots in neighbouring countries, and were kept abreast of their thinking. For another, through the variety of questions continuously put to them, they were forced into thinking about an entire range of subjects they might not have been involved or interested in previously. The process between interviewer and interviewee was mutually educational in the best sense; over a period of time

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both question and response became more sophisticated and better articulated. But behind this was the increasingly self-satisfied knowledge that when power came they would be the first recipients. This may have been good political science but it was bad for the soul. With Independence and high office, these men walked in with the feeling that they had 'thought' themselves into their jobs.

Deterioration through undisputed power was equally fast, as one after another inconvenient intellectual belief was thrown overboard, and the conversion from 'intellectual' to political animal became merely a matter of time. The speed with which this conversion took place was disturbing.

The erosion began even before they took office. Exposed early to ideas from the West and exhilirated by the prospects of turning them to reality they cut themselves loose from many of the restraints of traditional society. There was too, that subtle corruption of knowing that whatever you did or said would be better thought of—because you were in that psychologically intoxicating period during colonial withdrawal,—when yesterday's villains became today's 'jolly decent chaps.' Even the academics from the world's universities improved your remarks before using them. What one saw was that instead of a measured thoughtfulness there was only the staccato promptings of a question-and-answer intelligence test. Instead of the man representing a body of opinion, it was the other way around—with the man hiding behind it.

The sobering effects of power and office may have matured them into men of the world able to hold their own at coffee price-fixing conferences, but it has erased any pretences to intellectuality. These first 'intellectuals' of East Africa still hold power now. Intellectually most of them are adolescents—and some delinquent at that.

IT could be argued that when Independence came the men least prepared for it were the first 'intellectuals.' To some of them it must have been very much like receiving an expensive toy which you have dreamt and had fantasies about—such was the psychological unpreparedness for the take over of power. It has become something of a cliché now that the first acts of a new government, after the flag-raising ceremony and the taking of oath of office, is the obligatory deportation from the country of a number of whites and other non-Africans, and the use of the Youth Wing movement to terrorise and intimidate others.

However liberal commentators abroad explain away or accept such incidents as part of 'nation-building' they remain simply what they are: exercises of the psychologically insecure who are unable to take the power they hold for granted. Without the demonstration that they are able physically to remove people from the country, it would seem, they are unable to feel quite sure they have in fact taken over. Similarly, the Youth Wing is organised and used as an extra-governmental arm of physical intimidation and minor terrorism. (Invariably after about a year or so of high-handed activity the movement's leaders get ambitious

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and turn against the government itself; at which stage the movement is quietly dissolved.)

When personal or government excesses in the use of power occur they have to be rationalised sooner or later. Where there can be no intelligent justification, the rationalisation can be disguised through rhetoric. With the entry of rhetoric into the language of government the demise of the previous 'intellectual' style can be said to be complete. For students of politics there is a rich field of exploration in the speeches of political leaders before and just after Independence and their speeches three to six years later on the same subjects. Making all allowances for changed circumstances, the 'burden of governing' factor and personal idiosyncrasies in style the content of the latter, will often show a dramatic configuration of new bold non-thoughts when compared to their earlier, humbler and even pedestrian statements. It can be argued that as with their Westminster pattern of democracy, new African governments have been saddled with a political vocabulary which came nowhere near expressing the true idiom of the grievances of their people and there is some truth in this. But the language used to exhort the peasants to produce more or to coax them to the ballot box has never been the same as that used in Parliament. It is in the nature of the new official language of government that it exhibits a startling departure from reality. I do not speak here of the language of the *administration* (which maintains its prim British matter-of-factness) but the language of the ideologues of the government spokesmen, the why-we-are-here men of the top. It is here that illiteracy combining with high cynicism shows the greatest feats of verbal acrobatics.

Much of the self-confidence that produces this language of elation is based on the simple fact that having avoided elections successfully, and sometimes, it would seem, for ever, there is literally no accountability to anyone. (In Uganda, each time elections have been due, a new 'revolutionary' constitution is placed before and approved by Parliament extending its life for another term.) But there are other factors for it as well. One of them is to do with the mesmerizing and hypnotic quality that a continuous barrage of fractured meanings and words has on the listener. Foreign news correspondents, for example, after a rare meeting with a head of state, will come out of one of such sessions feeling curiously light-headed that they have been confided in at a very exalted level. The main purpose of the rhetoric here is to 'invent' a new language more conducive to justifying or asserting the permanence of government, and to seduce or bewilder the inside critic or foreign observer into a stupefied acceptance. And, on the whole, it works. (How well it succeeds with would-be critics inside the country is illustrated by a recent incident in Uganda. A student demonstration marched to Parliament buildings to protest against the government's inaction against the Rhodesian regime. One of the placards they carried asserted 'We mean business—no nonsense!' The President came out to speak to them, and after commending them on their discipline launched into a

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routine diatribe against the Smith regime. He ended dramatically pointing at the sign. 'As that placard says, We mean business—no nonsense!' The students cheered wildly and went home, forgetting for whom the slogan was meant in the first place.)

The other function of this non-language is of course for the straightforward intimidation of lesser, argumentative beings who stray from their prescribed paths. 'If you are a true African you could not ask me such a stupid question.' End of reply. The victims are usually humble in their station in life (a junior reporter, a clerk, an up-country school-teacher) and their impertinence is rewarded with the full wrath of brute power, underscored by contempt. The overall effect is a subtle erosion in the quality and frankness of free discussion in the country.

WHO then are the intellectuals now? As a group they appeared on the scene after Independence. Qualifying from university either at home or abroad, these young men regarded Independence 'matter-of-factly' as a condition that offered them the fullest possibilities to make use of their skills. They did not aspire to become politicians, and in any case the first round of political musical chairs had been played out. They were intelligent, self-assured and without expectation of political reward. They knew that regardless of the field they qualified in there were jobs waiting for them. In the best way they suffered no career anxieties, and this gave them a tolerant and broad approach to their work and a flexibility which enabled them to take jobs that suited them best. Cosmopolitan by inclination, they were open to the newest trends in the world's capitals without feelings of inadequacy or a wish to imitate blindly things foreign. For them adulthood meant independence—a happy coincidence of new horizons.

When the first magazines and journals appeared on the scene in the early 1960s they were the first contributors and the natural audience. The positions they held either in commercial organizations or semi-governmental agencies or at the university allowed them time for such activity. Today, still in their early thirties, they form the largest intellectual base in their countries. It is perhaps significant that although they follow political developments almost none of them has opted for direct participation in day-to-day political affairs. If they are in government they are usually the administrators and almost never the ministers.

As a group they come closest to sharing the values and concerns of the international intellectual community. Although their orientation is Western, there are, in fact, many areas where intellectuals in Africa share with their Russian counterparts a tendency to take the 'official' line when discussing issues with outsiders to speak for the country rather than for themselves. But there are important differences. Unlike the Russian writer, the African intellectual is not directed from above; his work is not expected to fit within a pre-set formula of national reconstruction. Indeed, if he is a novelist, the chances are that he will be quite unknown in governmental circles. His proximity to power is more

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by accident than design—his career has run parallel to those that now form the Establishment. If he has watched from the sidelines, it has been not out of pique but because he often felt his own role to be just as important. There was also an element of generosity about the uninvolvement. He wished the politicians would get on with the job, even if their only qualification often was that they happened to be the only ones around at the right time. He sensed inadequacies among these men but hoped the momentum of new energies released by Independence would carry them through. It was the nature of their jobs and not their persons that was important. Most of all he did not feel excluded from the processes of power—if he really felt strongly about something, he could speak directly to whoever was in charge; or he could send a long memo which would be read. And if called upon, he was sure he could manage the affairs of government as competently as anyone else in the country.

While it is something of a minor tragedy that in the years after Independence the number of young intellectuals who were actually inducted into government remains negligible, there has been at the same time a more disturbing phenomenon in the rise of feelings of impotence and helplessness that as a group they now experience. Part of this powerlessness was inevitable as government moved from nationalistic idealism to entrenchment, and corresponds somewhat to the traditional sense of alienation that intellectuals in the West feel towards the power structure. At the more personal level, however, there has been a sense of betrayal—an abrupt deafness replacing a former willingness to continue an internal dialogue, a dialogue always conducted with discretion and outside public hearing. Persuasion, and not confrontation, has always been the East African intellectual's style of operation. A crisis called for behind-the-scene activity rather than outright stands on principle. Outside observers often found it difficult to be sure where intellectuals stood on any important issue, as a result. In the journals and magazines, polemical writing and discussions would reflect this roundabout and inhibited approach lacking the vitality and bite of direct thrust. And the price paid for this dialogue of discretion was heavy: such an excess of good manners meant that when government felt it had no use for them it could drop them with impunity.

WHEN this period of mutual disenchantment was complete (and in Uganda one could even give it an approximate date: in the later part of 1967) the relationship between government and the intellectuals begins to come out in the open and thus can be described more 'normally'. This is the time when, for example, the Ugandan poet Okot p'Bitek could write that 'The most striking and frightening characteristic of all African governments is this: that without an exception, all of them are dictatorships, and practise such ruthless discriminations as to make the South African *apartheid* look tame. . . . I leave it to

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political scientists to explore and analyse this strange situation whereby Independence means the replacement of foreign rule by native dictatorship'. In another article analysing the Uganda Government's newest constitutional proposals, an undisguised attempt at establishing a one-man dictatorship in a country with a long-standing tradition in law-making, the lawyer-intellectual Abu Mayanja wrote:

> The government proposals are . . . in many respects illiberal, authoritarian and dictatorial. They make serious inroads in the concept of the rule of law as accepted by most jurists and civilised nations. They provide for the concentration of excessive, autocratic and dangerous powers in the hands of one man. They are even repugnant to the concept of the African Personality in so far as they provide for a wholesale abolition of all traditional institutions which were evolved in this country over centuries in time, experimentation and adaptation. But they do not attempt to replace them by the more enlightened and generally accepted form of government as understood at any rate by the West. Instead of providing the country with a truly republican form of government, we have ended with a Machiavellian Prince.
>
> The justification for all this—in the words of President Obote and some of his colleagues—is that Uganda is backward and not yet ready for democratic government, that is to say, a government that bases itself on the concept of the governed . . . which observes and promotes the rule of law, and which promotes the free exchange of ideas and change in government by periodic elections. The only effect [of this kind of argument] is to give comfort, solace and encouragement to men like Ian Smith of Rhodesia, who would enjoy nothing better than to see the African in a permanent state of serfdom—on the ground that he is not yet able to play a full role in the affairs of the modern state.
>
> A dictatorship by black men has no objective advantages whatsoever over a dictatorship by white men: it may even be less efficient and less impartial.

It should be noted that this was not a case of a previous suspension of intelligence about government's activities changing suddenly to vociferous criticism; neither were these soured voices from a political wilderness. Instead, they were from the mainstream that on the whole supported the general drift of government policy towards modernization. It would also be simplistic to suggest that on some magical date the differences between the good and the bad became complete with both sides divided into neat camps and the appearance overnight of a pristine new conception of what good government was all about. The developments that followed in Uganda typify somewhat dramatically a pattern that is present in all African countries—the beginnings of governmental distrust for the intellectual in general, and his own predicament and weaknesses at a time of crisis.

WHAT happened in Uganda was that the absence of vocal groups outside the centres of decision-making encouraged the government

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to legalize what was already a matter of fact: one-man rule in the country through (military) force. Confident of the outcome, discussion on the constitutional proposals was invited and the press officially encouraged to feel free to present dissenting views. The overwhelmingly critical response that followed took the government by surprise, and a number of amendments were introduced somewhat restricting the President's powers before the constitution was made law. If the government's eyes were opened to the widespread public awareness of its every act it chose to ignore it, no doubt congratulating itself on the wisdom it had shown in extending its own term of office for another period without elections as part of the constitutional deal. The reaction of the intellectuals took it by surprise.

For one thing the intellectuals belonged to the Establishment—their independent opinions amounted to rebellion, made all the more suspicious by the fact that they were allied to no obvious opposition group. Then, unlike the 'common man's' responses that had appeared in the local newspapers with little or no readership outside the country, their remarks were made in magazines that had comparatively wide circulations abroad among an interested and influential audience, thus 'exposing' internal affairs to outsiders.

Mindful, however, that the country still had a reputation for an unfettered press the government's first move was laudable enough: to answer criticisms directly in the magazines concerned rather than take outright action against them. But for its spokesman it chose the head of the Secret Police. Some of his defences are worth quoting:

> *On detention without trial.* There has been an outcry against the Uganda Constitution on the grounds that it made enactment of a Detention Act possible and consequently did not protect the rights of the individual. . . . The Detention Act is now found in each and every independent country in Africa and . . . consequently one might deduce that there were circumstances peculiar to Africa which necessitated this.
>
> There is a mistaken belief that the state alone is the enemy of liberty. This is not so.
>
> Other circumstances necessitating the Act is the fact that until recently we have been ruled by a foreign power which has tended to identify the central government with its laws and trappings as belonging to alien people and therefore something which must be avoided and frustrated.
>
> *On non-elections.* We have, in this country, always been of the opinion that a member of parliament is not an ambassador for his constituency, and consequently does not have to refer back every question that arises in parliament to his constituency for direction.
>
> *On the new restricted clauses for removal of the President.* One point which the critics seem to have missed is that the President is not a houseboy and should not therefore be removed as a houseboy. If this is what the critics want, then I am afraid they are

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> rightly disappointed. No nation worthy of its name would allow its president to be removed from office by any Tom, Dick or Harry or by a handful of megalomaniacs or on a mere flimsy ground or excuse.

It takes courage to reply to the man responsible for a nation-wide network of informers. One college student, writing under a pseudonym, did—saying the constitution would have been better served without such a lame defence, a constitution which was introduced in the worst possible way by a government that had outlived its legal life, to a Parliament about 10 per cent of whose members were either in detention or otherwise politically incapacitated, and at a time when the largest and most important province of the country and its capital were (and still are) under a State of Emergency. Unlike the United States constitution, which had effective checks and balances against the abuse of presidential power, the Ugandan one was more concerned to give the President, it would seem, the power of life and death over the whole country. Any 'democratic' government which was about to commit itself to a policy that amounted to a reversal of its declared aims when elected would have first sought a fresh mandate from the electorate. The student signed himself Steve Lino.

For a while all was quiet. Somewhat shaken at the extent of public distrust, the government retired from further verbal forays, and began consolidating its newly increased powers. It had lost the intellectual round in the magazines and ministers who were sent to explain the new proposals to university students did not have much success. But the government took partial satisfaction that it had got its own way in its compliant legislature—but it knew it had been robbed of the real fight. The real political arena, it was beginning to remember, was outside the Parliament buildings.

The quiet continued—making even hardened cynics question their previous attitudes. Perhaps the government had begun to see the value of public criticism, perhaps it had been more liberal than they had credited it with being all along, perhaps its future acts would now be tempered by the knowledge that not all of the people could be fooled all of the time. Foreign news correspondents began sending stories out about Uganda's unique democratic handling of its new constitution. There was a considerable easing in the tense atmosphere that had built up. But, like elephants, authoritarian governments never forget. They would not forgive their intellectual critics.

When a government discovers that its vocabulary of invective, expletives and rhetoric no longer intimidates, it looks rather frantically for a new one. In Africa, more often than not, this is when a pseudo-Marxist tone begins to appear in policy statements, another 'Move to the Left' programme is announced. Expatriates and foreign businessmen wonder anxiously over breakfast whose firms might be nationalized this time. As it is possible to dismiss arguments of a persistent critic by

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questioning his qualifications as an 'African', so there is another unspoken rule by which any government can place itself above criticism by crying 'socialism' at the right time. In Uganda, the immediate reason for a move in this direction was an urgent need to replenish its political vocabulary and not because cabinet ministers discovered Marx or knew anything about him. But Marxists or not, there is an instinctive knowledge that an ideology of centralization provides respectability and cover to the realities of totalitarian rule.

For a while, the President's office became a haven for unemployable young men, a few of whose Soviet qualifications were not recognized either at the university or in state bodies in the country, who began producing a number of position papers on different subjects in the new vocabulary. One of the most significant of these, later to appear as an article in *Transition,* argued that the judiciary in Uganda needed to be ideologically committed to prevailing party doctrines of 'nation-building' rather than the rule of law. Just as the Youth Wingers, in the first years after Independence, were used by government as an extra-legal device of testing what it could get away with, so this new corps of politically ambitious men would form a kind of advance guard—providing new arguments when needed and putting out feelers (through their writings) for reactions to new measures planned. Without their knowing it, they were also a suicide squad: they would be dumped or disavowed whenever opinions attributed to them became too embarrassing for the government to be associated with, or if they outstripped their roles.

It would be misleading if all this suggests that governments in Africa operate from a deep prejudice or are simply anti-intellectual. On the contrary, African governments pay a disproportionate amount of attention to what intellectuals think or say—if they ever attempt justifying their actions it is usually to the intellectual group that their ingenuity is directed. In a very genuine way they wish to be thought well of by this educated élite. There is an involuntary respect accorded to them that has its roots in a reverence for learning that all underdeveloped countries share.

In Uganda, for example, the government concentrated its attention on the university—Makerere University College—one of Africa's most respected institutions. They wanted to gauge academic resistance to their future moves. The student body had already been infiltrated by a network of government informers. The President took to making appearances at the university, increasing in frequency when he quickly realized that he had a captive, not a hostile, audience. It was true that there were one or two individuals who stood out and would not be easily won over, and these exceptional individuals would remain a constant irritation and reminder of what intellectuals were really supposed to defend. But of the academic community as a whole, it could be said that if they did not come out in noisy support of everything the President said, they did not register icy disapproval either. They were too entranced by the proximity to absolute power to be capable of objective

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judgment. The President, who in the past had always been uncomfortable and not entirely secure in an academic atmosphere, began to relax as he realized that like other people academics too suffered from power-envy —a condition he was an acknowledged expert in exploiting. Neither was it lost on him that these people appeared to feel grateful for the attention he paid them. One of the banalities of the authoritarian situation is the way in which otherwise intelligent people become inordinately suffused with humility when a morsel of recognition is shown them from above. Satisfied that there seemed little likelihood of wholesale academic protest, despite the few stubbornly independent voices, he felt ready for his next moves.

Not long after, Okot p'Bitek was dismissed from the National Cultural Centre, of which he was the talented and energetic director. His attempts to seek other employment (he is an anthropologist) in the country were fruitless—the word had been sent around—and he left the country to take up a university appointment in a neighbouring country. Almost exactly a year after their writings on the constitution had been published, the lawyer and Member of Parliament Abu Mayanja, the student letter-writer, Steve Lino, and I were suddenly arrested and detained. All three had written in *Transition* magazine, of which I was editor. No charges need be brought against persons detained under the Emergency Regulations. Thus, after a vigorous and eventful existence of seven years, *Transition,* which against unbelievable odds had established itself as the most widely read and influential magazine of ideas on the continent suspended publication in October 1968. Its last issue had appeared a few days before my arrest. The government went to some lengths to emphasize that the magazine was not banned—only its editor detained—a distinction I found as difficult to understand at the time as after six months of solitary confinement when I was released. I decided I had to leave the country. It would have been impossible for *Transition* to begin from where it had left off, as if nothing had happened. And you did not have to be an editor to recognize that the end of an era had come in the relationship between government and intellectuals.

THE relationship that had ended could have been said to have been that of 'intellectual as collaborator'. From now on they would be out in the cold—or they would be straight government hacks; the period of ambiguous roles would no longer sustain either side. And it is worth noting that if for the first time this distinction was clearer it was because of precipitous government action—a naked removal of veils—rather than through an initiative in clarification on the part of intellectuals. The role of collaborator is ultimately passive.

It was not too long after this that the first voices of the newly committed began to appear in the party press, a typical one from a government economist began:

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It is an accepted fact that corrective or constructive criticism is required and needed and indeed, the President, as leader of the nation and government has made his views clear in this respect.

This being so, a most important question remains to be answered: namely, through which avenues should constructive criticism (postulating that intellectuals' criticism was constructive) be channelled?

This is the crucial question and one that brings the question of dishonesty into play. Certainly the intellectuals should know, better than common folk, that the press is not the right medium to air criticism of a public authority such as the government.

If honesty was what these intellectuals wanted to portray then they should have forwarded their criticisms to the Attorney-General who would table the documents to the Cabinet for consideration.

But the fact that the intellectuals chose the press clearly betrays their so-called intellectual honesty. It is therefore a foregone conclusion that the intellectuals wanted to glorify their paper and *ipso facto,* smear the public authorities in the eyes of society at large.

The references to 'intellectual honesty', a phrase that would become the theme of statement after statement of government ministers and other self-appointed spokesmen for the regime, was in reference to a comment made soon after our arrests by Professor Ali Mazrui, head of the political science department of the University of Makerere, who said it would appear that we had been arrested for being intellectually honest. (Mazrui's courageous and persistent stand, in spite of being singled out for attack by the entire government apparatus, deserves to be told fully elsewhere.) The head of the Secret Police criticized 'those who directly or indirectly advocate wholesale sabotage of the law . . . regardless of the label they attach to themselves, whether it be *mercenaries* or so-called intellectuals'.

WITH a handful of exceptions, the intellectual in Africa has failed both as an intellectual and as a man. He failed because early, almost unknowingly, he wedded himself to a political vision of himself, not necessarily as an activist of social change but as one who equated the political solution with the way to personal salvation. In the heady days of Independence this was perhaps an understandable, even desirable, narrowing of vision. When the paths of politician and thinker diverged, as they sooner or later had to, he chose not to notice it. Like the white expatriate who has servants for the first time, he could no longer operate without the frills that went with power whether real or, as increasingly was the case, purely imaginary. 'Don't quote me', he would invariably say at the end of an interview to the foreign journalist, adding with an unconscious twist of irony, 'I prefer remaining in the background'. Remaining in the background soon became more of a

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condition than a preference. Whether writer, poet or playwright the 'political' answer came quicker than the personal one. 'The average published writer in the first few years of the post-colonial era was the most celebrated skin of inconsequence ever to obscure the true flesh of the African dilemma', as Nigerian playwright Wole Soyinka put it. And it was true that all the writer had to do in those early years was to type out the title page before he was snowed under by contracts from British publishers, greedy to cash in on the new nationalism, 'hovering like benevolent vultures on the still foetus of the African muse' (Soyinka.) To the extent that a changed political situation made publishing and getting into print effortless, where previously there was only blank uninterest, creative writing became to many an act of political identification; the creative act became synonymous with political contribution—the writer seeing himself, too easily, as nation-builder.

Stripped of their public faces, intellectuals in Africa are beginning, for the first time, to have to look at themselves—and it isn't a pretty picture. They remain indebted to a few for this long-delayed reflection. 'The role of a writer depends to some extent on the state of health of his society. If a society is ill he has a responsibility to point it out; if it is healthy—and I do not know of one—his job is limited. The kind of commitment I speak of is not to governments or any kind of establishment', says the Biafran novelist Chinua Achebe, one of the finest writers on the continent today. 'He should be committed to causes. At this particular time the Nigeria-Biafra thing is not politics, it is a cause—a fundamental cause. What I was writing seemed suddenly irrelevant to me.' On his release after almost two years in a Nigerian prison in solitary confinement, on no specified charges, Wole Soyinka said, 'For reasons I cannot help, I am incapable of any peace of mind under certain social situations. There is nothing I can do about it. I can't change. If it were possible to blind, deafen and seal my skin so that I was incapable of seeing, hearing or feeling what was happening around me, I would do so. But until such an instrument of dehumanization is invented, I'm afraid I just have to continue the risk of getting locked up again. Before one is a writer, I suppose, one is a person'. The eloquence of others is silent—sometimes behind bars.

In the maze of slogans, justifications and rationalizations that conceal the authoritarian heart of most governments, the intellectual with a voice of his own strikes a note of strident professionalism in the drone of amateur yea sayers. He can be, and often is, easily singled out and punished out of all proportion to his 'offence'—the insecurity of dictators being that of unexceptional people who have an edge over an exceptional situation. But his example is not always lost on the silent populace and governments are beginning to realize this. In Kenya, President Kenyatta finds it necessary to warn various categories of deviants from authority: 'lawbreakers, university students and their lecturers who dabble in politics and prostitutes.' President Obote of

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Uganda observes that 'the government is not blind to the activities of intellectuals, feudalists, landlords and confusing agents'.

Thus the silent collaborator steps at last into the isolating spotlight—even if in the company of prostitutes and other confusing agents—he is beginning to find his feet and, one hopes eventually, his head.

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MAO AND THE CLASSLESS SOCIETY

Dennis M. Ray

THE phenomenon of social stratification is fundamental to understanding the dynamics of Chinese politics. Class conflict is one of the most ubiquitous phrases on the mainland of China. It takes on many forms and shapes; it can be very complex, or it can be rather simplistic. The theory of class conflict constitutes the essence of the Chinese communist world outlook. Though the Chinese communists have often departed from classic Marxist definitions of class, they have consistently regarded all conflict, whether internal or external to China, as being class in nature.

If the antagonisms deriving from social stratification are perceived by the Chinese communists as the driving force of history, the elimination of social classes is perceived as the destiny of man. Mao Tse-tung has, perhaps more than any other communist leader, sought to implement his vision of a classless society. Mao Tse-tung's vision of a classless society is perhaps to be found more in the experiences of the Yenan period of Chinese communist history than in the theories of Karl Marx.[1] In Yenan virtually everyone was a member of the army, endured persistent warfare, lived on the march and remained isolated from the bourgeois influences of the city. This life style gave rise to a camaraderie which is probably out of place, if not unattainable, in an industrializing society characterized by increasing differentiation, specialization and impersonal relationships.

With the passing of the Yenan period, the clearest demonstration of Mao's vision of a classless society came in 1958 with the people's commune experiment. While fragments of Mao's vision can be detected in numerous campaigns and policies, the people's communes attempted to eliminate the gaps between the rulers and the ruled, between mental and manual labour, between the city and the countryside and between the working class and the peasantry. The people's commune experiment attempted to recapture the spirit of comradeship, simplicity and lack of functional differentiation of the Yenan days. In organizational terms, this meant that the people's communes were an 'attempt to eliminate the middle and join the top and bottom directly; leaders and masses were to be in intimate relationship, bypassing the professionals who earlier stood between them'.[2] The cadres were supposed

[1] See Mark Gayn, 'Mao Tse-tung Reassessed', in Franz Schurmann and Orville Schell, eds., *The China Reader: Communist China* (New York, Vintage Books, 1967), pp. 92–108.

[2] Franz Schurmann, *Ideology and Organization in Communist China* (Berkeley, University of California Press, 1966), p. 71. Schurmann is referring to the Great Leap Forward which can be considered interchangeable with the commune movement.

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to work with the peasants in the fields, eat with the peasants in communal dining rooms, participate in common militia training, join with the peasants in political, cultural and athletic activities, and, on occasion, live together with the peasants in dormitories. Collectivism means far more than a way of organizing agriculture in Mao's vision of a classless society; it symbolizes the togetherness of the rulers and the ruled.

The commune experiment was also characterized by its hostility to rational, highly differentiated bureaucratic structures in which professionalism and expertise become general goals. This hostility is an integral part of Mao's vision of a classless society, for he feels that expertise left to its own devices will inevitably lead to revisionism and a new class of technocrats. By merging staff functions with line responsibilities, the Maoist vision of a classless society seeks not only to unify the rulers and the ruled but to cultivate the goals of human solidarity and sharpen the cadres' vision of a spiritually integrated *Gemeinschaft*. Consequently, Mao's vision of a classless society seeks not only the horizontal integration of society but also men who are both 'red' and 'expert', both highly conscious of the needs of the revolution and capable of performing a number of specialized economic or administrative functions.[3]

The people's communes attempted to eliminate the distinctions between 'red' and 'expert', between mental and manual labour. Every member of the commune was to become an all-around worker, a jack of all trades: farmer, scholar, activist, soldier, poet and worker. This attempt to mould the people of China into both 'reds' and 'experts' as a means of attaining a classless society is responsive to the age-old source of social stratification in China. Many observers have identified the bifurcation of the Chinese into two groups—the upper classes (the gentry and the officials) and the masses of peasants—as the direct result of the gap between mental and manual labour.[4] The policy of cadre participation in manual labour is designed to break this age-old pattern of social bifurcation.[5] The cadre labour movement represented a transformation in 'leadership style and working methods'

[3] On 'red' and 'expert' see Liu Shao-chi, 'The Significance of the October Revolution', 6 November 1957, as reprinted in *Communist China 1955–1959* (Cambridge, Harvard University Press, 1962). See also D. J. Waller, 'China: Red or Expert?' *The Political Quarterly*, vol. 38, April-June 1967, pp. 122–31 and Richard D. Baum, '"Red and Expert": The Politico-Ideological Foundations of China's Great Leap Forward', *Asian Survey*, no. 9, 1964, pp. 1048–57.

[4] See, for example, Conrad Brandt, Benjamin Schwartz and John King Fairbank, eds., *A Documentary History of Chinese Communism* (New York, Atheneum, 1966), p. 15, and Derk Bodde, *China's Cultural Traditions* (New York, Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1965), p. 49.

[5] Chalmers A. Johnson, 'Building a Communist Nation in China', in Robert A. Scalapino, ed., *The Communist Revolution in Asia* (Englewood Cliffs, N.J., Prentice-Hall, 1965), p. 64, points out that unpleasant or demeaning work for cadres tends to weaken their pretensions. Manure collection, for example, has occupied a prominent place in the discussions of cadre labour. See 'Teaching by Words and Deeds', *People's Daily*, 29 July 1963.

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of the old society which would prevent and overcome the 'erosive effects of bureaucracy'.[6]

Another important component of Mao's vision of a classless society is the elimination of those socio-economic factors which distinguish urban from rural areas. In the commune experiment this was symbolized by the attempt to bring industry to the villages in the form of backyard furnaces and communal industries. The Taching oilfield was another experiment in the same vein; it was characterized by a 'village-like city or a city-like village—a new social organization which helps eliminate the differences between industry and agriculture and between town and countryside'.[7] In many ways the Taching oilfield experiment was an advanced expression of the commune experiment. At this large new industrial complex in the north-west, no city was built; instead the workers lived in separate village settlements where their dependents engaged in farming and various social services. In the refineries, the People's Liberation Army's system of 'democracy' was applied and all decisions were made by committees which included managers, technicians, Party representatives and workers. Every member of the managerial staff participated in manual labour and half-work, half-study schools were opened.

The half-work, half-study schools in China were designed to reduce the distance between mental labour and manual labour. Mao has assumed that if the intellectual were isolated in his ivory tower, his knowledge could only be ignorance since it was not rooted in the class struggle. 'Any form of education that fails to attain knowledge through practice according to the prescribed formula of production and class struggle . . . is worse than no education at all'.[8] Thus, clustered around the commune and similar experiments are a series of programmes and assumptions which demonstrate Mao Tse-tung's desire to eliminate the distances between the rulers and the ruled, mental and manual labour and town and country. As these distances were reduced, China would move closer to a classless society and the 'buds of communism' would blossom forth in great splendour.[9]

MAO Tse-tung's optimism about the instinctive goodness and perfectability of man has led him to place great faith in the

[6] *People's Daily*, 21 July 1963, as cited by Chalmers A. Johnson, op. cit.

[7] *Peking Review*, 22 April 1966, p. 20. See also Hsu Chin-chiang, 'Hold High the Great Red Banner of the Thought of Mao Tse-tung: Further Deepen the Revolutionizing of Enterprises', *Chin-chi Yen-chiu* 'Economic Research', no. 4, 20 April 1966. This article describes the 'basic experience in revolutionizing the Taching Oilfield'.

[8] Hu Chang-tu, *Chinese Education Under Communism* (New York, Columbia University Press, 1962).

[9] The 'buds of communism' were, of course, most obvious in the short-lived 'free supply' system of the communes which attempted to implement the communist principle of 'to each according to his needs'. Perhaps more than any other aspect of the commune experiment, this programme reveals the egalitarian depth of Mao's vision of a classless society.

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capacity to reform or remould even class enemies. The subjective basis for class designation in terms of an individual's support of the regime's policies has not merely been a cynical device of social control, but it has expressed Mao's belief that man can transcend his social (class) origins. This has led the Chinese communists to 'treat the illness' so as to 'save the patient'. This has been a product of the communists' confidence in their tools of persuasion, thought reform and ideological remoulding, and their optimistic assumptions about the revolutionary perfectability of man. This revolutionary optimism was reinforced by necessity, for the regime has needed the skills and expertise of the intellectuals and capitalists of China. The attitude towards intellectuals, for example, has been most ambivalent. On one hand, the intellectuals are

> a revolutionary force second only to the workers and peasants. Our Party has in the past placed and will continue to place great hopes on the intellectuals. It has all along paid great attention to uniting, educating and remoulding the intellectuals and [has] given full play to their role in the people's revolutionary cause and socialist construction.[10]

On the other hand, the intellectuals are viewed with suspicion as purveyors of those bourgeois ideas which come from the old society and from abroad. The communists live in a kind of love-hate relationship with the intellectuals. While the regime's tolerance is bred of optimism and necessity, the intellectuals as a group have been a continuing source of uneasiness.

The regime's tolerance of China's capitalists has given rise to some rather remarkable deviations from the image of China as a land of proletarian self-sacrifice. A leading Western specialist in industrial management who visited China early in the Cultural Revolution reports how:

> It was indeed disconcerting for me in Shanghai in May 1966 to be picked up by a native Chinese capitalist in a new Jaguar, taken to his large factory for a day of discussions, and later to his sumptuous home where he still lives as a wealthy industrialist does in a capitalist nation.[11]

The Chinese industrialist had an investment of about 6·4 million dollars which was nationalized but which still brought him annual

[10] Wei Heng, 'CCP Shansi Provincial Committee Calls Forum of Intellectuals to Sum Up Experience and Arouse the Activism of the Broad Masses of the Intellectuals', *Enlightenment Daily*, 20 December 1961.

[11] Barry M. Richman, 'Capitalists and Managers in Communist China', *Harvard Business Review*, January-February 1967, p. 57. Professor Richman, a Canadian citizen, is Chairman of the International Business Program and Chairman of the Management Theory and Industrial Relations Divisions at the Graduate School of Business Administration, University of California at Los Angeles. He was able to visit a wide variety of industrial enterprises in 11 major cities in China in May and June of 1966. Professor Richman's article offers a fascinating view of China on the eve of the Cultural Revolution.

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interest payments of about 32,000 dollars per year, a huge fortune in a country having a per capita income less than three per cent of that of the United States.[12] Another source reports that one textile tycoon receives about 400,000 dollars per year and another capitalist, a match magnate, receives about 320,000 dollars.[13] The continued remuneration of China's leading capitalists on such a scale certainly suggests a slight gap between the image of a revolution by the proletariat and the reality of China's incomplete revolution.

UNTIL 1957 the regime aimed to achieve revolutionary change with a minimum of disruptive side-effects, so that a relatively high degree of integration and unity could be maintained.[14] This was a period of success, moderation and optimism. A remarkable rate of economic development had been enjoyed during the first Five-Year Plan; industry had been nationalized and collectivization of agriculture had been completed. The regime's policies towards the bourgeoisie seemed to suggest harmony instead of 'antagonistic class struggle'. The great political symbol of this mood of optimism was the policy of letting 'a hundred flowers bloom, let a hundred schools of thought contend'.[15] Mao Tse-tung put his faith in the revolutionary perfectability of China's bourgeoisie on the line when he wrote:

> Never has our country been as united as it is today. . . . Led by the working class and the Communist Party, and united as one, our six hundred million people are engaged in the great work of building socialism.[16]

This unity had been realized through the elimination of exploiting economic classes. The contradictions which continued to exist in Chinese society were consequently non-antagonistic contradictions (that is non-violent differences among the people) as opposed to antagonistic contradictions (violent conflict between the people and the enemies of the people).

The criticisms levelled at Mao Tse-tung and the communist regime by the intellectuals during the Hundred Flowers period were profoundly

12 Ibid., p. 59.

13 Reported by C. Lynch, *China: One Fourth of the World* (Toronto, McLelland and Stewart, 1966), pp. 75–78. See also Chou En-lai's statement on the extension of the 'fixed rate of interest payments' in 'Press Communiqué of the Third Session of the Second National People's Congress of China', NCNA, 16 April 1962.

14 Tang Tsou, 'Revolution, Reintegration, and Crisis in Communist China', in Ping-ti Ho and Tang Tsou, eds., *China in Crisis*, vol. 1, *China's Heritage and the Communist Political System* (Chicago, University of Chicago Press, 1968), p. 305.

15 Lu Ting-yi, *Let Flowers of Many Kinds Blossom, Diverse Schools of Thought Contend* (Peking, Foreign Languages Press, 1957). See also Chou En-lai, *Report on the Question of Intellectuals* (Peking, Foreign Languages Press, 1956), p. 5.

16 Mao Tse-tung, *On the Correct Handling of Contradictions* (revised version): (Peking, Foreign Languages Press, 1960), p. 7.

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unsettling.[17] In the aftermath of the experiment, the easy optimism of the early years evaporated.

> China's leaders now recognized that the development of 'socialist consciousness' would at best be a long and arduous process, even after basic changes had taken place in the nation's institutions, [and] began thinking in terms of prolonged, virtually indefinite, revolutionary struggle to obtain acceptance of the regime's values.[18]

Thus, with the anti-rightist campaign of 1957, there was a major hardening of the regime's class line. The most immediate manifestation of this change in the regime's class line was the people's commune experiment which attempted precipitously to implement Mao Tse-tung's vision of a classless society.

The immensity of the shift in the class line which had occurred in 1958 was perhaps not immediately obvious to Western observers. First, Mao's vision of a classless society was somewhat obscured by some of the more dramatic aspects of the commune experiment (the backyard furnaces, the 'everyone a soldier' movement, economic claims, etc.). Second, most of the concrete programmes which gave substance to that vision were soon modified or abandoned by the regime. To put the argument in a slightly different way, the class aspects of the commune experiment were submerged in the uniqueness of the economic strategy of the Great Leap Forward, while the crisis which followed the experiment forced Mao to abandon his hardened class line. For all practical purposes the regime returned in 1960 to the relaxed and moderate class policy of the mid-1950s and the spirit—if not substance—of the Hundred Flowers period.

The economic crisis also forced the regime to introduce a series of adjustments in economic and social policy which can only be considered 'revisionist'.[19] There was a reintroduction of private property, free trade fairs and self-employment in rural China.[20] Moreover, the Chinese Communist Party undertook a concerted effort to make a limited range of consumer goods widely available in rural China.[21] Finally, the whole atmosphere of the early 1960s was per-

[17] Herein lies the source of the regime's ambivalence about class enemies. On one hand, they nearly welcomed the existence of class enemies as a means of keeping the revolution vigorous and dynamic; on the other hand, the existence of class enemies represented a genuine challenge to Mao's revolution, not to say an affront to his ego.

[18] A. Doak Barnett, ed., *Chinese Communist Politics in Action* (Seattle, University of Washington Press, 1969), p. xxi, and the selection by James R. Townsend, 'Revolutionizing Chinese Youth: A Study of *Chung-kuo Ch'ing-nien*', pp. 447–76.

[19] Franz Schurmann, 'China's "New Economic Policy"—Transition or Beginning', in Choh-ming hi, ed., *Industrial Development in Communist China* (New York, Frederick A. Praeger, 1964).

[20] See Kuan Ta-tung, 'Concerning Questions of Rural Domestic Subsidiary Production, Private Plots, and Trade at Rural Fairs', *Impartial Daily*, 5 July 1961.

[21] The increased flow of consumer goods to the countryside in 1960 was probably to offer the peasants 'luxuries' in place of dwindling supplies of grain and other foodstuffs. This was suggested by NCNA (1 November 1961). Another reason for the production of consumer goods during the crisis was that they provided a

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meated by emphasis on normalized personal relationships, regularized public relationships and a general relaxation of the demand for ideological and political purity.[22] While these policies represented a brilliant series of adjustments to the problems created by the leap forward and commune experiment, they raised the spectre of a return to capitalism and the death of the revolution.

One of the most interesting and revealing glimpses at the desire for the 'good life' on the mainland of China is provided by a Yugoslav correspondent who spent a total of seven years in residence on the mainland, his last tour covering the period from 1963 to 1967.[23] According to this correspondent, in the period following the recovery from the economic crisis of 1960–62, a movement for material goods began to play a very important role in the lives of most of the Chinese population, particularly the 'middle strata' (of intellectuals, highly skilled specialists, prominent artists and the leading cadres of all ranks) in the urban areas of China. Even the

> poor rickshaw drivers of Peking and the porters from the railroad station, who had also introduced into their standard of living the habit of dropping into a pub and having, along with a warm meal, a glass of cheap, potent vodka.[24]

While the 'middle strata' enjoyed a higher style of life, the basic desire for material comfort had been aroused among virtually all groups in urban China. This is suggested by an article in the *Peking Review*:

> In China's cities the bicycle is ubiquitous. In some of the bigger urban centres like Peking and Shanghai they run into the hundreds of thousands, dominating the rush-hour traffic. Bicycles are growing in popularity among commune members who want, like everyone else in China, to 'get there quicker' too. With the rising purchasing power of the [commune] members, the demand for bicycles *seems to be insatiable*.[25]

Admissions of insatiable demand for consumer goods seems far removed from pronouncements about class conflict.

THE intensity of the desire for material goods can be partially seen by the shift in the kinds of consumer goods sought and produced

politically feasible means of combating inflation (potentially threatened by the excess of purchasing power over the supply of goods) without resorting to stringent measures which would have worked at cross purposes with the climate of political moderation. In other words, the production of cheap consumer goods was a means by which the Party could mop up the extra money which was being put into the hands of the peasantry under a policy of reduced rates of capital accumulation.

22 See my doctoral dissertation, *The People's Communes in Communist China* (Graduate School of International Studies, University of Denver, 1967).

23 Branko Bogunovic, 'Red China's "Middle Class" Clinging to Its Better Life', *Denver Post*, 26 November 1967.

24 Ibid.

25 Tang Kao-Tsai, 'Makers of "Forever" Bicycles', *Peking Review*, 2 February 1962, pp. 15–16. Emphasis added.

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in China from the hard years of 1960–1961 to the good years of the mid-1960s. In 1960 the symbols of material wealth were a wristwatch, a fountain pen, possibly a better suit and a bicycle. By the mid-1960s, the desire and availability of consumer goods had been broadened considerably. The transistor radio, tape recorders and even television sets became important durable consumer goods for the 'middle strata'. Near the apex of conspicuous consumption was a small motorcycle occasionally seen on city streets. While these consumer goods were possessed by only a few, the Yugoslav correspondent felt that they were widely coveted by others in the social system. Indeed, he suggests that these desires represented 'new social and ethical norms'.[26]

> In the years of 'adjustments', 1963–1966, the intimate and true wishes of millions of people leaned toward attractive clothes, tasteful footwear, more comfortable furniture and then on and on, according to individual possibilities and inclinations.[27]

The emerging social and ethical norms of consumerism stood in stark contrast to the rhetoric of self-sacrifice and class struggle.

Rather than resisting these trends, the communist Establishment became a vanguard of revisionism. As a Cantonese Maoist put it:

> It is not right for a Party member and a cadre to compare his material life with that of any other. Party members should compare themselves with others as to revolutionary will, revolutionary zeal, achievements in work and contributions to the Party and the people. There should not be any comparison of material life. . . . Our Party members and cadres are examples for the broad masses of the people. To be a communist, one must engage in selfless labour and work in the spirit of not caring for personal remuneration. . . . The fact that some comrades have given in to the 'theory of suffering disadvantages' is probably because they compared their own material life with that of two kinds of people. One kind of people are 'clever boys' in our ranks [who] are expert at pursuing material comforts; they satisfy their private ends at the expense of the public and of others, the end justifying the means. The other kind of people are people with serious spontaneous capitalist tendencies among the peasant masses.[28]

The chief instrument of Mao's revolutionary visions, the Party apparatus, began to succumb to the same desires for material comfort that characterized the Chinese peasants and workers.[29]

Using Red Guard newspapers, the *China News Analysis* provides

[26] Branko Bogunovic, op. cit.

[27] Ibid.

[28] Nan Kan, 'Compare Yourself with Yu Hsi-chu', *Southern Daily*, 4 May 1963.

[29] See Kan Feng, 'In Discussing "Too Many Pleasures Stifle Ambition"', *China Youth*, 16 November 1960, for an interesting and early statement of this problem. According to the *Bulletin of Activities*, no. 6, 27 January 1961, many cadres enjoyed special privileges and according to the *Bulletin*, no. 7, 1 February 1961, their wives sometimes behaved in a pompous and extravagant way.

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several examples of the 'good life' among high Party officials.[30] These included examples of luxurious dining, misuse of public funds, and sex. Red Guard newspapers, for example, accused Yu Chiu-li, a lieutenant-general, former political commissar in rear supply, and Minister of the Petroleum Industry since 1958, of being a 'dirty fellow'.[31] He 'used to eat and drink, play cards and abuse women. . . . Yu had a family of seven members. He lived in a most elaborately built and decorated house of 21 rooms. His wife [who] had a high position in the ministry, drew the salary but never went to work'.[32] Tao Chu, former associate of Lin Piao, and the man whose meteoric rise and fall during the Cultural Revolution is of vital importance, was accused of having a special film show every week on the fourth floor of the Kwangtung Provincial Committee building.

> Some obscene US films were imported from Hong Kong. Tao Chu and his wife took the most expensive medicinal plant, ginseng, and spent 10,000 yuan a year on it. Tao Chu maintained luxurious guest houses at the expense of the state treasury. He had a floating club and was on the point of building a crystal palace when the Cultural Revolution began. . . . [He] liked to dance and he spent 4 million yuan on the construction of a dance theatre.[33]

Teng Hsiao-ping, who reportedly liked to play cards, was accused of building a club which was provided with every comfort for higher cadres in Peking.[34]

If the events of the early 1960s suggested that the emerging social and ethical norms of the peasants and workers (i.e. bourgeois materialism) stood in stark contrast to the revolutionary aspiration of Mao Tse-tung, the behaviour of Party cadres and Party leaders must have led him to King Lear's question: Is man no more than this?

Mao Tse-tung probably is not opposed to the Chinese peasant or the communist cadre enjoying material comforts *per se*. What he probably is opposed to is that such conditions should emerge spontaneously and under non-Maoist auspices. The programmes and policies of the early 1960s were designed as *ad hoc* and temporary responses to a severe economic and political crisis. By the mid-1960s these programmes were being integrated into the fabric of Chinese communist society.[35] As peasants, workers and Party members res-

[30] 'Curious Stories: La Dolce Vita', *China News Analysis*, no. 661, 26 May 1967. Father LaDany cautions his readers that 'one cannot attempt to check, or even guess, how reliable the information given by Red Guard newspapers is. Indeed, one cannot be sure of the authenticity of all the Red Guard publications which are sold on the Mainland and in Hong Kong.' It is well to keep this qualification in mind.

[31] Red Guards Representative Congress, Peking Teachers Training University, Ching Kang Shan Commune made the accusations against Comrade Yu. These accusations are reprinted in *Ming Pao* (Hong Kong), 1 May 1967.

[32] Ibid.

[33] Accusations of Red Rebels, 15 January 1967.

[34] As reported in *China News Analysis*, no. 661, p. 7.

[35] Michel Oksenberg, 'Communist China: A Quiet Crisis in Revolution', *Asian Survey*, no. 1, 1966.

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ponded to the appeals of the 'good life', they probably developed a vested interest in maintaining and extending their material comforts.[36] The revolutionary dynamism of China would be squandered on the momentary gratification of bourgeois selfishness.[37] This emergent materialism promised to corrupt and ultimately destroy the possibility of creating a Maoist utopia wherein material well-being could flourish in a classless society. Moreover, and in less ideological fashion, the consumption of the economic pie before it was fully baked might bring temporary satisfaction and eventual starvation. The practice of self-denial is not an oddity of capitalist economies during the nineteenth century or communist economies in the twentieth; it is a necessity of early industrialization. As industrialization proceeds, but *only* as industrialism proceeds, the psychology of the population must shift from a Puritan type of self-denial to a bourgeois type of insatiability.

THE desire for material comfort was just one of many symptoms that the Chinese Communist Party had lost its revolutionary dynamism and its self-purgative function. The relevance of Mao Tse-tung's ideological premises and the Party's civil war experience were also called into question by the post-revolutionary growth of bureaucratism in China.[38] This development assumed proportions beyond a mere reconstituting of traditional bureaucratic practices and the traditional bureaucratic outlook. As Chou En-lai lamented in his address before the National People's Congress in 1964:

[36] In commenting on a study by Joyce K. Kallgren, 'Social Welfare and China's Industrial Workers', in A. Doak Barnett, ed., *Chinese Communist Politics in Action*, Professor Barnett writes that China's urban workers appear to have developed—at least to a certain extent, and in contrast with other groups who are less well off—both a feeling of separate identity and a *kind of conservatism*, a sense of having some tangible stake in a new status quo under which they are comparatively well treated (p. xxiii—emphasis added). Professor Kallgren is more cautious, but does observe that 'In light of the welfare tasks set by the CCP, the services involved, and the demands for participation placed upon both trade union cadres and workers, *it may well be* that a kind of conservatism and perhaps a sense of separateness have developed among industrial workers and union cadres in China' (p. 572—emphasis added). According to the *Bulletin of Activities* (no. 11, 2 March 1961) the behaviour of some Rear Service Department Bureau chiefs was conservative. 'The ideological substance and common characteristics of this type of personnel are characterized by the lack of the spirit of uninterrupted revolution. They have neither the desire to change the status quo, nor the courage to create a new life. The effect of their work is the continuation of the same old practice year after year without the creation of anything new or the introduction of fresh energy, just like a pool of dead water without waves or billows.' See *The Politics of the Chinese Red Army: A Translation of the Bulletin of the People's Liberation Army* (Stanford, The Hoover Institution, 1966), p. 303.

[37] Professor Barnett writes: 'Whereas the presently dominant Maoist leaders insist upon continued revolutionary upheaval and self-sacrificing dedication to long-range goals, certain groups of industrial workers may now be more preoccupied with the desire to preserve the gains and advantages they have already achieved' (ibid., p. xxiii).

[38] A. Doak Barnett, *China After Mao* (Princeton, New York, Princeton University Press, 1967).

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> . . . for quite a long period, the landlord classes, the bourgeoisie and other exploiting classes which have been overthrown will remain strong and powerful in our socialist society; we must under no circumstances take them lightly. At the same time, *new bourgeois elements, new bourgeois intellectuals* and other *new exploiters* will be ceaselessly generated in society, in Party and government organizations, in economic organizations and in cultural and educational departments.[39]

Until 1962 the Chinese communist policies of class conflict had been directed at the remnants of China's pre-communist class structure. After 1962 the Maoist oligarchy had to concern itself not only with the continuing influence of the 'bourgeois ideas' of the old China, but had to confront the reality of new patterns of social stratification which had been created by the communist regime. Despite the efforts of Mao Tse-tung, the Party and the government cadres have increasingly become an élite set apart from the population. This phenomenon was described by Robert Michels in his analysis of political parties.[40] According to Michels, as an organization increases in size the struggle for high principles becomes increasingly impossible. An organization is rarely identifiable with the totality of its members, and still less with the class to which these members belong. The Party is created as a means to secure an end, but having become an end in itself, endowed with aims and interests of its own, it undergoes detachment from those whom in theory it is designed to serve.

> In a Party, it is far from obvious that the interests of the masses which have combined to form the Party will coincide with the interests of the bureaucracy in which the Party becomes personified.

Michels continues:

> By a universally applicable social law, every organ of collectivity, brought into existence through the need for the division of labour, creates for itself, as soon as it becomes consolidated, interests peculiar to itself.[41]

[39] As reprinted in *Peking Review*, 1 January 1965, p. 12 (emphasis added). Also quoted by William Malden, 'A New Class Structure Emerging in China', *China Quarterly*, no. 22, April–June 1965, p. 84. The emergence of a new rural class structure replete with the resurgence of vestigial 'rural capitalism' and special privilege has been recognized by several observers but not as carefully researched as the emergence of social stratification within the urban bureaucracies (see below). Among the works which mention the new rural class system, see Franz Schurmann, *Ideology and Organization*, pp. 497–500; Jack Gray, 'The Economics of Maoism', *Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists*, no. 2, 1969; and Thomas P. Bernstein, 'Cadre and Peasant Behavior Under Conditions of Insecurity and Deprivation: The Grain Supply Crisis of the Spring of 1955', in A. Doak Barnett, ed., *Chinese Communist Politics in Action*, pp. 365–99, especially p. 384. Another line of research as yet uncultivated is the rise of a new class of semi-autonomous scientists and technocrats.

[40] Robert Michels, selections from his *Political Parties* reprinted in Roy C. Macridis and Bernard E. Brown, eds., *Comparative Politics: Notes and Readings* (Homewood, Illinois, The Dorsey Press, 1964), pp. 221–29.

[41] Ibid.

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Even when the discontent of the masses culminates in a successful attempt to deprive the bourgeoisie of power, this is effected only in appearance; always and necessarily there springs from the masses a new organized minority which raises itself to the rank of a governing class. That which *is* oppresses that which *ought to be*, even in the most revolutionary of movements.

Mao Tse-tung had developed over the years a vast array of imaginative and thorough techniques for avoiding the pitfalls of the 'iron law of oligarchy'.[42] While the regime enjoyed a long period of success with these techniques, by the mid-1960s the Chinese might well have inscribed a proverb: a cadre selected is a revolutionary lost.[43] This was, however, not merely a problem rooted in the human weaknesses of a small percentage of the Chinese Communist Party. The very existence of the Party as a ruling oligarchy inherently perverted its revolutionary ideals.

Once the Chinese communists applied their definitions of class status, a clear demarcation of individuals and social groups was inevitable.[44] Once they introduced highly differentiated wage scales, it became only a matter of time before patterns of social consciousness began to express themselves in Chinese society.[45] There also emerged a clearly demarcated civil service grading system in which people of different status were entitled to different housing accommodation, transportation and office furniture.[46] One of the most significant privileges of China's new ruling class was the privilege to send their sons and daughters to special schools. For example, wall posters during the Cultural Revolution attacked the '1 August School' for the children of high-ranking cadres in Peking. The facilities of this school were described as lavish and the life of the students as corrupt. The students wore fine woollens, ate luxury foods and enjoyed monthly allowances in excess of the earnings of the average peasant farmer.[47] China, like

[42] See John Wilson Lewis, *Leadership in Communist China* (Ithaca, N.Y., Cornell University Press, 1963).

[43] Adapted from the French proverb: 'A man elected is a man lost.'

[44] See John Wilson Lewis, 'Political Aspects of Mobility in China's Urban Development', *American Political Science Review*, no. 4, December 1966, pp. 906–907.

[45] See Victor C. Funnel, 'Social Stratification', *Problems of Communism*, March–April 1968, pp. 14–20, on wage scales.

[46] A. Doak Barnett, 'Social Stratification and Aspects of Personnel Management in the Chinese Communist Bureaucracy', *China Quarterly*, no. 28, October-December 1966, p. 17. Professor Barnett remarks that this behaviour is 'strangely suggestive of New York corporation executives rather than revolutionary and ostensibly egalitarian leaders'.

[47] *High School Cultural Revolution Bulletin*, 10 February 1967, quoted by C. K. Yang, 'Cultural Revolution and Revisionism', in Tang Tsou, ed., op. cit., p. 522. Moreover, the practice of admitting students to institutions of higher learning through competitive examinations not only gave implicit advantages to the urban bred sons and daughters of the bourgeoisie and the communist establishment, it compromised the revolution by placing 'school marks in command' and encouraging the 'students to become bourgeois specialists by the bourgeois method of "making one's own way" and achieving individual fame, wealth, and position' (*Peking Review*, 24 June 1966, p. 16).

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the Soviet Union before it, had become, in the words of Barrington Moore Jr, ' a system of organized social inequality '.[48]

It is not surprising that ' the majority of the cadres in this highly stratified system were notably rank-conscious '.[49]

> One of the most notable aspects of all these formal ranking systems was the great and real gap between those at the top and those at the bottom. In short, the relative egalitarianism of earlier years had been replaced by a system in which rating indicated very great differentials in power, prestige, salaries and other prerogatives—and also involved great psychological distance between those at the top and those at the bottom.[50]

THE growing social distance between various levels within the ruling oligarchy was projected on to the polity in general. The gap between cadres and non-cadres, between the élite and ordinary people, the rulers and the ruled, became very real indeed. In 1956, for example, Teng Hsiao-ping, then a member of the Standing Committee of the Politbureau, warned that some Party members had become so arrogant and self-complacent that it appeared ' as though the mere fact of being Party members makes them stand head and shoulders above non-Party people '.[51] Teng felt it necessary to remind cadres that communists should never regard the masses as their instruments, but rather they should regard themselves as instruments of the people.[52] In 1958 the people's commune movement was launched with a great flourish of egalitarianism, but it was not long before the regime realized that the communal cadres enjoyed a privileged position above the peasantry.[53] Rather than tearing down the social barriers between the ruled and the rulers, the communal cadres tended to become a bureaucratic stratum of a new class. As one *People's Daily* article put it:

> [The cadres] no longer shared their lot with the masses; they sought leisure, worked little, ate much, spent a lot, received high rations, and became something special in contrast to the commune members.[54]

Nor were the cadres able to avoid the temptation of becoming ' big shots '. Another article in the *People's Daily* confessed that:

> Some brigade and production team cadres, and even some older Party members and cadres, say to themselves, ' we are now cadres.

[48] Barrington Moore Jr., *Soviet Politics—The Dilemma of Power: The Role of Ideas in Social Change* (Cambridge, Harvard University Press, 1950), p. 406.

[49] A. Doak Barnett, ' Social Stratification . . .', op. cit., p. 8.

[50] Ibid., p. 14.

[51] Teng Hsiao-ping, *Report on the Revision of the Constitution of the Communist Party of China* (Peking, Foreign Languages Press, 1956), p. 56.

[52] Ibid., p. 59.

[53] This is the most notable in the operation of the public mess halls during 1958.

[54] *People's Daily*, 24 March 1961, as quoted in H. F. Schurmann, ' Peking's Recognition of Crisis ', *Problems of Communism*, September-October 1961, p. 12.

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> If we ever again take part in physical labour together with commune members, it will not be in keeping with our status.' [55]

The widespread incidence of commandism and the feeling of superiority on the part of communal cadres revealed the all-too-human element within the Chinese Communist Party.

These incidents were not limited to the rural Party cadres, but apparently persisted as a sub-current in Chinese communist rule. An important regional newspaper obliquely set forth the dimensions of this problem:

> Every Communist Party member is a servant of the people and . . . he must at all times mingle with the masses as a single entity, and always remember that he himself is an ordinary labourer on an equal footing with the masses. As such he should not claim any special privileges. Nor should he show the least sense of superiority or pride in his special position. . . .[56]

The journal of the Central Committee, *Red Flag*, was more direct when it admitted that:

> . . . Communist Party members . . . must . . . get rid of the influence of the status and position concept of the exploiting classes. . . . We must promote . . . [the] fine Party tradition and avoid alienating ourselves from realities, from the basic level, that is, from the masses.[57]

While the evidence is fragmentary and circumstantial, there seems good reason to conclude that China had not escaped the dynamics of the iron law of oligarchy.

The impact of China's new class system not only compromised the integrity of the Chinese revolution, it also had a detrimental impact on social mobility in Communist China. The longevity of Chinese communist leaders and the demographic patterns of China meant that China's iron law of oligarchy worked to close several avenues of social mobility. While youthful officials had reached middle level positions rapidly during the mid-1950s, opportunities for promotion became more limited after that period as the growth of organizations levelled off and special campaigns checked continued bureaucratic expansion.[58] China's generation of revolutionary communists has been slow to pass from the scene due to good health and the absence of violent Stalinist purges. In many respects China's clogged channels of promotion

[55] 'Teaching by Words and Deeds', *People's Daily*, 29 July 1963.

[56] Editorial, 'The Character of a Communist—Learn From Comrade Yu Hsi-chu', *Southern Daily*, 13 March 1963. See also Kuo Yao-ting and Pao Tung, 'Firmly Uphold System of Participation in Physical Labour by Cadres', *People's Daily*, 27 June 1963. Joyce K. Kallgren in her article 'Social Welfare and China's Industrial Workers', in A. Doak Barnett, ed., *Chinese Communist Politics in Action*, p. 569, points out that refugees report that welfare programmes were occasionally diverted from their intended users by officials of the army and Party.

[57] Chen Chan-chao, 'A Very Good Revolutionary Tradition', *Red Flag*, 1 April 1963.

[58] Ezra F. Vogel, 'From Revolutionary to Semi-Bureaucrat: The "Regularisation" of Cadres', *China Quarterly*, no. 29, January–March 1967, p. 57.

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resemble the problem of US military services during the 1950s wherein a generation of young career officers emerged out of the Second World War and until the early 1960s filled most of the allotted positions in the middle strata of the officer corps. Only when these people began to retire in the 1960s was the problem alleviated. Chinese communist leaders and cadres did not retire; their tenacity for holding on to power has rivalled that of a J. Edgar Hoover or a General Hershey.

While the top and middle levels of the Chinese communist establishment were ossified in the hands of the old revolutionaries, youth began to knock more incessantly at the doors of power. Michel Oksenberg has perhaps given the most perceptive analysis of the political implications of China's demographic patterns. Demographic projections, based on the 1953 census, suggest that the number of youth in the five to 24 years age bracket has jumped from approximately 225 million in 1953 to 350 million in 1968.[59] It has been estimated that approximately eight to 10 million young Chinese will enter the job market annually although the industrial sector of the economy can generate only 1·5 to two million new jobs annually.[60] China thus faces a problem not unusual in countries where modern education outpaces economic expansion: the under-utilization of youthful talent with a subsequent disenchantment among the young.

China's demographic patterns undoubtedly exacerbated the limited opportunity for upward bureaucratic mobility in China. The problem became so acute by 1963 that members and officials of the Young Communist League resisted leaving that organization at the terminal age of 28, probably recognizing that their opportunities were limited outside that organization.[61] In this context, the widespread purges of the Cultural Revolution may have reopened channels of social mobility.[62] If not, a generation of educated Chinese will know a cynicism bred of bitter experience and the divergence between ideological rhetoric and political reality, for the facts of oligarchy are most apparent to those who want to be in and are excluded.

Chinese political behaviour and China's emergent patterns of social stratification did not always conform to idealized functioning of class conflict as conceived by Mao Tse-tung. In many ways China became more revisionist than the Soviet Union, the country so religiously attacked during the 1960s. Indeed, the ideological attacks on the Soviet Union might have been meant to obscure China's own revisionist

[59] The United Nations, Department of Economic and Social Affairs, *Future Population Estimates by Sex and Age*, Report 4: *The Population of Asia and the Far East*, 1950–1980 (Population Studies, no. 31, St/SOA/Series A/31, New York, 1959), as cited by Michel Oksenberg in Ping-ti Ho and Tang Tsou, eds., op. cit., p. 497.

[60] Shigeru Ishikawa, 'The Chinese Economy: A General Framework for Long-term Projection', *China Mainland Review*, September 1966, p. 75, as cited by Oksenberg.

[61] 'How Should Over-age YCL Members Look at the Question of Withdrawing from the League', *China Youth Daily*, 2 February 1963.

[62] Michel Oksenberg, op. cit., p. 495.

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policies. However, the ultimate effect of China's moralistic attack upon Soviet revisionism might have been to juxtapose vividly in the mind of Mao Tse-tung the widening gap between ideological pronouncement and actual practice on the mainland of China.[63] There is little doubt that revisionism had become a major threat to the achievement of the regime's original revolutionary goals. Not all within the Chinese communist oligarchy, however, looked upon revisionism and China's new class structure with the same horror with which these phenomena were received by Mao. Indeed, by 1962 the ruling oligarchy of China had developed a series of methods to insulate itself from the prophetic demands of the 'faith' and the charismatic authority of Mao Tse-tung.[64]

THE Cultural Revolution matched the charismatic power of Mao Tse-tung against the power of a ruling oligarchy. Mao Tse-tung sought to move practice closer to ideology while the Party apparatus seemed content to utilize the ideology of Chinese communism and class struggle as a mask for social reality. The apparatus could live with the iron law of oligarchy so long as it constituted the oligarchy; Mao could not, for his symbolic immortality could only be secured by denying the iron law of oligarchy and seeking to maintain the integrity of China's revolution through continuous class struggle.

Mao Tse-tung has been most sensitive to the capacity of a revolution to be perverted and the possibility that his vision of a classless society might be perverted. However, he has not readily grasped that the source of these perversions might be inherent in his vision. Certainly the potential of perverting Mao's vision of a classless society is inherent in his dedication to Leninist theories of democratic centralism. Indeed, it might be said that the readiness with which the Party apparatus became a new ruling oligarchy not only perverted Mao's vision of a classless society but was, in a sense, its lowest expression. This was due to the fact that Mao has attempted to

[63] There may be a very great similarity in the political extremism of the Cultural Revolution emerging out of the gap between 'image' (manifest ideological dogma) and 'reality' (concrete social conditions) and political extremism on the 'right' and 'left' in American politics. In China, this extremism probably derived, in part, from the suffering endured at the hands of ill-trained and corrupt cadres which made the mass line leadership techniques appear to be little more than a cruel hoax. See John Wilson Lewis, 'China's Secret Military Papers: "Continuities" and "Revelations"', *China Quarterly*, no. 18, April-June 1964, p. 74. In the United States political extremism, in part, stems from the perpetuation of obsolete models of social reality. The New Left responds to the contrast between democratic rhetoric and the practice of American society and its constituent institutions; the 'right' responds to the contrast between the rhetoric of 'God, Country and Capitalism' and the practice of urban, cosmopolitan and corporate America.

[64] See, for example, the 'Summing-Up Report Made by the Political Department of the General Rear Services Department on the Rectification of Party Committees of the Regimental Level and Above', *Bulletin of Activities*, no. 11, 2 March 1961, p. 305.

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synthesize two contradictory concepts: the oligarchical principles of democratic centralism and the ideal of a classless, egalitarian society.[65]

Mao Tse-tung's synthesis of democratic centralism and egalitarianism has stimulated him to create an élite that did not *look* like an élite and did not conventionally *act* like an élite. The elimination of the superficial distinctions between the rulers and the ruled which Mao's vision of a classless society demanded thus became—perhaps inevitably—a clever way of hiding the fact of oligarchy and stratification in Chinese society. Just as Americans have long hidden the facts of extreme inequality in the distribution of wealth and power behind such phrases as 'middle class' and 'democracy', so the Chinese came to hide dissimilarities in power and privilege behind a broadly uniform life style. This life style was probably meant to create a genuine unity among the people and the local agents of central authority (the local cadres).[66]

However, as one ascended in the hierarchy, the demand for becoming one with the masses probably became increasingly a matter of form. A high official might be expected occasionally to show his oneness with the people by working with the peasants for a couple of weekends each year or he might symbolically illustrate that oneness with the people by wearing the rather simple, ill-fitting, formless and colourless clothing of Mao Tse-tung. If local cadres acted as one with the workers and peasants, and high officials appeared to be one with the people, then the fact of their special leadership positions became less obvious. The aloofness of the local cadres was probably their own attempt to enjoy some of the satisfactions of status and deference enjoyed by their superiors.

DESPITE his complicity in the deviations from his own vision of a classless society—perhaps because of it—Mao Tse-tung launched his attack on the apparatus which he had assumed had risen above the base motivations of status and privilege. He probably arrived at a conclusion similar to one of E. H. Carr's provocative statements:

> The ideal, once it is embodied in an institution, ceases to be an ideal and becomes the expression of a self interest, which must be destroyed in the name of a new ideal.[67]

[65] In this context, Mao's vision is not unlike Raymond Aron's formulation of a classless society. Aron describes a classless society as a pure form of totalitarianism; as a society that has eliminated all intermediary groups between the ruled and the rulers. See his 'Social Structure and the Ruling Class', in Lewis A. Coser, ed., *Political Sociology* (New York, Harper Torchbooks, 1966), pp. 48–100, especially pp. 48–64 and 81–82.

[66] See, for example, Editorial, 'An Important Way of Establishing Close Relations Between Cadres and the Masses', *People's Daily*, 4 July 1963.

[67] E. H. Carr, *The Twenty Years' Crisis*, as quoted by Bert F. Hoselitz, 'Noneconomic Factors in Economic Development', in Bernard Okun and Richard W. Richardson, eds., *Studies in Economic Development* (New York, Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1961), pp. 346–47.

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The Cultural Revolution advanced no new ideals, but it did seek to destroy the selfish interests which were corrupting the Maoist ideals of a classless society.

There are at least four hypotheses which might shed light on why Mao Tse-tung decided to deny the iron law of oligarchy, preserve the integrity of class struggle and maintain his ideal of a classless society. First, Mao Tse-tung had a very strong revolutionary commitment with deep anarchist roots.[68] It is the anarchist tradition which has 'consistently pointed out the dangers of making the wrong kind of revolution, and their warnings over the last hundred years that Marxism would lead to dictatorship and to the replacement of the old tyrannies by a new one have proved all too right'.[69] Possibly sensitized to this problem by his early attraction to anarchism, Mao may have initiated the Cultural Revolution in part to ensure the revolutionary effectiveness of those most abused by the new tyranny. This meant maintaining the effectiveness of the political participation of the Chinese people in the post-revolutionary period.[70] In the Cultural Revolution, as in the Hundred Flowers campaign and the people's commune movements before, Mao sought to involve the people, in a limited way, in the criticism and direction of public affairs.[71] Mao Tse-tung then has been in the stream of the anarchist tradition in his suspicion of strong bureaucratic structures and in his search for effective paths to participatory democracy.

Second, the widespread desires for material comfort and the 'good life' may have caused Mao to doubt the revolutionary vitality of the 'backbone' (the peasants and workers) of the Chinese revolution. Mao Tse-tung's vigorous attack on the Party hierarchy during the Cultural Revolution served a dual purpose: it rationalized the non-revolutionary behaviour and attitudes of the Chinese peasantry and the proletariat by using the Party apparatus as a scapegoat for such behaviour, and it attacked those in the Party apparatus who directly or symbolically represented the policies of revisionism. By rationalizing the behaviour of the Chinese peasant and worker, Mao was able to sustain his faith in their ultimate (revolutionary) goodness.

A third possible source of Mao Tse-tung's motivation was his sense of impending death which gave increased urgency to the saving of the

[68] This hypothesis is borrowed from Michel Oksenberg's fascinating discussion in Ping-ti Ho and Tang Tsou, eds., op. cit., pp. 491–93.

[69] James Joll, *The Anarchists* (New York, Grosset's University Library edition, 1966), p. 278, as quoted by Oksenberg, in Ping-ti Ho and Tang Tsou, eds., op. cit., p. 492.

[70] Oksenberg, op. cit., pp. 492–93.

[71] Ibid., p. 493. Benjamin Schwartz in his article 'The Reign of Virtue: Some Broad Perspectives on Leader and Party in the Cultural Revolution', *China Quarterly* no. 35, July–September 1968, pp. 1–17. Schwartz points out that the Maoist anti-institutionalism and anti-formalism was opposed to a preponderantly technocratic version of the theory of progress. Mao sought to involve the masses as active participants in the political process and as instruments to 'reproletarianize' the 'dictatorship of a bourgeoisie' (pp. 6 and 17).

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revolution. This factor assumes two dimensions: his fear that his name and works would be debased after his death in the manner in which Khrushchev reviled Stalin, and his belief that only by saving the revolution could he achieve symbolic immortality. That Mao believed that he would be criticized by his former comrades after his death is at least suggested by the writings of the 'black gang' of intellectuals who maintained close political ties with high Party officials. For instance, Teng To wrote a piece entitled 'Special Cure for Amnesia' in 1962 which said:

> There are all sorts of illness in this world, . . . one of which is called 'amnesia'. Anyone who has this disease has a lot of trouble, because it cannot be easily cured. . . . The man who has this illness . . . often forgets what he has said or done. Gradually he will become temperamental . . . easily angered, and finally mad. . . . Another sympton is that he often faints. If not cured in time, he will become an idiot. Once one of these two symptoms is discovered, he must take a full rest and stop talking or doing things, otherwise the result will be disastrous.[72]

When the 'black gang' was purged during the Cultural Revolution, it was accused of subverting the revolution and making veiled criticisms of Mao.

In his January 1965 interview with Edgar Snow, Mao was 'reflecting on man's rendezvous with death and ready to leave the assessment of his political legacy to future generations'.[73] 'The overwhelming threat', writes Robert Jay Lifton, was not so much death as the 'suggestion that his revolutionary works will not endure'.[74] This was suggested when he told Edgar Snow that there were 'two possibilities' for the future of the Chinese revolution: the first, the 'continued development of the revolution toward communism'; the second, 'that youth could negate the revolution and give a poor performance; make peace with imperialism, bring the remnants of the Chiang Kai-shek clique back to the mainland and take a stand beside the small percentage of counter-revolutionaries still in the country'.[75] The first alternative is an image of continuous life while the second alternative means death and extinction, or impaired immortality. In light of China's incomplete revolution and the emergence of a new class structure, Mao has probably been far from certain about the fate of his revolutionary works, about the vindication of his own life.

A fourth possible source of motivation may have been the political position in which Mao found himself during the mid-1960s. In December 1958, at the time of the initial retreat from the most obvious excesses of the commune experiment, Mao Tse-tung stepped down

[72] Teng To, 'Special Cure for Amnesia', *Frontline*, 25 July 1962.

[73] See *The New Republic*, 27 February 1965, p. 23.

[74] Robert Jay Lifton, *Revolutionary Immortality: Mao Tse-tung and The Chinese Cultural Revolution* (New York, Vintage Books, 1968), pp. 14–15.

[75] Ibid., p. 15.

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from his governmental post of Chairman of the People's Republic. There is some evidence to suggest that when he warned his colleagues at the tenth plenum of the Central Committee in September 1962 'not to forget class struggle', he was respectfully ignored. Mao Tse-tung, China's 'great teacher, great leader, great supreme commander and great helmsman', probably became increasingly isolated from day-to-day decision-making and policy formulation. That this gnawed at him is suggested by the revelation during the Cultural Revolution that Mao felt himself to be like the father attending his own funeral. Mao Tse-tung suffered a special kind of status discontinuity between his charismatic position and the decline of his bureaucratic and operational authority. It is this status discontinuity that has probably led several observers to interpret the Cultural Revolution as a conflict between charisma and organization and between the leader and the commissar-bureaucrat.[76] What, perhaps, is most important about this hypothesis is that it suggests that Mao had no stake or vested interest in preserving the Party apparatus which by 1966 did not reflect his political visions.[77]

FROM Mao Tse-tung's point of view, the Cultural Revolution was a noble attempt to maintain the purity of the Chinese revolution. But the very political dynamics within which Mao had to operate mortgaged his purposes before he began. He sought the support of the government apparatus although that apparatus was probably the most revisionist on the mainland. When the Cultural Revolution spilled over into the countryside, he relied upon the 'have-nots' to purge the 'haves' in the villages although the 'have-nots' of 1966 were the 'haves' of the early 1960s, who had been purged during the Socialist Education Movement and the Four-Clean-Ups Movement.[78] He appealed to youth and others outside the communist Establishment to attack that Establishment, but was the source of that appeal a rejection of oligarchy, power and privilege or was the source of the appeal jealousy that other people enjoyed power and privilege? As one reads the appeals to the youth and poor peasants to attack the Establishment, it seems that the Cultural Revolution falls prey to the dilemma of all revolutions; it is not sure whether it wants to destroy the Establishment because all establishments are corrupt and it genuinely sought to create new patterns of social relationships in which the common good takes precedence over self-aggrandizement or because they unconsciously desired the benefits of power and privilege. If the Cultural Revolution succeeds, its leaders and supporters will probably

[76] See John Wilson Lewis, 'Leader, Commissar, and Bureaucrat: The Chinese Political System in the Last Days of the Revolution', in Ping-ti Ho and Tang Tsou, eds., op. cit., pp. 449–86.

[77] In this context, Liu Shao-chi, Mao's chosen heir apparent until 1966, made a strategic blunder in isolating Mao from the Party and policy-making apparatus.

[78] Richard D. Baum, 'The Early Impact of the Cultural Revolution in the Chinese Countryside, 1966–67' (a paper prepared for the Asian Studies Association, Pacific Coast, June 1969), p. 36.

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assume the roles of the purged revisionists. Mao Tse-tung's answer to this problem would be the perpetual instigation of class struggle and cultural revolutions, but it is unlikely that the leaders who succeed Mao will share either his commitment to perpetual revolution or feel the same inner compulsion to maintain the purity of the revolution. Mao has personalized the fate of the revolution; it is an extension of his ego. No other Chinese leader will ever be quite so involved with the glorious days of the Chinese revolution.

Still another problem has confounded Mao Tse-tung. The challenges of modernization and development have juxtaposed the demands of industrialism and the heritage of the revolution. The Chinese revolution has outgrown its original ideological premises both by the assumption of political power and by the very processes of modernization and industrialization. 'Revisionism' may be far less the product of evil men than the logical outgrowth of economic development.[79] As the Chinese economic system advances and production problems become more complex, it will be the skill and knowledge of the technician, not the enthusiasm of the masses, which will bring continued development. This leads Mao Tse-tung into an ambivalent love-hate relationship with industrialism. The harder Mao seeks to move China into the industrial age, the greater will be the appearance of 'revisionist' evil in Chinese society.

[79] On the 'logic of industrialization', see Clark Kerr, John T. Dunlop, Frederick H. Harbison, and Charles A. Myers, *Industrialism and Industrial Man* (New York, Oxford University Press, 1964), pp. 14–29. See also Richard D. Baum, 'Ideological Redivivus', *Problems of Communism*, May–June 1967.

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THE SINO-SOVIET SPLIT AND PARTY LEGITIMACY

Dan C. Heldman

THE problem of the so-called 'Sino-Soviet split' has been approached from a number of different viewpoints over the past few years: most studies have isolated only one or two aspects to the detriment of others or have sought to explain the source of the conflict without due consideration to what actually is going on and, thus, to what will eventually occur. There are those—the participants themselves for example—who prefer to picture the controversy as a conflict between revisionism of one or another sort and orthodoxy. There are those—generally American analysts and self-styled 'pragmatists'—who describe the international relations of socialist states as being essentially no different from those of non-socialist states and therefore explainable in terms of ordinary national interests, the search for power or other geopolitical considerations. There are a few who talk only of traditional or historical conditions, of centuries-old goals or Chinese dynastic expansion, of ice-free ports and of mutual Slavic-Chinese distrust. And obviously there are many who argue numerous combinations of the above.

These approaches, however, while they may be admirable in offering insights into the genesis of the conflict, do not go very far in telling us what is happening now or what is likely to occur in the future. They do not, in short, focus on the process of the dispute. 'Among diverse theories of conflict—corresponding to diverse meanings of the word "conflict"—a main dividing line is between those who treat conflict as a pathological state and seek its causes and treatment, and those who take conflict for granted and study the behaviour associated with it.' [1]

It is assumed here as a matter of course that conflict will emerge, increase, subside and in general exist between any two entities be they individuals, small groups or nations; and that such conflicts can arise for reasons which are unimportant and insignificant as well as fundamental and far-reaching. It is also assumed that inquiry into the process of a dispute, i.e. what are the forms (as opposed to content) of action and reaction, is more likely to lead to the formulation of propositions concerning how the dispute may or may not be resolved.

WE might fruitfully begin by noting that, since the domestic structure of socialist systems is different from that of non-socialist systems and since, both by logical implication and by the precepts of Marxist ideology, socialist foreign policies are

[1] T. C. Schelling, *The Strategy of Conflict* (New York, Oxford University Press, 1963), p. 1.

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similarly different, we have no good reason for supposing that their international relations (their relations vis-à-vis each other) are not also different. In other words, it has been argued that what sets communist political systems apart from non-communist political systems is the former's fusion of government, party and ideology; and that this fusion creates a series of dynamic needs on the part of communist leaders faced with opposition in any form.[2] In much the same manner can relations among communist states be characterized. Leaders, whether individual or collective, rule their systems through the expenditure of political resources: force is applied to appropriate social levers in order to 'move' the system or various parts. The use of political resources tends to lead to a decrease in their number, amount or availability: therefore, no leader can continue this constant diminution of his resources indefinitely, for no resource is inexhaustible. Somehow he must seek to accomplish these same ends at a cheaper cost, i.e. with little or no expenditure. This may be done in several ways but the most common and possibly the most effective device is 'legitimacy' as accorded by an ideology.[3]

Communist political systems make heavy and explicit use of this device and thus are more vulnerable to its special dynamics, chief among which is the fact that an attack upon the truth or reality of a system's ideology constitutes, or at least is perceived by a leader as constituting, an attack upon his legitimacy. As may be easily seen, this in turn endangers his position domestically. While such challenges may have as their source either dissident domestic groups or supposedly fraternal foreign countries, it is in the latter that our interest lies for the moment. If the Chinese assert the continued inevitability of war and of other sorts of general military conflict among imperialists or between imperialism and communism[4]; if 'peaceful coexistence' is only an unwarranted accretion on to Marxism representing revisionist fears of Russian unwillingness to do their socialist duty with regard to local wars of national liberation[5]; or if, by means of special techniques, China can progress to the final stage of communism by telescoping previous stages (thereby outpacing and surpassing the Soviet Union and rendering pointless its 30 years' headstart),[6] then all of these can be

[2] See D. C. Heldman, 'The Need for Controls', *Problems of Communism*, no. 1, January–February 1967, pp. 70–71.

[3] See H. Gelman, 'The Conflict: A Survey', *Problems of Communism*, no. 2 March–April 1964, pp. 9ff.

[4] *Peking Review*, 5 December 1963: compare with Khrushchev's statement in *Pravda*, 15 January 1960.

[5] NCNA, 14 May 1963 and *Peking Review*, 21 June 1963: compare with *Pravda*, 15 February 1956 and *Pravda*, 14 July 1963. Note also the very clear statement in *New Times*, 4 September 1963, pp. 42–43. Gelman (op. cit., p. 9) states that the Chinese were particularly concerned that the Soviet doctrine of peaceful coexistence would erode 'the militancy of revolutionaries around the world'.

[6] NCNA, 16 September 1956 and 5 September 1958 and *Peking Review*, 30 September 1958: compare with *Pravda*, 20 September 1963. No Soviet leader could be more explicit: 'Things were depicted as though they [the Chinese] were really engaged in communist construction, leaving other countries behind.' The problem

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and have been construed not only as attacks upon the Soviet Union but also as potentially dangerous to its internal stability. Similarly, Soviet efforts to counter these Chinese charges invariably produce new charges which are potentially dangerous to Chinese stability. The relevance of ideological controversies to ideological-political systems has been too little explored, a fact which is surprising in respect of communist international relations because the problem has been dealt with to some extent in respect of communist domestic systems.

What is being said here is that the Soviet Union and communist China together constitute a system of interrelationships which has a structure and a process paralleling in many ways the structures and processes obtaining in each of them; moreover, actions and responses in one of the two domestic systems or in the larger international system between them will necessarily have reciprocal repercussions particularly if the action or response is couched in ideological terms. It can be said that domestic needs and foreign policies constitute a 'seamless web' in which actions generated by one power demand responses by the other.

For example, when the 'peoples' communes' were initiated in China, the leaders surrounded their adoption with two main ideological assertions: the communes were an economic form by means of which China could accelerate growth so as to enter the period of communist construction within the 'foreseeable future', and they were a form which had relevance to the overpopulated and under-industrialized areas of Africa and Asia. It is conceivable that, if the commune programme had simply been instituted without these ideological justifications, the Soviet Union would not have been greatly troubled. It is equally conceivable (indeed probable), however, that the Chinese leaders could not have done without such justifications which were at least initially directed towards the rank and file for the benefit of whom the revolution was ostensibly made and whom the programme affected most. In the modern world, when leaders speak they are heard not only in their own country but throughout the world. Given these assertions, the Soviet Union was challenged both domestically and in its foreign policy.

Chinese claims that the communes constituted a 'special form' would work to undermine the integrity of the Soviet economic system: if the Chinese form was better, more efficient or more Marxist, then, by implication, the Soviet model was inferior and domestic confidence might be eroded. It also applied to Africa and Asia, where the Soviet Union was presenting its economic model for adoption by countries wanting to industrialize rapidly. Chinese claims that the communes have specific relevance to the conditions obtaining in the Third World, though less of a threat domestically, nevertheless implied that the

was that the Chinese were presenting their 'totally unsound and harmful policy [the commune programme] as an objective law', 'as a prescription or recipe for other countries' (*Ekonomicheskaya Gazeta*, 28 September 1963). It is difficult to miss the aggrieved tone.

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applicability of the Soviet model was restricted temporally and/or geographically, i.e. it was not universally correct. And, as anyone could see, the Chinese People's Republic was 'more like' Africa and the rest of Asia than was the Soviet Union.[7] But if the economic model was not universally valid, then at least the possibility existed that neither were other Soviet models, e.g. politics or the Party system. Each ideological assertion, therefore, though initially designed to engender domestic compliance with and support for the commune programme, challenged the Soviet Union's validity and legitimacy both internally and internationally in such a way as to cast doubt on Soviet experience as correct or relevant, efficient or effective.

WHAT sorts of responses to these challenges could the Soviet Union make? One might be to claim that the form was not new at all, that it had been tried in the Soviet Union decades ago and had been found unworkable or inappropriate.[8] The advantage, apart from turning aside the Chinese contention that the communes were a new and better form, is that it automatically implied that China was then where the Soviet Union was in the 1920s, thus reasserting Soviet superiority and the Soviet role as leader of the movement. The disadvantage is that it necessarily implied also that the Chinese were 'backward' or 'behind in development' and thus invited a new counter-challenge. Another possible response might be to agree that the communes were a special form but to add that their relevance was limited specifically to China and not just to Chinese-type conditions. However, the logic of this sort of argument made it possible to say exactly the same thing about the Soviet Union and and its conditions. The Soviets could respond quite pragmatically on the basis of Lenin's 'unity of theory and practice' that the communes simply would not work in any set of conditions, that it would create more difficulties than it resolved and that the result would not be any significant advance toward communism.[9] The problem here, of course, is that such a response is entirely ineffective, perhaps even dangerous, if the commune programme turned out to be in any way successful. Being predicated largely on the hope or wish that it would fail, the response is reminiscent of Stalin's disastrous policy toward Tito's Yugoslavia in 1948. In terms of Soviet benefits, the negative consequences of failure (the peasant commune programme succeeding being equivalent to Tito's continued survival as an independent) are much greater than the positive consequences of

[7] Attempts to define the similarity went so far as to include race as a factor. For specifically Soviet charges on this question, see for example *Pravda*, 14 July 1963; also L. S. Feuer, 'Marxisms . . . How Many?' *Problems of Communism*, no. 2, March–April 1964, pp. 54–55.

[8] Khrushchev claimed this was the case in a speech delivered in Poznan and reported in *Pravda*, 21 July 1959.

[9] The Soviet Union's foremost economist of that time, Strumlin, argued this in *Voprosy Ekonomiki*, no. 5, 1958.

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accurately predicting that the programme will fail (equivalent to Stalin's prediction that Tito would be crushed by isolation from the Cominform). Thus, the adoption of this response would be beneficial if supported by later events but would also be fraught with greater risk. Additionally, even if the programme did fail as predicted, the Soviet Union would be open to charges that somehow, by collusion or conspiracy, it had interfered in Chinese domestic matters and had made the prophecy come true.

Similarly, it is possible that the Chinese position regarding the inevitability of war among capitalists or between imperialist and socialist countries was designed to further the same domestic purposes as Soviet charges of 'capitalist conspiracy' in the thirties and of 'capitalist encirclement' in the forties. Such a position justifies, in ideological fashion, not only present ills but also future hardships; popular unity and resolve are needed to overcome the inevitable effects of international hostility and to prepare (by spending relatively less for domestic consumption) for future conflicts. But this assertion on the part of the Chinese represented a potential domestic threat to the Soviet Union as a country which has much more to lose in the event of a general war. To forestall grumbling and a possible sense of futility in a people undergoing embourgeoisement,[10] the Soviet Union had to respond by arguing that a general war was no longer inevitable due to the advances and growing strength of socialist and progressive forces in the world (primarily the Soviet Union, thus again asserting superiority).[11] But, as before, this worked to undermine Chinese domestic policy by calling into question the rationale of spending priorities.

The important point is not that the Chinese have challenged and do challenge Soviet ideological primacy within the movement. After all, why should this matter to anyone, Chinese or Russian? Obviously it must matter because ideological primacy *means* something to one or both of the participants. The purpose of the two examples above,[12] then, is to show *why* it matters: that, as a result of internally motivated ideological justifications for Chinese domestic policies, Soviet leaders perceived challenges to their domestic and international legitimacy[13];

[10] T. H. Rigby, 'The Embourgeoisement of the Soviet Union and the Proletarianization of Communist China', in K. London, ed., *Unity and Contradiction: Major Aspects of Sino-Soviet Relations* (New York, Praeger, 1962). While lengthy and perhaps clumsy, Rigby's terminology is meaningful. Compare Zagoria's 'neo-Stalinist phase' in his 'Strains in the Sino-Soviet Alliance', *Problems of Communism*, no. 3, May–June 1960, p. 3.

[11] *Pravda*, 20 July, 30 July, 7 August and 12 August 1960.

[12] For a clear and concise discussion of other examples, see R. Lowenthal, *World Communism: The Disintegration of a Secular Faith* (New York, Oxford University Press, 1966), chaps. 5–8.

[13] Gelman, op. cit., p. 9: 'in April 1960 the CCP unleashed a massive propaganda assault aimed at the policies—*and, implicitly, the authority*—of the Soviet Communist Party' (emphasis added). Zagoria (op. cit., p. 5) points to the domestic impact: 'but Sino-Soviet ideological differences are not merely conducive to

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that all of the responses appropriate to the challenges were also ideological in nature[14]; that each was itself a counter-challenge to China's domestic and international position; and that a chain of challenge and response is thereby created. It is necessary, then, to inquire as to whether such a chain can be broken and, if it can, by what means.

EARLY in the Bolshevik movement, before and after the 1917 revolution, conflict took place and deviations existed within Lenin's Party.[15] Lenin, as a practical revolutionary following the precepts of Tkachev, had sought to weld together a disciplined, compact group of devoted adherents by offering to them the *élan* of common struggle and hardship, the closeness born of secrecy and conspiracy, the éliteness of restricted membership. He achieved this end by numerous skilful manipulations of group majorities, particularly during the Second Party Congress of 1903. Once having gained this goal, of the formation of a Party constructed according to his own specifications, Lenin had at his disposal the psychological weapon he needed against future doctrinal deviations or deviations in practice—the threat of isolation. Contrary to what may be thought, the threat was a real one considering the degree to which Party members gave themselves to the fulfilment of its goals and remembering that isolation, despite the scope of the initial deviation, would be total. When the Party defines the limits of the individual's actions in society, then the Party *becomes* society, and expulsion means isolation from society.

Defeat by the majority in an organization and the threat of isolation can be seen emerging as possible deviation control devices for the Sino-Soviet conflict system. Both were operative, for example, when Tito challenged Soviet leadership and hegemony within the Cominform and when he was finally expelled from that body in 1948. It need hardly be added, however, that isolation and defeat by the majority require, respectively, something from which to be isolated and an organization in which the majority can operate. It is safe to say that the former does not now exist and the latter is, at best, evanescent.

The factionalism both among the ruling Parties and within the non-ruling Parties serves to guarantee that isolation, if it were attempted, would not by any means be total and hence the efficacy of such a tactic would seriously be diminished if not removed altogether. There is no clearly recognizable community large enough and cohesive enough for either participant to be expelled without drawing to itself sufficient

disunity among the individual bloc parties; perhaps even more important is their potential effect as a stimulus to factionalism within the Soviet and Chinese party leadership'.

[14] See Lowenthal (op. cit., p. 173) for the necessity of ideological responses.

[15] For earlier schisms, see R. V. Daniels, 'How Monolithic was the Monolith?' *Problems of Communism*, no. 2, March–April 1964, pp. 40–47.

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support from within the movement to survive the split and even perhaps to derive certain benefits therefrom. In short, the Soviet preponderance which made Yugoslavia's attempted isolation at least feasible though eventually unsuccessful, is missing.[16]

That there is at present no organizational structure in which Chinese or Soviet doctrines could be defeated as inadmissible deviations seems amply indicated by efforts to call such an international convocation over the past years, efforts which have been at times muted and at times strident depending upon prospects for achieving this purpose. As the meetings held in Moscow early in 1969 showed, no former organization would be reconvened nor any new one created unless at least one of the participants felt sure of being successful; in which case the other participant and its international allies lose nothing by a boycott, thus obviating the impact of any actions taken. The logical result in this situation, and the result of the Moscow conference, is that the meeting would turn ostensibly to other issues thereby shoving the original and instigating problem into the background.

The conclusions to be drawn from the above would seem to be these:

1. the very size and heterogeneity of the 'world socialist movement' militates against a decrease in doctrinal challenges;
2. Marxist systems will continue to require ideological justification of domestic and foreign policies, and challenges will therefore continue to threaten legitimacy;
3. in the absence of any 'founder' or of any commonly recognized doctrinal arbiter, there is logically no challenge to which a response cannot be made nor any response to which a new counter-challenge is not possible;
4. there is no organization, the hierarchy of which could authoritatively settle these questions, nor any membership which could be manipulated so as to vote against either of the contending positions;
5. there is no cohesive community from which either party (or, indirectly, any allies) could be isolated;
6. general military action by either party against the other or against the other's allies seems unlikely as a conscious policy choice;[17]

[16] In this respect, we may note that Yugoslavia was able to survive precisely because isolation was not total, particularly vis-à-vis the West.

[17] The writer was in several of the southern and western republics during and after the major border clashes of 1969 and discovered many expressions of popular opinion which fit this description. One Soviet journalist, reflecting the feelings of not a few of his fellow citizens, argued for a pre-emptive nuclear strike against the Chinese and expressed bitterness over his government's apparent lack of will and resolve in this matter.

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7. in short, there are no mechanisms or devices by which the conflict can be resolved and the deviations controlled similar to any used in the past for the same purpose.

Meanwhile, the participants continue to undermine each other's international and domestic legitimacy though each is acting in an effort to preserve and protect its own authority. The result is an accelerating erosion of the international socialist movement as a whole.

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COMMUNIST CHINA AND EASTERN EUROPE

M. Kamil Dziewanowski

IN a Noël Coward comedy a man trying to sustain a conversation asks a lady: 'How is China?' The lady answers: 'Very big.' For generations China was for most Westerners not much more than a geographic expression. Oswald Spengler in his *Decline of the West* wrote that 'Old nations, like idiots and Chinese, will never play a role in world history'. Revitalized by the communist upheaval, however, the Chinese are now trying to make up for lost time and extend their activity to practically all corners of the globe, Eastern Europe included.

The Chinese influence in that region was dramatized in August 1968, during the Soviet-led occupation of Czechoslovakia. On the eve of the invasion the Chinese Party organ, the *People's Daily*, published an editorial which assured the Albanians that they should have no fear of the future because at their side stood the '700 million Chinese people armed with the thought of Mao Tse-tung'. Three days later, on the occasion of the Rumanian national holiday of 23 August, Premier Chou En-lai attended the reception at the Rumanian Embassy in Peking and condemned the occupation of Czechoslovakia, comparing it to Hitler's aggression. Chou En-lai warned that Rumania was facing the danger of a foreign intervention and promised that the Rumanian government in its struggle for 'independence and sovereignty' will have the support of the 'Chinese people, who have grown even stronger through the tempering of the great proletarian revolution'.

These two moves opened a new stage in the evolution of China's attitude towards Eastern Europe. In order to assess the role Peking has been playing in the affairs of the area one has to put the Chinese involvement in the sphere of Soviet hegemony in perspective. In 1949, when Mao Tse-tung was establishing his power on the mainland of China, Stalin's East European empire was at its peak. It was true that Yugoslavia had defected from it in the previous year, but the propagandistic as well as the economic pressure exercised on it by Moscow and its vassals was formidable and Tito's fate was still hanging in the balance. It should be remembered that by March 1948 the Soviet Union had concluded bilateral treaties of alliance with all of its vassals, with the exception of the GDR, which at that time did not legally exist. Thus the new rulers in Peking had to face certain realities and adjust to them; the Soviet Union stood at the head of an impressive coalition of communist states, which, at that time, could rightly be called a bloc.

This was the state of affairs when in February 1950 the Soviet Union signed in Moscow its treaty of friendship and mutual assistance

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with China. It should be noted that Peking did not conclude treaties of alliance with the East European communist countries. Instead, the Chinese negotiated trade agreements with Czechoslovakia, Poland and East Germany in 1950, with Hungary in 1951, with Bulgaria and Rumania in 1952 and with Albania in 1954; cultural agreements were concluded with Poland in April 1951, Rumania in 1952 and Bulgaria in October 1952. Peking did not participate in the January 1949 Moscow conference that set up the Council for Mutual Economic Association (CMEA) and never formally joined the Council. It seems that during the first seven years or so the new masters of China were too busy consolidating their power to take an active part in intra-bloc politics.

A similar situation was created in respect of the Warsaw Treaty Organization set up in May 1955. Again, this was strictly a white, European grouping; consequently while political, economic and military ties were being forged between the East European members of the Soviet bloc, the Chinese were left outside. In a way it was all quite understandable. CMEA was set up as Stalin's reply to the Marshall Plan and the incipient integration of Western Europe; the Warsaw Pact was to be a countervailing force against NATO. The treaties of alliances uniting the Soviet Union and its East European vassals were directed against West Germany. Thus, for seven years or so, China was kept apart, and was keeping itself apart, from East European affairs. China played a secondary role not only in inter-state, but also in inter-Party, relations. The Korean war and other events in Asia, as well as pre-occupations with domestic conditions, focused Peking's interest on areas closer to home.

Until 1956 economic relations between the Chinese and Eastern Europe were minimal. At that time most East European leaders viewed Soviet economic involvement in backward and adventurous China as a burden and a danger, and hence undesirable. If China had become the main economic partner, the other communist countries would have had short shrift: they would have been deprived of some of the supplies they needed for their economies, and the shortage of hard currency made it difficult for them to find their supplies elsewhere.

STALIN'S death and the repercussions it had within the Kremlin and throughout the bloc gave the Chinese their first opportunity of actively entering East European politics. The cease-fire in Korea and Indochina, in 1953 and 1954 respectively, was, of course, another factor that gave Peking more leeway and hence a chance to expand its influence outside its borders. But as long as the Chinese communists were weak and dependent on Soviet aid, they subscribed, or at least paid lip service, to the Stalinist concept of bloc politics: there was no attempt to balance the interests of the unity of the communist camp with the claims of the Soviet satellite states to a certain degree of autonomy; there were no significant efforts to participate actively

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in the leadership of the bloc. Stalin's successors must have realized that in the long run they could not treat a country so vast and so potentially powerful as China in the same way as the old boss had treated the vassals of Eastern Europe. This realization was reflected in the signing of the Sino-Soviet treaty on 12 October 1954 and the withdrawal of Soviet occupation forces from Manchuria and Sinkiang. This was a milestone in Sino-Soviet relations: Communist China had now become, formally and legally, an equal partner of the Soviet Union.

The first opportunity to express this new status came only after Khrushchev's famous 'destalinization' speech of February 1956, and during the Polish and Hungarian revolts of the October of that year. From the beginning, the Chinese were highly critical of Khrushchev's pronouncement: they considered it improper, untimely and detrimental to the interests of the world communist movement.

Consequently the post-Stalinist era, which revealed cracks in the bloc and the weaknesses of the Soviet leadership, created new opportunities for Peking. It was symptomatic that during the October events in Poland the Chinese press published many articles praising Gomulka, while Imre Nagy was severely condemned for having gone too far in his drift from the bloc. At the same time, during that critical autumn, Peking tried to act as arbiter between Moscow and Warsaw.

On the surface the attitudes taken by Mao towards the events in Poland and Hungary may appear to conflict. In reality they were determined by the divergent course which events took in the two countries. In Poland the unrest was channelled by Gomulka within the Communist Party; the Party by and large preserved its 'leading role'; the armed forces remained subordinate to the Party leadership; and there was never any question of Poland breaking away from the Warsaw Pact. As a result Mao decided to back Gomulka and restrain Khrushchev from a military intervention. In Hungary the situation was different; there the Party very early lost control of the levers of power, including the armed forces, and was consequently unable to ensure that the country would remain within the communist camp. That is why Peking condemned the Hungarian line as 'counter-revolutionary' and urged Moscow to act ruthlessly. Thus, the Chinese position, outwardly contradictory, was actually more consistent and logical than it would first appear. In both cases the criterion was the preservation of communist rule and the fundamental unity of the communist camp, based on the equality of its members.

On 13 November 1956 *Ta Kung Pao* published an editorial entitled 'What Are the Similarities and Differences Between the Polish and Hungarian Incidents?' According to the Chinese newspaper 'there were legitimate grievances as well as errors in both cases, but in Hungary a mass reform movement was penetrated by the class enemy and took a reactionary swing due to the lack of vigilance on the part of the leadership. Most striking among the events which took place during

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the period were the incidents in Soviet-Polish relations, and the counter-revolutionary rebellion in Hungary.' The two events were different in character, stressed the paper. But the leadership of the CPSU made grave mistakes in both. By moving up troops in an attempt to subdue the Polish comrades by armed force, it committed the error of 'great-power chauvinism'. 'And at the critical moment when the Hungarian counter-revolutionaries had occupied Budapest for a time it intended to adopt a policy of capitulation and abandon socialist Hungary to counter-revolution. We insisted on the taking of all necessary measures to smash the counter-revolutionary rebellion in Hungary. . . .'

As is known, the Soviet declaration of 30 October 1956, entitled 'On the Principles of the Development and the Further Strengthening of Friendship and Co-operation Between the Soviet Union and Other Socialist States', promised to turn the communist camp into a 'socialist commonwealth'. A prompt Chinese declaration basically approved the Soviet statement, but even this approval was mixed with reprimands:

> Because of the unanimity of ideology and aim of struggle, it often happens that certain personnel of socialist countries neglect the principle of equality among nations in their mutual relations. Such a mistake, particularly the mistake of chauvinism by a big country, inevitably results in serious damage to the solidarity and common cause of the socialist countries. . . . As a result of these misunderstandings and estrangements, a tense situation has sometimes occurred which otherwise would not have occurred. The handling of the 1948–49 Yugoslav situation and the recent happenings in Poland and Hungary are enough to illustrate this.[1]

As we have seen, Peking's move probably saved Poland from a Soviet invasion but sealed the fate of Hungary.[2] The confused situation then prevailing in Eastern Europe, the embarrassing position in which the Russians found themselves and the apparently friendly tone of the Chinese *démarche*, which outwardly stressed the necessity of preserving the unity of the communist camp, all this allowed Peking to get away with this unprecedented move. Peking's intervention was not denounced as an interference in the internal affairs of the Soviet Union. As a result of the Chinese step some communist leaders in Eastern Europe,

[1] Quoted in P. Zinner, ed., *National Communism and Popular Revolt in Eastern Europe* (New York, 1957), pp. 493–94. For a detailed discussion of China's role in the events of 1956 in Eastern Europe, see Donald S. Zagoria's *The Sino-Soviet Conflict 1955–1961* (Princeton, 1962), chap I; and Z. Brzezinski's *The Soviet Bloc. Unity of Conflict* (Cambridge, Mass., 1967), pp. 271–367. The Chinese claim that the Soviet declaration of 30 October was actually issued on their initiative. Moscow has never officially denied this.

[2] The gratitude which the Polish Party felt towards Peking was expressed by Prime Minister Cyrankiewicz. In January 1957, while greeting his Chinese counterpart Chou En-lai in Cracow, Cyrankiewicz thanked Chou En-lai for the assistance granted by Peking. 'In 1956 Chinese friends', said Cyrankiewicz, 'fully understood that . . . the coexistence of nations should not be like the coexistence of various fish . . . living in one lake, the bigger devouring the smaller ones. We are fighting against all forms of national oppression' (*New York Times*, 15 January 1957).

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until then suspicious of Peking, began to look upon Peking as a moderating or countervailing factor in relations between communist parties. At that time Tito highly praised the Chinese position. It should be borne in mind that Yugoslav-Chinese relations during the Hundred Flowers period were rather cordial. In his televised interview with Edward R. Murrow Tito said that his views on the different national roads to communism were 'to a great extent identical with those of Mao Tse-tung'.

Thus, the 1956 Chinese intervention in East European affairs was of crucial importance; temporarily and outwardly it helped to restore the shattered unity of the Soviet bloc. But it also established a precedent; it showed that Peking was willing and able to assist Moscow in formulating the bloc's global strategy and act as a partner of Moscow. The Chinese intervention was a phenomenon heralding the appearance of a new and hitherto rather exotic factor in East European politics. This precedent established the principle that any potentially counter-revolutionary development in any communist state, or any conflict between communist states, was of concern not only to Moscow but also to Peking. This was a modification of the clear, unspoken Stalinist rule, that the Soviet leadership and nobody else should decide on these matters. Thus for the first time since Tito's revolt the exclusive authority of Moscow had been challenged with impunity.

THE 1957 conference of the 81 parties held on the fortieth anniversary of the October Revolution laid down the basic principles that should govern relationships between communist states. The five principles of the Moscow declaration were: observance of national sovereignty and independence, respect for full equality of rights, comradely mutual aid and mutual benefits.

The five principles were the last major compromise jointly agreed upon by the Russians and the Chinese. Differences soon began to develop in many areas of their mutual relations. Economy and strategy led the way. The launching of the sputnik considerably strengthened the position of the Soviet Union. This in turn inspired Mao with the idea of using the enhanced prestige of his partner to China's advantage. Mao concluded that 'The east wind was prevailing over the west wind', and that the final showdown with capitalism was at hand. In order to be prepared for the final battle the communist camp must be strengthened.

The last period of apparent Sino-Soviet amity saw numerous efforts to revitalize the existing multilateral organizations (CMEA and the Warsaw Pact) and the groundwork for co-operation in various technical fields (scientific research, communications, transportation, medical sciences and others) was prepared in 1956–1957. Peking, hoping for Soviet assistance, eagerly participated in such projects as the Joint Institute for Nuclear Research in Dubna (founded in March 1956). Moreover, friendship societies, promoting co-operation between various

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East European countries and China, were set up; trade began to develop; and travel to China became more and more frequent, and even fashionable, among the East European members of the 'New Class'.

On 24 May 1958 a conference of the Political Consultative Committee of the Warsaw Pact Organization was held in Moscow. A high-ranking Chinese observer, Chen Yun, a Politbureau member and a Vice-Premier, was present. The proposals adopted at this conference, with the consent of the Chinese government, concerned the establishment of peace zones both in Central Europe (a new, modified version of the Rapacki Plan) and in the Pacific. This might have been a first step towards closer co-operation between the Warsaw Pact Organization and the Chinese. In the spring of 1959 a Chinese military delegation, led by Defence Minister Peng Te-hui, visited the Soviet Union as well as eastern Europe. During that period the Soviet Union and its east European satellites extended credits and all sorts of other 'fraternal help' to China.

Despite this surface amity, symptoms of conflict were accumulating. While outwardly accepting 'the leading role of the Soviet Union', Mao was launching such experimental domestic policies as were bound to constitute a most serious political challenge to Moscow's primacy. The separate Chinese road to communism led through the 'people's communes', declared to be 'the best organizational form for the gradual transition from socialism to communism'. The Soviet Union was bound to repudiate such a claim. On 1 December 1958 Khrushchev, in a conversation with Senator Hubert Humphrey, denounced the communes as 'old-fashioned and reactionary'.[3]

The Sino-Soviet conflict as such is outside the scope of the present article, which is concerned only with its east European repercussions. But a brief summary may be in order. As we know, the long, smouldering feud came into the open in April 1960, on the occasion of the official celebrations of the ninetieth anniversary of Lenin's birth. The anniversary was, of course, celebrated throughout the communist world, but Peking put a special emphasis on the festivities: on 16 April *Red Flag* published a booklet entitled *Long Live Leninism*, which constituted a call for the eradication of imperialism in all its forms, by military means when necessary, and accused the Soviet Party of not being Leninist enough. The Russians defended stubbornly the idea of peaceful co-existence, while the Chinese rejected it with scorn as cowardice and even treason. The acrimonious polemics which ensued have continued without interruption since that time. The Peking Congress of the World Federation of Trade Unions at the beginning of June 1960, and the Rumanian Party Congress later that month, provided another opportunity for mutual recriminations and further sharpened the tone of the controversy.

[3] H. H. Humphrey, 'My Marathon Talk with Russia's Boss', *Life*, 17 January 1959, p. 86.

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East European observers of the outburst of the struggle were obviously bewildered by the demoralizing spectacle of the two communist giants publicly hurling insults at each other. Their embarrassment and hesitation as to what to do were revealed in the way they tried to manoeuvre between the two antagonists. The behaviour of the Polish delegates at the 1960 WFTU meeting was typical. A Politbureau member (and a close friend of Gomulka), Ignacy Loga-Sowinski, firmly supported the Soviet position of co-existence but tried to avoid polemics with the Chinese. Attempting to flatter his hosts, Loga-Sowinski sought to use a well-known slogan of Mao Tse-tung, but combined it with the Soviet one, thus producing a strange hybrid: 'The east wind will prevail over the west wind as a result of peaceful coexistence.' An equally conciliatory line was followed by Ochab, the Polish delegate to the Rumanian Party Congress in Bucharest in July 1960.

While the politicians were disconcerted, the apolitical masses of eastern Europe were rather amused. Their drab existence had been brightened by the sight of the giants falling out and hurling recriminations and even threats at each other. Soon the mood changed, however. *Schadenfreude*, mixed with an undercurrent of fear, soon found its expression in dozens of anecdotes on the subject. One of them is a Polish joke which soon spread to Hungary and Czechoslovakia: 'How lucky we are to have such a powerful buffer state between us and China. . . .' But soon satire was replaced by more sober thoughts about the ever-present German problem.[4]

IT is, of course, well known that the first, and so far the only, East European Party that has definitely sided with the Chinese without reservation has been the Albanian.[5] Here it should be stressed that by 1959 the Albanian Communist Party had already become disturbed by the prospects of a Soviet reconciliation with Yugoslavia. It should be borne in mind that the Yugoslav-Albanian clash of 1948 was

[4] One should remember that the influence of the National Democrats still lingers in Poland. Roman Dmowski's view that, despite the numerous points of friction, in the long run Polish and Russian *raisons d'etat* are not incompatible has still many supporters. Only a generation ago, Dmowski, while analysing the plans of a possible German and, perhaps, European crusade against the Soviet Union, bluntly warned his countrymen against getting involved in a conflict with Russia, and wrote that 'the time may come when those who are now dreaming about partitioning Russia will anxiously ask whether she is strong enough to withstand the pressure of China. . . . This moment may not be very far away': *Swiat Powojenny a Polska* ('The Post-War World and Poland'), Warsaw, 1931, p. 186.

The residue of National Democratic thinking is still rather strong in Poland and this line of reasoning may be found both among the representatives of the Party as well as among opponents of communism. Both Gomulka and his predecessor, Bierut, often quoted Dmowski whenever the fundamentals of Russo-Polish relations were to be sold to the people.

[5] For an able discussion of the problem, see W. E. Griffith, *Albania and the Sino-Soviet Rift* (Cambridge, Mass., 1963); N. C. Pano, *The People's Republic of Albania* (Baltimore, 1968); and P. S. H. Tang, *The Twenty-Second Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union and Moscow-Tirana-Peking Colations* (Washington, D.C., 1962). See also Harry Hamm, *Albania-China's Beachhead in Europe* (New York, 1963).

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precipitated largely by Tito's desire to incorporate Albania. Tirana now feared that Belgrade's price for its rapprochement with Moscow might be the absorption of Albania. The Albanian leaders still remembered that the previous period of Soviet-Yugoslav rapprochement (1955–56) had in their opinion threatened them with a danger that they had only barely survived. Who knows what could have happened had the second honeymoon between Moscow and Belgrade not been rudely interrupted by the Hugarian revolt?

Consequently, in 1960, Tirana promptly took advantage of the Chinese challenge to Soviet control of the communist camp. Soon after the open polemics between Moscow and Peking had begun, the Albanians boldly sided with the Chinese. Hoxha went as far as to declare publicly that Moscow had deliberately withheld wheat from Albania during the recent severe drought. Khrushchev was reported as having shouted in reply: 'Comrade Hoxha, you have poured a bucket of dung on me, and you will have to wash it off.' Nothing of the sort ever happened.

To counter the Albanian revolt the Soviets applied economic pressures, including the refusal to ship wheat, and formulated several plans to remove Enver Hoxha from the Albanian leadership. All these efforts failed miserably. Enver Hoxha replied with a series of counter-measures: in 1961 the Soviets were ordered to vacate Albanian naval bases, including those at Valona and Sassona. Despite some resistance, Soviet personnel were compelled to leave and had to abandon four submarines and a quantity of older equipment. In retaliation the Russians seized some Albanian warships at Sevastopol. Soviet Embassy officials in Tirana (despite Soviet protests) were placed under police surveillance. In 1961 Hoxha executed some high-ranking Albanian officials, including a Moscow-trained rear-admiral, for conspiring with the Soviet Union against Albanian security and sovereignty. What a change in a decade! Ten years before, communist leaders (like Traicho Kostor in Bulgaria or Rayk in Hungary) had been executed for allegedly putting the national interests of their respective countries above those of the Centre. In 1962 the USSR severed its diplomatic relations with Albania, an unprecedented move in relations between communist states.

It must be said that the Chinese loyally stood by their only European ally. Despite their domestic economic weakness, they have not only sustained Albania's immediate needs, but have also helped her to complete, in 1968, her third Five-Year Plan, which included a number of significant industrial and agricultural projects. In addition, Peking has been financing the country's budget deficit and supplying it, on credit, with various raw materials. By this means the Chinese have lifted the economic blockade imposed by the USSR and its satellites. Several thousand Chinese experts and advisers, including naval and rocketry specialists, have been stationed on Albanian soil. Soon the small, backward Balkan country, conveniently protected from the

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Soviets by a belt of Yugoslav territory, had become the channel for Peking's activity in Eastern Europe, as well as Peking's chief spokesman in the United Nations.

From the point of view of Tirana, communist China is an ideal protector. It is sufficiently powerful yet distant (over 6,000 miles away!) and it is hostile to the Soviet Union, which would sacrifice Albania in order to woo Yugoslavia. Finally, China's resources are large enough to subsidize Albania, but so limited that it could not restrain Albania in its search for a secondary means of support. Consequently, Albania, while committed to her protector, retains at the same time, rather in the same way as Cuba, a considerable freedom of manoeuvre. One of the minor secrets of the strange Chinese-Albanian friendship is the fact that they share a proclivity towards Stalinist extremism in internal politics.

The demoralizing effect of the Albanian affair on the East Europeans has been profound. The fact that Moscow has failed to crush a country so small, so poor and so isolated as Albania is a measure of the Soviets' impotence in the areas not adjacent to their empire. A joyous Albanian flea cavorting on the back of the Chinese elephant is a spectacle to behold!

IN order to prevent the rift from widening, several East European leaders, including Gomulka, Kadar, and Gheorghiu-Dej, made numerous attempts to mediate in the dispute. While the Polish and Hungarian attempts had one common aim—to avert a final break—Gheorghiu-Dej must have perceived quite early a possibility of utilizing the Soviet–Chinese rift to enhance Rumania's position within the camp. But, unlike the adventurous Albanians, the Rumanians waited until they could see which way the wind was blowing. It will be recalled that in the autumn of 1962 Khrushchev suffered another blow in the form of the lost Cuban missile gamble. This, in turn, weakened his position not only domestically, but also made him considerably more cautious in international relations: it made him still more reluctant to stick out his neck in order to help the Chinese to achieve their objectives in Asia. As Khrushchev put it on 12 December 1962 in his report to the Supreme Soviet: 'The paper tiger has nuclear teeth.' To this one should add the disruptive effect of the Chinese attack on India, plus Peking's growing rage at Moscow's aid to 'bourgeois' countries; all this brought the debate between Moscow and Peking to a new pitch. The bitter polemics and recriminations which were exchanged in the winter and spring of 1963 could fill volumes. About 300 articles on the subject were printed in the Soviet press during 1963 alone.

Bucharest soon took advantage of the escalation of the dispute. There were numerous early small manifestations of Rumania's defiance

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towards Moscow.[6] For instance, when, at the end of June 1963, the Soviet Union and her satellites met in East Berlin for a 'little summit', Gheorghiu-Dej was not present. In March 1963 the Rumanian Ambassador to Albania, who had been recalled in 1961 together with the other ambassadors of the East European countries, returned to his post. This news followed the announcement that a new Rumanian-Albanian trade agreement had been signed on 7 March 1963; the agreement anticipated a sizeable increase in the growing trade between the two countries. Many East European countries had lifted the embargo which the Russians had wanted to impose on trade with Albania, but not one had announced it publicly. While cultivating good commercial relations with China and supplying it with oil, the Rumanians were intensifying their efforts to develop closer economic ties with the West. Moreover the policy of cultural de-Russification continued apace.

While pursuing the line of cautious defiance of Moscow, a fluid and unresolved situation temporarily suited the purposes of Bucharest better than an open break. Hence the mission of the Rumanian Premier, Maurer, to Peking in March 1964, in the role of mediator. His visit ended in failure, but it nevertheless bolstered Rumania's prestige and radically altered its status in respect of the Soviet Union. It is noteworthy that the Rumanian communiqué of 24 April 1964, while supporting the Soviet Union on all major issues, rebuked both sides for engaging in polemics. What a change of tone since the days of Stalin!

The Peking leaders were obviously not slow in perceiving the potential advantages that the Rumanian challenge could give them. Consequently, whenever they could they proclaimed their support for Bucharest's independent line. This was not difficult since on at least one question their interests coincided: both countries insisted on the right of each state to develop its own economic resources in its own way. Soon, however, Chinese support shifted from the economic plane to the political plane. To create a political diversion, Peking conveniently raised the problem of 'unresolved territorial claims'. On 10 July 1964, in a meeting with Japanese socialists, Mao Tse-tung criticized Soviet 'great power chauvinism' which had led the Russians to make several territorial gains not only in Asia, in the Amur valley, but also in Eastern Europe: 'There are too many places occupied by the Soviet Union. . . . They appropriated a part of Rumania. Having separated a portion of East Germany, they chased the local inhabitants to West Germany. They divided a part of Poland and annexed it to the Soviet Union, and gave a part of East Germany to Poland as a

[6] The story of how Rumania, initially one of the most docile of Soviet satellites, has transformed itself into a reluctant ally and eventually into a virtually independent state has never been fully told. For a competent attempt at tracing the basic trends of events, see Stephen Fischer-Galati, *The New Rumania. From People's Democracy to Socialist Republic* (Cambridge, Mass., 1967), chaps. 4 and 5; see also David Floyd, *Rumania, Russia's Dissident Ally* (London, 1965), especially chaps. 6–9.

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compensation. The same thing took place in Finland. They took everything they could'.[7]

On 2 September 1964 *Pravda* replied with a violent attack on Mao's statement, accusing him of proposing 'the division of the territory of the Soviet Union'. So did the Bulgarian *Rabotnichesko Delo* of 6 September, which ended its attack with a rhetorical question: 'Is not this a call to Japan, to the Chinese people, the yellow race to rise and conquer an area of vital importance to the Soviet Union?'

The Rumanians used Mao's interview and the polemics that followed in order to stress their own territorial claims. In 1964, under the guise of publishing Karl Marx's opinions about Russo-Rumanian relations during the nineteenth century, Professor A. Otetea of the University of Bucharest and the Rumanian Academy edited a book reviving the problem of Bessarabia. The book contained Marx's condemnation of Tsarist imperialism and Russian encroachments on Rumanian national rights.[8] At the same time Bucharest continued to defy calls for the greater integration of CMEA and of the Warsaw Pact.

A NEW chapter in China's relations with Eastern Europe opened in 1968. As has already been mentioned, the Czechoslovak crisis provided China with an opportunity to reactivate its East European policy and to renew its opposition to Moscow. No other communist state condemned the invasions as vitriolically as did China.

Even before the news of the invasion reached Peking, the *People's Daily* had assured the Albanians of Chinese protection: 'If the US imperialists or the Soviet modern revisionists and their lackeys dare touch Albania in the slightest, nothing but a thorough, ignominious and irrevocable defeat awaits them'. The statement was broadcast repeatedly by Tirana Radio, which promptly suspended its attacks on Belgrade: broadcasts in Serbian, Czech, Slovak and Rumanian called on these peoples to resist Moscow's 'aggressive imperialism' and 'great-power chauvinism'.

Frightened by the invasion and the possible implications of the doctrine of the 'socialist community' and 'limited sovereignty', Hoxha announced on 13 September, in a rather symbolic gesture, Albania's formal withdrawal from the Warsaw Pact, in the work of which Albania had not participated since 1960. On 25 September Hoxha promptly sent his Defence Minister, Beqir Balluku, to Peking to attend the nineteenth anniversary of the communist victory in China. The nature of the communiqué issued after the visit and the tone adopted by the Albanian press leave no doubt that military problems were the

[7] Quoted by E. Kux, 'East Europe's Relations with Asian Communist Countries', in K. London, ed., *East Europe in Transition*; for the text of Mao's interview with the Japanese socialists, in which the Chinese leader accused the Russians of illegally occupying Japanese, as well as East European, territory, see *Pravda*, 2 September 1964.

[8] A. Otetea and S. Schwann, eds., *K. Marx Inseminari Despre Romani* ('Karl Marx's Notes on the Rumanians'), Bucharest, 1964.

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main topic of conversation. After his return from Peking, Beqir Balluku went so far as to state that the 'nuclear weapons in the hands of the great Chinese people—are weapons in the hands of all the revolutionary peoples of the world . . . especially those who, like Albania, are threatened by "great power imperialists"'. In November and December 1968 a Chinese delegation visited Tirana. A commercial agreement was signed and staff talks conducted. On 2 December, during a reception for the Chinese guests, their leader, Huang Yung-sheng, declared that the two countries 'will always remain united, fight together and win together'.

On 27 December the Chinese exploded their second hydrogen bomb of three megatons, or the equivalent of three million tons of TNT. The event was immediately hailed by the Albanian news media as another proof of their powerful ally's ability to thwart any aggressor. This was followed by rumours that Chinese experts were working on the construction of a nuclear rocket base in Albania. Consequently, the Czechoslovak crisis has contributed to the further widening of the Sino-Soviet split and has pushed the Albanians deeper into the arms of the Chinese and made them more dependent on their distant protector. Tirana, however, has on the whole been more moderate in its domestic affairs than Peking. While praising the role of Mao and congratulating him on every significant step in his Cultural Revolution, Hoxha has not attempted a wholesale transplant of the Chinese experiment.

AS we have seen, the shock-waves of the Sino-Soviet dispute have had a far-reaching effect on Eastern Europe. All five of the major anti-Soviet revolts which have taken place in Eastern Europe (in Poland, Hungary, Albania, Rumania and Czechoslovakia) have been profoundly affected by the distant hand of Peking. Thus, the Sino-Soviet quarrel has helped in shaping a new type of relationship between Moscow and its satellites.[9] The schism has brought about far-reaching rearrangements in the system of alliances and has been a decisive factor in transforming what used to be known as the Soviet bloc into a communist camp.

Since 1960 the Russians have been anxious to secure the diplomatic as well as the ideological support of the main communist parties in power. Consequently, for the first time in history, the Soviet leaders have had to canvass for the support of their satellites to whom they had previously only issued orders. There is no doubt that the morale of the Soviet vassals has suffered as a result of the split. The fact that the Russians have failed either to crush the Chinese or to bring them to heel has in itself had a demoralizing effect on the countries of Eastern Europe. Despite the ideological differences separating China and the East European countries, the influence of Peking has

[9] See R. Lowenthal, 'China's Impact on the Evolution of Alliances in Europe', in *Western and Eastern Europe: the Changing Relationship*, Adelphi Papers, no. 33, London, 1967.

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been far from negligible. The two main instruments of Soviet hegemony, CMEA and the Warsaw Pact, have been considerably undermined. While Albania broke away altogether, Rumania has made the most extensive use of the opportunities provided by the dispute to increase her autonomy.

The Sino-Soviet dispute in its present stage has relatively little to do with ideology. Power politics and national interests have played a much more significant role than Marxist dogma.[10] Nevertheless, ideology was a factor of some importance at the initial stages of the dispute. Here it should be stressed that the point of view of all communist parties, with the exception of the Albanian Party, has been rather close to that of the Soviet Union, and has been opposed to the Chinese approach on all three of the main ideological issues of the controversy: (1) the possibility of peaceful coexistence with capitalism; (2) the effects of thermonuclear war on the capitalist and socialist systems; and (3) the expediency of temporary, tactical compromises with the common enemy. It is obvious that Mao's apocalyptic vision of an atomic Armageddon has obviously left the East Europeans shuddering, and has dampened any possible enthusiasm for Peking. The people of Eastern Europe tend to agree with the Soviet argument that the bomb does not respect class divisions, and a thermonuclear peace is equally beneficial to the proletariat and the bourgeoisie. All East Europeans share with the Soviet leaders what the Chinese call 'nuclear fetishism'. That is why they have been following with eagerness the negotiations for the test-ban treaty, and the ups and downs of *détente* in East-West relations. Although few people in Eastern Europe are actually in sympathy with the Chinese point of view, Chinese opposition to Soviet domination of the communist camp has provided certain opportunities.[11] The very nature of some of the slogans proclaimed by the Chinese is bound to have some impact on the thinking of some East European leaders. For instance, Mao's battle cry—'Rely on one's own effort'—could not fail to impress some of the bolder communists like Gheorghiu-Dej. The Chinese Great Leap Forward undoubtedly had some effect on Rumania's economic policy. It encouraged Bucharest's

[10] The views of Dubcek were a far cry from those of Mao, yet Peking took a relatively benevolent attitude towards him. The recent support lent by the Chinese to Yugoslavia is another example of the diminishing value attached by the Chinese to the ideological factor. It is worthwhile remembering that in February 1969 Peking resumed relations with its former 'revisionist' arch-enemy, Belgrade, and has expanded economic relations with Yugoslavia. Thus, the weakening of the Soviet power position by all available means, including the encouragement of racial hatred, and not ideological considerations, is the main object of Peking's policy.

[11] As Professor Phillip Mosely remarked in his article, 'The Chinese-Soviet Rift' (*Foreign Affairs*, October 1963): 'The uneasy and apprehensive attitude of most East European Communist leaders is symptomatic for their sense of insecurity. They realize that their parties would not be able to hold power for long without Soviet support, that they would either be swept away, or would have to share power with other groups while evolving under popular pressure in the direction of Social Democracy. That is why they have been sticking to the Moscow apron even without seeking any political compensation.' Lack of positive alternatives may also have something to do with the cautious attitude of most satellite leaders.

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independent line by providing it with an argument: every socialist country is entitled to full industrialization.

The demotion of the Soviet Union to the position of a senior partner, a 'primus inter pares', a ranking member but not the leader of the communist camp, suits all of its members, although most of the East European parties prefer not to mention it aloud. Thus, by stressing this approach, the Chinese have fulfilled the silent wish of the entire communist world.

All the consequences of the Sino-Soviet conflict in Eastern Europe are difficult to ascertain. What seems to be certain at the present stage is that, for those rulers of Eastern Europe who are seeking greater freedom from the Soviet Union, it is comforting to know that they have at least the prospect of support from China. On the other hand, Moscow's troubles on her Far Eastern border make it all the more imperative to do everything possible to ensure that all is quiet on the Western front. Thus, the Rumanian ability to defy Moscow is based on Bucharest's belief in the Russian inability to undertake any really drastic measures against any member of the communist camp, in view of the Chinese reaction.

Generally speaking, in their efforts to establish a measure of autonomy, the peoples of Eastern Europe have an important card to play. Albania has already played this card (and won, at least temporarily). The Rumanians are playing it now with considerable boldness. The military pledges of Peking, no matter how propagandistic they may be and no matter how distant China is from Europe, must have had some impact on the strategic as well as the tactical thinking of those concerned. They most probably had a restraining effect on the potential aggressor while giving courage to the would-be victims.

Moreover, the quarrel between the two communist giants provided the smaller states with not only an awesome spectacle but also an opportunity to play a unique role: that of mediator. As has been stressed, the Poles, the Hungarians and the Rumanians have all tried their hand at this hitherto unthinkable role. They all failed, as we know, but in trying they have done much to improve their status. Relations within the Soviet camp will never be the same again. The more powerful the contenders, the higher the stake and the greater the prestige of the arbiter. The impact of the quarrel on Party discipline and morale has also been far from negligible. The racial arguments used by Peking have undermined faith (or whatever remains of it) in communism's claim to universality and to embrace the brotherhood of all races within the movement. In Eastern Europe, where communism has shallow roots anyway, this has posed new and serious problems, in addition to those that have already been created by the effects of destalinization following the Twentieth Party Congress.

HAVING examined the influence of China on Eastern Europe from the East European standpoint, a few words must be said about

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the Chinese attitude. How should Peking's involvement in such a distant area be explained? How should the position of Eastern Europe in China's foreign policy objectives be evaluated?

In a recent article Professor John Fairbank of Harvard has suggested that there are three main characteristic features of Peking's foreign relations: (1) the strategic primacy of inner Asia; (2) the disregard for sea power; (3) the doctrine of China's superiority over all other peoples regarded by the Chinese as 'barbarians'.[12]

It is clear that these three trends discourage deeper involvement in distant lands and predispose the Chinese to focus on the areas adjacent to their own territory, especially on Central Asia from which most foreign invaders tend to come. Why then was there this sudden and apparently fairly deep engagement in a region which had formerly been considered of marginal importance?

In order to understand this shift in China's policy it is necessary to reconstruct the situation in which China found itself in 1960 as a result of the mounting bitter political and ideological conflict with the great power which shares with the Chinese the longest frontier in the world (about 4,500 miles) and which dominates vital stretches of Central Asia (about 1,000,000 square miles), lands which once had belonged to the Middle Kingdom. At that time China was still weak and dependent both economically and militarily on the Soviet Union. The fundamental character of the conflict and China's weakness made Mao determined to use any resources and any allies that could be found. He had to re-examine and reappraise his country's geopolitical and ideological position and adopt new methods. Isolated from the 'international committee of nations' (to use a favourite expression of Lord Palmerston), economically underdeveloped and with a limited military potential, having at that time neither a nuclear bomb nor long-range rockets, Mao had to rely primarily on political warfare. Hence the overwhelmingly ideological overtones of the initial Chinese attacks against Moscow. In this search for allies Mao naturally enough turned his attention to the area which since 1944–45 had been smarting under Russian domination. By raising delicate ideological as well as political issues in Eastern Europe, by ruthless anti-Soviet propaganda, Peking aimed at achieving three main aims: (1) to embarrass Moscow by every possible means[13] (2) to prevent the Russians from mobilizing their

[12] 'China's Foreign Policy in Historic Perspective', *Foreign Affairs*, April 1969.

[13] A particularly striking example of Chinese propaganda is the re-establishment on Albanian soil of the old Communist Party of Poland, set up in Tirana on 4 December 1965. The Party is to continue the 'internationalist' tradition of the CPP as opposed to the 'national communism of Gomulka', to overthrow his 'revisionist clique' and to re-establish the real dictatorship of the proletariat. The group broadcasts in Polish from Tirana Radio. Until recently the broadcasts were directed by a prominent Stalinist hard-liner, Kazimierz Mijal, who is reported to be serving now as a high official of the Albanian-Chinese shipping line. The Polish programmes of Tirana Radio have denounced Gomulka's 'renegade clique' as

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satellites in the struggle against Peking; (3) to strengthen and enhance China's position in the world by making friends and influencing people wherever and whenever possible, irrespective of their ideological orientation.[14]

Thus the Chinese intervention in Eastern Europe is a new phenomenon for both sides. Since the thirteenth century, since the Mongol invasions, Eastern Europe has never been so affected by Asia. Given the limitations of China's military capabilities, her foreign policy still naturally tends to centre on Asian issues, and her involvement in Eastern Europe is a typical example of strategic diversion. Nevertheless, it is an interesting phenomenon pregnant with future possibilities.

'revisionist traitors', responsible for 'capitalist restoration' in Poland as well as for the country's subordination to 'Moscow's super-power imperialism'. The broadcasts have also preached the revision of the present Polish-Soviet frontier in Poland's favour as far as the Dnepr.

[14] The present East European policy of Peking may have another, psychological aspect: it helps to remove from the Chinese the onus of being outcasts, outlaws, and to wash away the stigma of a former semi-colonial nation. Mao's personality may also play a certain role. 'The myth of global popular adoration of Chairman Mao and the "Thought of Mao Tse-tung" seems to have become a function of the legitimization of Mao and his named successor, Lin Piao. . . .' Mao's political authority in theory is thus derived not simply from his particularistic exclusive base in China but from the universalistic validity of his message. Accordingly, Maoist foreign policy fulfils the function of reinforcing Maoist formal political authority in China' (M. B. Yahuda, 'Chinese Foreign Policy After 1963', *China Quarterly*, October–December 1968). It seems that the inveterate Chinese pride must be flattered by the fact that they have a white nation as their vassal. The racial considerations of the Sino-Soviet conflict, although generally neglected by scholars, appear to be of crucial importance.

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HOW TO COMBINE DÉTENTE WITH SOVIET HEGEMONY?

Paul Lendvai

TWO years after the invasion of Czechoslovakia and despite its retroactive justification by the Husak group, the ruling communist parties are still publicly split by radically divergent views of what sovereignty means and should mean, and of the 'correct' interpretation of 'the dialectical unity of national and international interests'.[1] At the heart of the dispute lies the basic conflict between Soviet hegemony and national independence within what the Kremlin still regards as a colonial empire, even if it is officially called a socialist community.

The tragedy of Czechoslovakia marked not only a watershed event in the history of the world communist movement; it was also a culmination point—neither the first nor the last—of a permanent colonial crisis. With the Soviet-German pact of August 1970 already stimulating a renewed outbreak of *détente* euphoria', we ought to remember that the key question of legitimacy constitutes the deepest structural source from which many, if not all, social strains are generated. The simple point, so often brushed aside, is that communism everywhere in Eastern Europe (except in the special and complex cases of Yugoslavia and Albania) is not a national but an artificial and profoundly anti-national system, imposed and maintained by an alien super power. This is not to say that the passage of time and the improvement of living conditions have not broadened the basis of the regimes. It is simply to take note of a basic political reality which neither the shifts of mood nor tactical considerations should be allowed to obscure.

It is the unity of power and ideology that makes conflicts between communist states over essential issues inherently insoluble and lasting compromises ultimately impossible. None of the disputes that pitted the Soviet 'empire' against Yugoslavia and China, Albania and Rumania, and most recently Czechoslovakia, have been purely 'ideological' or purely 'national' but rather a fusion of both. In the case of ideologically structured communist regimes, the national and ideological factors reinforce each other. Despite the irrelevance of a sterile, reactionary dogma to the real problems facing the single-party dictatorships, ideological formulas must be produced to provide a basis of legitimacy for imperialistic, chauvinistic and reactionary policies and actions.

This is the reason why in its efforts to justify the aggression against Czechoslovakia, the Soviet leadership *had to* come forward with the

[1] A favourite term, used both by Soviet and Rumanian speakers.

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ominous doctrine which legalized the 'right of intervention' in the 'higher interests of socialism'. This notion has become in turn the key ideological ingredient of the concerted drive to reassert Soviet domination over Eastern Europe. More significantly, the doctrine of 'limited sovereignty' provides a source of legitimacy for any future Soviet military actions against another socialist country.

The Yugoslavs, themselves directly threatened in August–September 1968, were the first to draw three vital lessons: first, 'it is enough for a group of countries to conclude that socialism in a country is "endangered" to intervene for the sake of higher interests, irrespective of what that country's leaders say'. Second, 'the socialist order in a country is by itself no guarantee that such a state will be absolutely secure, least of all from other socialist countries'. Third, '. . . the "right" of self-styled Marxists to "correct revisionist trends" by means of arms in this or that socialist country introduces into international life a qualitatively new dimension. This is the dimension of war between socialist countries.'[2]

It is against the background of Czechoslovakia and the Sino-Soviet border clashes that the protracted and often esoteric public disputes about the 'correct' relationship between national and international interests must be seen. The formulations of the notorious *Pravda* article of 26 September 1968 about the subordination of the 'formal observance of freedom of self-determination', the 'abstract, non-class approach to the question of sovereignty' and the 'sovereignty of individual socialist countries' to the 'laws of the class struggle . . . and the common interests of the socialist community' have been in the meantime embellished by other Soviet and East European writers.[3]

The core of what is popularly called the 'Brezhnev Doctrine' is an updated and broadened version of the old 'touchstone' theory (loyalty to the Soviet Union is the touchstone of proletarian internationalism). As 'there is no leading centre in the international communist movement' (reaffirmed recently in the main document adopted by the world communist meeting in Moscow), a different ideological link was needed to ensure a camouflaged Soviet domination. This is the key function of the 'new' theory which replaced national sovereignty by the concept of bloc 'sovereignty'. What this 'highest historical type of state sovereignty' means in practice was perhaps most clearly defined by an East German communist scholar, Professor Herbert Kröger. 'The socialist sovereignty of every individual socialist country includes the country's right and international duty to maintain and develop its own socialist achievements and to defend the dictatorship of the proletariat

[2] See *Borba*, 24 August 1968; *Ekonomska Politika*, 26 August 1968 (both Belgrade), speech by Beno Zupancic, *Borba*, 5 September 1968 and A. Gabelic in *Borba*, 12 October 1968.

[3] See for a list of selected Soviet, East German, Bulgarian and Hungarian formulations the three-piece series by Obren Milicevic, 19, 20 and 21 November 1969 in *Borba*.

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and the social foundations of socialism in every other country of the socialist commonwealth.'[4] As neither Kröger nor any other protagonist of the 'Brezhnev Doctrine' has ever identified the 'socialist community' (or 'commonwealth') as comprising only the Warsaw Pact states, this definition ominously implies the right 'to intervene in the sovereign rights of any socialist country, inside and outside the (Warsaw Pact) bloc'.[5]

THOUGH there reigns 'calm and order' in the subjugated Czechoslovakia, we may safely state that intra-bloc relations are bound to remain a priority target on the agenda of the 1970s. This is a logical result of the increasingly evident dualism in Soviet foreign policy which seeks to combine a limited accommodation with the West and intensification of Soviet control over Eastern Europe. To put it in a different way, Soviet strategy aims at the combination of the *illusion* of a genuine *détente* in the West with the *reality* of hegemony in the East.

Throughout the 15-year-old campaign for a conference and a pact on European security, the primary goals, if not the tactics, of Soviet foreign policy have remained unchanged: first, freezing and sanctioning of the post-war European status quo based on the permanent division of Germany and permanent Soviet rule over Eastern Europe. Second, the break-up of the Western alliance and separation of the United States from its allies. To this must be added of course the impact of the Sino-Soviet conflict that lends added urgency to the entire campaign.

As to what kind of *détente* the Russians want, it is self-evident that a 'European security system', without mutual balanced force reductions and based on an unchanged Soviet military presence in Eastern Europe facing an increasingly disunited West, would tempt Soviet militancy rather than promote true East-West relaxation. Yet at the same time the Soviet leadership has to grapple with the basic dilemma of subverting Western unity without jeopardizing the cohesion of its immediate power sphere. To serve the goals of Soviet foreign policy, '*détente*' must be essentially a one-way operation.

The more the Soviet Union, however, pursues bilateral, political and economic deals with the two supposed centres of 'imperialist plots', the United States and the German Federal Republic, the more difficult it will be to infuse classical Russian policy with ideological and missionary fervour. Inevitably politics will become, to varying degrees, focused on internal affairs. This in turn means an accelerated erosion of ideological homogeneity as the basis of the Soviet bloc and, more significant, the weakening of the corset of common danger which has been so long used to hold together the bloc and to castigate

[4] *Horizont*, October 1969 (East Berlin). Here quoted after RFE Research Report, 21 November 1969.
[5] See Milicevic series.

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Rumanian-style deviations from bloc discipline. Meanwhile, due to the very character of the Soviet concept of the 'indivisible socialist community', any active Western policy towards the East European states is bound to be intrinsically anti-Soviet for it lessens the dependence of the partners on the hegemonial centre and promotes national individualism.

Ever since the death of Stalin, and particularly since the Twentieth Soviet Party Congress, the Soviet leadership has been faced with the problem of how to maintain its domination over Eastern Europe—by suppressing or by tolerating diversity? And if the second course is followed, will the forced or voluntary toleration of autonomy save what is essential to Soviet interests, or will it rather accelerate the process of disintegration in Eastern Europe? The invasion of Czechoslovakia and its rationalization have annulled the entire process that began with the Belgrade Declaration in May 1955 on the separate roads to socialism and gained new impetus after the Twentieth Congress and the Soviet Government's statement of 30 October 1956 on relations between 'socialist' states.

There are two further factors which give cause for concern in the countries most exposed to Soviet pressure. The first is the fact that the dramatic shift from grudging tolerance of dissent to the Stalinist concept of Soviet primacy is nothing less than the external reflection of a relatively swift, internal re-Stalinization. The corollary to the decline of doctrinal authority and international prestige is the growing militarization and nationalism of the Soviet political system. It is discipline and not liberalization that appeals to the instincts and vested interests of the ageing, conservative and nationalistic ruling bureaucracy in the Soviet Union.

The second, and perhaps even more sinister, implication of the Czech experience is that its repercussions have justified the solution of the crisis by force. The storm of protests in the West and in the East subsided more quickly than perhaps even the most optimistic hawks in the Kremlin could have hoped for in August 1968. True, the reasons for the subsequent silence were different in each case and none of the ruling Parties withdrew their criticism of the invasion, though Rumania and even Yugoslavia did refrain from a condemnation of the overthrow of the reformist leadership and of the purges in 1969–70. Whatever the reservations of 14 of the 75 Party delegations were, however, the real significance of the Moscow world conference was the fact that it took place at all and that a 'dead' international movement provided a semblance of solidarity for the Soviet Party that less than 10 months earlier had found itself in an isolated minority position.

As to the Western governments, they act, after a very short interval, as if the occupation of Czechoslovakia, in the immortal words of former French Foreign Minister Michel Debré, was no more than a 'traffic accident'. It is doubtful whether the Russians from *their* point

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of view have committed an 'historic blunder' as held by some eminent Western observers.[6] But regardless of the outcome in the *very* long run, what matters now is the likelihood that the Soviet leadership may feel that it has a carte blanche to resort to force if and when 'a danger to socialism itself arises in a country'.[7]

This is not to say that the forces shaping the direction of changes in the Soviet sphere of influence have ceased to be operative or that the profound national and social transformations that have been taking place in the individual countries have been brought to an abrupt halt. External and internal emancipation from Soviet domination is still the underlying central theme of East European political life. What developments since August 1968 suggest is that Moscow's response to the problems of the new epoch and perhaps also the criterion for what is essential to Soviet interests has changed.

It does not, however, follow that the elimination of the most dangerous source of contagion has also eradicated the roots of the stresses and tensions within the 'inner core' of the Soviet realm or the disruptive influences radiating from the 'outer belt'—Yugoslavia and Rumania (and Albania). This is the chief reason why the Kremlin resumed the campaign—originally launched by Khrushchev—for a 'perfecting' of the Warsaw Treaty Organization and Comecon. Soviet attempts, as before, are designed to strengthen the supranational character of the institutional devices in order to restore and guarantee a greater degree of bloc discipline. Failing this, the Soviets feel that even the pursuit of a limited accommodation or a selective co-existence with the West may well facilitate what they call the 'export of counter-revolution'.

THE search for a *détente* with the West is bound to provide—as does the Sino-Soviet conflict—both a motive for broadening the margin of autonomy and an excuse for tightening the screws on Eastern Europe. Nothing suits the interests of Soviet hegemony more conveniently than the still persistent propensity of some Western governments for an approach in 'bloc' terms. Commenting on the Soviet and East European attacks on President Nixon's visit to Bucharest, the Belgrade newspaper *Borba* noted perceptively: 'These (attacks) reflect the impact of the theory of limited sovereignty, the idea that socialist Central and Eastern Europe forms one unit and any American contact with any part of this unit which fails to go through the centre means interference in the domestic affairs of the supranational whole'.[8] (Whatever the real intentions of Bonn's Ostpolitik, the formulation in the so-called 'Bahr paper' about normalization of relations with the Soviet Union, East Germany, Poland

[6] For example, Zbigniew Brzezinski, *Die Zeit* (Hamburg), 3 October 1969.
[7] S. Kovalev, *Pravda*, 26 September 1968.
[8] *Borba*, 30 June 1969.

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and Czechoslovakia constituting a 'united whole' comes perilously close to *Borba's* definition.)

In this connexion, the important point to stress is that such autonomous centres of decision-making as Yugoslavia and Rumania want to harness the forces unleashed by the Soviet campaign to a subtle subversion of Moscow's grand design. Promoting the idea of a European security conference should not mean consolidating Soviet hegemony but on the contrary providing options for more, and not less, independence of the East European countries. As Premier Maurer of Rumania put it, 'European security is incompatible with spheres of influence'.[9]

What is to Moscow an instrument to freeze the status quo is a possibility for gradual disengagement to Belgrade and Bucharest. In other words, while agreeing in *form* with the Soviet foreign policy goals, the Yugoslav and Rumanian leaders want to create a propitious climate for a *détente within* the Soviet bloc. For Moscow, cohesion and discipline within the 'socialist community' are a precondition for the pursuit of a limited *détente* in Europe, but for the Yugoslavs, Rumanians and possibly also for the Hungarians, an East-West reconciliation constitutes the basis for a steadily increasing freedom of each communist state in shaping their external policies along more individualistic lines, for growing diversity of the East European political systems and ultimately for a positive evolution within the Soviet Union itself.

IN sum, *détente* may be used not only against Western unity, but also against Eastern bloc cohesion. This is the chief reason why the Yugoslav and Rumanian Governments place the emphasis on the necessity of manifold bilateral East-West contacts, and seek the calling of a series of conferences and often seem in fact to prefer the preparations to the full-dressed conference itself.[10] Their long-range goal is the pursuit of a new Europe on the basis of independent nation-states engaged in peaceful co-operation.

At the Ninth Congress of the Rumanian Communist Party, the Central Committee secretary in charge of relations with 'fraternal' parties, Paul Niculescu-Mizil, presented the comprehensive Rumanian alternative to the Soviet doctrine of limited sovereignty:

> We see the socialist world system as a community of free, independent, and sovereign states whose multilateral international co-operation is based on the fundamental and indestructible principle that it is solely and exclusively the Party and the people of the respective country, the constitutional organs of the state that are authorized to decide about all questions in each country,

[9] At his press conference in London, 28 November 1969.
[10] See Michel Tatu, *Le Monde*, 9 December 1969.

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> be they of an economic, cultural or political nature, be they questions of national defence, internal or external questions.[11]

Paraphrasing the same theme, General Secretary Nicolae Ceausescu developed the argument to the effect that the 'socialist world system' should be an alliance of complete equals: 'By the the socialist world system we do not mean a bloc in which states merge completely and renounce their national sovereignty; we see in it the affirmation of socialism as an international force due to its victory in several independent states which develop independently and base their relations among themselves on new principles, the principles of Marxism-Leninism and proletarian internationalism'. The Rumanian leader left no doubts as to the core of this internationalism: 'The progress of each nation, the social and national self-affirmation of each people, therein lies the lasting fundament of the international solidarity of the socialist countries. . . . The consolidation of international solidarity presupposes relations of complete equality among all countries of the socialist world system.'[12]

While the Russians regard proletarian internationalism as the unconditional subordination of ruling and non-ruling parties to major Soviet policies, as an instrument of manipulation to impose unity from the centre, the Rumanian doctrine of independence proclaims complete equality as the decisive condition for a solidarity based on the free consent of fully sovereign nations and parties. One may say that all this is only a more elaborate restatement of the basic policy spelled out already in the famous 'Declaration of Independence' of April 1964. What matters, however, is the timing and the fashion in which the Rumanian defiance is expressed. To repudiate the Brezhnev Doctrine and to claim total freedom of policy-making *after* August 1968 (which brought in its wake also the direct threat of a Soviet attack on Rumania) still involves immense political risks, indeed greater than before August 1968.

The demonstrative and incessant reaffirmation of the independent course in the face of the proven unpredictability of the Soviet leadership is far more significant than such gestures of concessions as Rumanian participation at the world communist conference or the signing of a new friendship treaty with the Soviet Union whose provisions are ambiguous enough to provide the Rumanians with an escape-hatch. It might be argued that the Rumanians' audacity (for example the demonstrative fostering of friendship with China and the dispatch of high-ranking party and military delegations to Peking both before and after the conclusion of the new pact with Moscow) reflects their estimate that the period of acute crisis has passed. More probable, however, is the explanation that the Rumanians believe that any yielding on vital issues would whet rather than satisfy the Soviet appetite

[11] For full text of speeches at congress see *Scinteia*, 7–13 August 1969.
[12] Ibid.

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for concessions, that any display of weakness would tempt and not dampen Soviet militancy.[13] Whatever the motivation of the different moves at different times, the active and self-assertive Rumanian foreign policy poses a permanent challenge and a real dilemma to the Kremlin.

Thus it is imperative to take a balanced view of the likely evolution of intra-bloc relations. We should neither fall prey to the excessive optimism of the 1960s, that is, to lose sight of the limits, nor allow our keener awareness of the external restraints to let us forget the depth of continuing changes within the Soviet sphere of influence. It is important to remember that the network of conflicting and common interests, the cross-currents of disintegrative tendencies have always extended far beyond the deceptively simple demarcation line between the inner core of the Soviet power sphere and the outer belt of independent communist states in Europe and Asia. This inter-relationship has played, for example, a key role in reducing post-war Soviet domination over the Balkan peninsula to one isolated stronghold, Bulgaria. The triumphant rise of Balkan nationalism in turn has been a significant contributory cause to the eruptions of centrifugal pressures within the inner core.

IN evaluating intra-bloc relations we have to distinguish between movement and fluidity on the one hand and qualitative changes in power relationships on the other. The central political reality of the 1970s is the Soviet military presence in Eastern Europe as far west as the Elbe. Twenty-five years after the Second World War, four of the Soviet Union's six Warsaw Pact partners rank officially as occupied countries, with a fifth Bulgaria, subjected to total Soviet military domination.[14] The Rumanian behaviour after the evacuation of Soviet troops in May 1958 and the Czechoslovak crisis must have eliminated the last lingering doubts in the Kremlin that the Soviet power sphere in general and the East German regime in particular could be maintained without the right to station troops. Thus the Soviet armed might in Eastern Europe is the single most important guarantee of its imperial interests.

Even aside from Moscow's nuclear armoury, the 30 Soviet divisions in East Germany, Poland, Czechoslovakia, and Hungary are a tangible symbol of Soviet domination. There is furthermore an overwhelming Soviet superiority in population, resources and military power. Thus the Soviet Union has a population over twice that of all other Warsaw Pact powers combined; its gross national product is 2·8 times larger and its armed forces are 3·2 times greater.[15] In addition to this unequal relationship, the East European states have never been able

[13] See J. F. Brown, The Strategy of Defiance, *Problems of Communism* (Washington), March–April 1969.

[14] After the invasion of Czechoslovakia, the Albanians repeatedly—even after Bulgarian *dementis*—announced the stationing of Soviet troops in Bulgaria.

[15] The *Military Balance* 1968–69, The Institute for Strategic Studies.

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to co-operate against great challengers bent on filling a power vacuum. Just like Nazi Germany in 1939 and 1941, the Soviet Union has been able to rely on loyal vassals both in 1956 and 1968 in confrontation with an isolated small country.

In view of the immensely powerful military bonds and the network of 20-year bilateral treaties between the East European states and the Soviet Union, it is legitimate to conclude that 'there existed and exists now little military need for the Warsaw Treaty Organisation (WTO). The WTO could be dissolved without in the least impairing the military capacity of the alliance.'[16] The treaties on the 'temporary' stationing of Soviet forces with Poland, East Germany, Hungary in 1956–57 and finally with Czechoslovakia in October 1968 as well as the renewal of bilateral treaties among all member states can alone assure both the continuation of the military alliance and the virtual perpetuation of Soviet military presence. To replace NATO and WTO by a 'European security system' as offered by the Bucharest declaration of the WTO Political Consultative Committee in July 1966 would thus leave the Soviets in military control of Eastern Europe up to the Elbe, while Western Europe would be deprived of American protection and any alternative alliance system.

Yet despite the built-in safeguards for the maintenance of Soviet preponderance, the offer for a parallel dissolution of the WTO was preceded and followed by Soviet efforts to strengthen military and political co-operation under the pact. In fact, the offer was not repeated in the declaration issued by the Foreign Ministers of the Warsaw Pact in October 1969 which proposed an agenda for a European security conference. Even though the Warsaw Pact memorandum of June 1970 broadened the projected agenda to include the reduction of foreign forces stationed on the territory of European states, this is as yet primarily a calculated 'concession' to sweeten the pill for the NATO governments and to provide new arguments for the advocates of a unilateral reduction of American forces in Europe. Such gestures should not be allowed to obscure the retrogression of recent years, so dramatically evident in the invasion of Czechoslovakia and in the continued presence of Russian troops which after the recent treaty between the Soviet Union and West Germany have lost the pretence of defending a border and forestalling an attack from the very country that now recognizes all existing borders in Europe as inviolable.

Everything that has been happening in Czechoslovakia, including the new Treaty of Friendship with Russia which laid down officially that it was the 'joint international duty of the socialist countries' to defend 'socialist achievements', is evidence of the Soviet determination to consolidate and not to weaken its hegemonic hold.

Regardless of the original rationale for the creation of the Warsaw Pact (response to NATO, bargaining instrument and legalization of

[16] See Bela Kiraly, *East Europe*, April 1969.

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the stationing of Soviet troops in Hungary and Rumania after the signing of the Austrian State Treaty), its main use was and is political rather than military.[17] It serves the Soviet centre primarily as a policing instrument to control and to contain centrifugal forces.

IN view of the gradual loss of Soviet ideological authority and with manifold political-economic frictions eroding the cohesion of the bloc, the Soviet leadership both under Khrushchev and after has felt a growing need for some form of institutionalized unity, for a joint body to co-ordinate foreign policy in addition to the tested device of bilateral 'consultations'. This is the reason for the persistent attempts to lend a supranational character to the two existing bloc-wide organizations, the WTO and Comecon.

The very ambiguity and brevity of the Warsaw Treaty, signed on 14 May 1955—as in the case of the statutes of Comecon—has all along seriously hampered Soviet efforts to 'perfect' the mechanism of military-political integration, and to revitalize the two major bodies at the pinnacle of the formal structure: the Political Consultative Committee, the highest organ of the WTO and the Joint Supreme Command. Though the key positions—supreme commander, chief of the general staff and secretary general—have always been held by Soviet marshals and functionaries, the Kremlin was forced to realize during the turbulent 1960s that military preponderance by itself could not satisfy the need for an institutional form of supra-state authority over the member states.

The lack of precision in the Warsaw Treaty provided a way out for the Rumanians to resist Soviet demands for closer political and military integration. Already in 1966 on the eve of the Bucharest summit meeting, the Rumanian leadership successfully pre-empted the Soviet campaign by putting forward proposals for a sweeping reorganization of the WTO, including a periodic rotation of command. One year later Ceausescu for the first time referred publicly to the necessity that each member country 'have its own command able to answer any call'.[18]

Both before and after the Czechoslovak crisis, the Rumanian leadership continued to stand firm on the principle of self-determination 'including questions of national defence'. Though the WTO conference in March 1969 announced the setting up of a Committee of Defence Ministers, which held its first meeting nine months later, the Soviets are unlikely to have made much progress in realizing their ambitious designs, specifically in entrusting the Joint Supreme Command with formal and legally binding authority over the national armies and not only over forces assigned to it by the member states. At a party conference of the Ministry of Defence in Bucharest, Ceausescu declared

[17] For a thorough analysis of the Warsaw Pact, see Roman Kolkowicz, *Survey*, Winter-Spring 1969.
[18] *Scinteia*, 19 June 1967.

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unequivocally: 'The only leaders of our armed forces are the Party, the government and the supreme national command. Only they can give orders to our army and only these orders can be carried out in the Socialist Republic of Rumania'.[19] At the time of this writing the Rumanians still appear to have resisted the pressure for holding Warsaw Pact manoeuvres on Rumanian territory, the more so since the Bucharest Parliament solemnly decided that a decision regarding the stationing of foreign troops was a 'matter exclusively within the jurisdiction of this supreme elected body'.[20]

The Soviet-Rumanian conflict in the field of military integration goes of course far beyond the contested issue of troop manoeuvres. Its core lies in diametrically opposed concepts. Regardless of the real power relationships, the Rumanians rely on Article 8 of the charter about the principle of mutual respect for independence and non-interference in internal affairs and behave as if the WTO *were* an alliance of independent states where binding decisions could be made only unanimously. Moscow offers a semblance of participation in decision-making in order to gain the substance of supra-state authority—Bucharest is willing to yield only on non-essentials in order to save the substance of independent foreign policy. In short, the Rumanian response to Soviet pressures remains short-term retreat combined with long-term advance.

Even more important than the purely military aspects is the fact that the WTO has failed to fulfil its primary political function of becoming an effective instrument of joint foreign policy. Its supreme organ, the Political Consultative Committee, should meet 'according to necessity but at least twice a year'.[21] In fact it has held only 11 formal meetings during its 15-year existence. Prior to the Soviet-Rumanian conflict, the conferences served to sanction policy decisions made in advance by the Kremlin. The Soviet Union has not been able to use the Warsaw Pact as a potent weapon in either preventing or responding effectively to Albania's 'defection' and Rumanian acts of defiance. Nor have the Russians managed to gain formal backing by the WTO as an alliance in their campaign against China. Such Rumanian deviations on substantive issues as the establishment of diplomatic relations with Bonn, the non-aligned stance during and after the Middle East war, the abstention from signing a formal Warsaw Pact document supporting the nuclear non-proliferation treaty,[22] President Nixon's visit to Bucharest and a host of other single-handed initiatives have provided striking proofs of the impotence of the WTO

[19] *Scinteia*, 6 February 1970.
[20] 21 August 1968.
[21] For the relevant texts, see Boris Meissner, *Der Warschauer Pakt*, Köln, 1961.
[22] Subsequently Rumania signed the non-proliferation treaty in June 1968, ratified by the State Council on 30 January 1970. On this occasion, Ceausescu reaffirmed Rumania's reservations and criticism with regard to the treaty and the lack of concrete measures toward nuclear disarmament.

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as a *political* alliance, as a mechanism to contain pressures toward independence.

The Czechoslovak crisis completed the cracking open of the whole façade of bloc solidarity. One WTO member was occupied by five others; a seventh—Rumania—vigorously condemned the invasion but maintained what *Pravda* a year earlier had called a 'formal presence' in the WTO, while an eighth member, Albania (since 1962 only nominally adhering to the WTO) on 13 September 1968 annulled even its formal membership in the WTO because 'it has been turned from a peace treaty into a war pact, from a defence treaty against imperialist aggression into a pact of aggression against the socialist countries'.[23]

The seemingly strengthened cohesion of the WTO since August 1968 coupled with the 'normalization' in occupied Czechoslovakia can at best alleviate the effects of the profound changes and fissures within the Warsaw Pact. Neat definitions about a 'northern tier' of East Germany, Czechoslovakia and Poland forming an 'iron triangle' and a 'southern tier' comprising Hungary, Bulgaria and unreliable Rumania have been made obsolete. Far from having stabilized the soft southern flank, the Soviets could not even contain the pressures of liberalization and nationalism within the 'iron triangle' without resorting to naked force.

The participation of the four vassels in the attack was a poor substitute for the lack of a legal rationale, the absence of a statement by the statutory organs of the Pact. Furthermore, the 14 Czechoslovak divisions can hardly be regarded as an asset. The strong misgivings voiced by the Hungarians about the entire operation are by now public knowledge.[24] To sum up, in a crisis situation the Soviets can rely (for diverse reasons) on the unfailing and enthusiastic obedience of the East German, Bulgarian and Polish rulers while the Hungarians—though in the last resort subscribing to key Soviet decisions—represent an element of moderation. As the Hungarian regime is perhaps internally the most stable today, Kadar's counsels carry some weight as long as there is no solid majority in the 'collective leadership' in Moscow. Once, however, the Kremlin makes an irrevocable decision, the Hungarians will take part even in highly unpopular actions.

For all its failures in the political domain, the WTO nevertheless remains the best available integration mechanism for the post-Stalin control system, a centre to contain and to hold together the bloc. The military conspiracy in 1965 in Bulgaria, the Rumanian decision to maintain total control over national defence and the behaviour of the Czechoslovak army during the invasion must have strengthened the distrust of the Soviet high command with regard to the reliability of the East European armies in a crisis situation. Thus both military

[23] Albanian news agency English-language service, 14 September 1968.

[24] Kadar's secret meeting with Dubcek on 17 August 1968 in Komarno was for the first time officially confirmed by Husak one year later. *Rude Pravo*, 20 August 1969.

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and political considerations force the Soviets to press for a revitalization of the WTO and for 'legally' binding ways of a deeper institutional penetration of the allied forces.

The inter-relationship between the centripetal and centrifugal forces is particularly evident in the military-political field. The very basis of Soviet hegemony—the direct possession of East European territories through the stationing of Soviet troops—is also the single most powerful symbol of national resentment against an alien super-power. Soviet occupation, in addition to historical memories, territorial and economic grievances, continuously stokes the fires of the defensive and primarily anti-Soviet nationalism of the East European peoples. Thus what is undoubtedly the most vital safeguard for Soviet imperial power simultaneously provides steam for nationalism—the real challenge to Soviet dominance.

ECONOMIC integration as the second main lever to consolidate Soviet control has proved if anything even more difficult and raised even more complex problems than the attempts to 'perfect' the Warsaw Pact. In one of the most candid communist analyses ever made about the future of Comecon, Rezsö Nyers, the architect of the Hungarian economic reforms and Politbureau member, once described it as 'a question of enormous political importance' since economic and political problems are insolubly tied and final decisions can be taken only at the political level.[25] This indeed is the chief reason why all attempts to promote full economic integration have failed and the much-publicized specialization has so far affected a mere 6 per cent of the total engineering output of the member states.

Instead of becoming a corset to hold together the economies of the bloc, Comecon has been subjected to sharpening contradictions between national economic dynamism and supranational statism, between autarkic practices and integration blueprints. Ever since Khrushchev's bid to transform it into a supra-state co-ordinating body foundered on Rumania's veto, Comecon has been virtually paralysed. For the principle of unanimity means that only recommendations or decisions approved by all interested parties can take effect. The main economic factors responsible for the deadlock (irrational and isolated pricing systems, lack of realistic exchange rates and of free convertibility, etc.) are well known by now.[26]

It is however often overlooked that the Soviet pressure for putting teeth into Comecon has always been dictated by political and not economic considerations. Foreign trade amounts only to some 4 per cent of the Soviet national income; while the corresponding figure

[25] Speech at the party Political Academy. For text, see *Nepszabadsag*, 23 January 1969.

[26] For an excellent summary, see J. M. Montias, 'Obstacles to the Economic Integration of Eastern Europe', *Studies in Comparative Communism*, July-October 1969.

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for Hungary, for example, is no less than 40 per cent.[27] It is highly significant that Nyers, in his speech cited earlier, for the first time publicly raised—and of course immediately dismissed—the possibility of the Comecon member countries integrating with the *external* support of the Soviet Union which in itself is a huge integrated unit, needing no further integration. He hastened to add that for 'political reasons and economic considerations' the future economic community was 'possible and correct' only with the closest participation of the Soviet Union. The Kremlin is the most fervent advocate of new institutional arrangements for multilateral economic co-operation. Yet, Nyers felt it necessary to reassure his audience, 'it would not be correct to think that the Soviet Union is not interested in economic integration'.

This is not really a paradox. The crux of the matter is that the Soviet leadership pursues the old Khrushchevian concept of subjecting the economic policies of the individual members to binding decisions made by a supranational planning agency, of making Comecon into the principal economic instrument of Soviet hegemony. Six years after Khrushchev's famous call for supranational integration, Academician G. Sorokin came out in favour of a single, integrated, world socialist economy with a single economic plan and supranational administration for entire economic branches to be achieved in two decades.[28] Despite some differences of emphasis, the writings of Soviet experts indicate that the long-term Soviet scheme continues to aim at the creation of a supra-state, economic, decision-making centre as a prelude to covert political unification.

In contrast to the early 1960s, however, the deadlock in integration can no longer be reduced to the simple formula of Rumania versus the rest of the bloc. Even in those years of course the conflict of interests also pitted the 'haves' against the 'have-nots'. The excessively uneven pace of domestic economic reforms and increasing trade with the West (involving the partial loss of 'stable' markets for East German and Czech capital goods in Eastern Europe) have in recent years further sharpened these frictions. The Russians want to resolve the conflicts through administrative decisions imposed from above. Economically, they welcome some improvements of present arrangements with such key problems as prices, foreign exchange rates and convertibility regarded merely as 'perspectivical means of integration'.

By contrast, the Hungarians, the Czechs (until Dubcek's fall), and, albeit less vocally, the Poles contend that without radical reforms of the currency and payments systems, of the entire pricing mechanism and enterprise autonomy a proper co-ordination of plans, let alone a common economic policy, is impossible. Whereas the Russians see a high degree of economic union as the beginning of real integration, the Hungarians want to create through economic levers the preconditions of a 'Common Market'. In short, what the Kremlin regards as the

[27] For details, see Deputy Premier Antal Apro's book on Comecon, quoted by M.T.I., 28 January 1969.

[28] *Voprosy Ekonomiki*, December 1968.

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starting-point—a supra-state centre—the Hungarians envisage as the culmination of the process of integration which nevertheless would safeguard 'the essence of national sovereignty', though it might lead 'in an historically distant period' to some form of a political union.[29]

The difference between what the Hungarians now openly describe as 'two schools of thought' reflects not only the gulf between the Hungarian approach to economic reform and the Soviet tinkering with piecemeal improvements of an essentially unchanged global planning of the Stalinist vintage. It also indicates a basic conflict both over the methods and aims of economic integration. What the Russians mean by closer co-operation is a bloc-wide command economy which would institutionally subordinate 'narrow' national interests to the 'common interests' as they interpret them. Though, for diametrically opposed reasons, both the Russians and the Rumanians are against radical economic reforms as advocated by the Hungarians. The Russians prefer to maintain the present structure rather than risk any dangerous experiments in decentralization and seek domination through barely veiled coercive measures. The Rumanians strive for a maximum of independence within what they want to maintain as a loose association of economically sovereign states.

The real issue in the 1970s is not likely to be just integration versus immobilism but what kind of integration the Comecon members seek and what exactly ought to be done. The purely economic considerations in each case are naturally coloured by the various degrees of political servility towards Moscow and the political strength (or weakness) of the leadership in the individual countries. Thus it is only due to political factors that such economic opposites as East Germany, the most highly developed industrial country, and Bulgaria, still the least developed, unconditionally support the *basic* Soviet approach regardless of their conflicting interests. The Poles favour the Hungarian proposals for a new monetary system but are more ambiguous about co-operation at enterprise level. Czechoslovakia, so recently the pacemaker of market-type arrangements, is unlikely to play an independent role in reforming Comecon in the foreseeable future.

Even this crudely simplified tableau indicates how difficult it is to find a balance between conflicting interests. Yet it would be unwise to forget that the individual countries are becoming year by year more closely 'integrated' not among themselves but with the Soviet Union. One-third of the intra-Comecon trade is with the Soviet Union, the major supplier of vital raw materials and the single largest market for manufactures. Except for Rumania, the Soviet share has been increasing during the past decade. In addition to a Soviet preponderance in selected crucial branches, the economic bonds are also

[29] For Hungarian criticism of Sorokin, see Bela Sulyok, *Kozgazdasai Szemle*, April 1969, and Ivan Wiesel in same journal, May 1969.

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strengthened through such bilateral ventures as the Soviet-Hungarian aluminium agreement, the Czech capital investments in the extraction of Soviet oil, the Soviet-Bulgarian co-operation in the exploitation of Soviet timber and through multilateral projects (oil pipelines and power grids) and supra-state enterprises in the production of steel, ball-bearings and chemicals (each without Rumanian participation). Nor is Rumania a founding member of the new Comecon Investment Bank, established in July 1970, which may mark the beginning of a transition from the rule of unanimity to the Soviet-sponsored principle of majority decisions.

It is realistic to suppose that the Kremlin would not tolerate a spread of the 'Rumanian model' and deviations in essential matters in common external economic policy. Nevertheless, the manifold conflicts of interests and divergent policies in economic experimentation, influenced by the specific sources of domestic social instability in each country and heightened by the need for technology importation from the West pose a constant, albeit long-term, threat to the economic cohesion of the bloc. With the gradual loss of the unifying impulse of external threat and of Soviet ideological authority (but not of course of military and economic preponderance) the economic and non-economic frictions between the hegemonial centre and the weaker partners on the one hand and particularly among the smaller member states on the other will become exacerbated rather than curbed.

Other sources of potential centrifugal pressures are intimately connected with the paradoxical effects of the Soviet nuclear umbrella. In a world of nuclear deterrence and at a time of dialogue and relaxation in East-West relations, the East Europeans are bound to resent the maintenance of high-cost defence establishments and the subordination of domestic priorities to the requirements of military and economic aid for distant client states and temporary allies in Asia and the Middle East.

THE future pattern of political, military, and economic co-operation will depend primarily upon the Soviet leadership. The next decade is likely to be one of continued search for a politically safe balance between uniformity and diversity, between the optimal degree of centralization of decision-making in Moscow and the optimal degree of domestic autonomy. While the right of armed intervention remains the ultimate Soviet weapon, the dominant unknown in any equation is the timing and extent of future reshuffles in the Kremlin.

In sum, there are two paramount factors which serve as the cement holding the Soviet sphere of influence together: first, the physical presence of Soviet garrisons as well as the Soviet Union's military and economic might, and second, the vested interests of the Party apparat and the officer corps in preserving 'imported' minority regimes whose very survival could be in danger without Soviet protection. The East European leaders are willing to make *tactical* concessions in

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order to gain acceptance or a modicum of co-operation from their populations. In *strategic* terms, however, they all (including also Kadar and particularly Gomulka, let alone Ulbricht) see Soviet power as the ultimate protector. Despite the enormous difference between the atmosphere in Hungary and that in East Germany or Bulgaria, there is a common area of self-interest in following the Soviet lead in all fundamental matters. This is a self-interest rooted in weakness.

These considerations do not pertain to Yugoslavia, Albania and Rumania whose rulers staked *their* survival on past or present defiance of Soviet hegemony. Belgrade and Bucharest exert a permanent, albeit varying influence, the first as a centre of ideological and political innovation; and both as symbols of triumphant nationalism. The attraction of the 'outer belt' is bound to become stronger and not weaker if new international relationships emerge in Europe.

Nationalism is as before the principal source of the centrifugal forces weakening the political-economic cohesion within the inner core of the Soviet hegemonic sphere. Other factors threatening the status quo are a widening of East-West collaboration beyond the economic and technological relations to real and not merely formal cultural contacts; the intellectual ferment and the generation gap coupled with changes in value and cultural choices, in life style of the young and the cultural elite; and the 'ideology-fatigue', the irreversible process of ideological erosion.

The relationship between the individual regimes and Moscow will also depend on the degree of operational connexion between the East European leaders and the Kremlin. This in turn is influenced by the given degree of political stability of each communist regime and that of the cohesion of the Soviet 'collective leadership'. The examples of Hungary (1953–56) and to some extent also of Czechoslovakia (1968–69) show that factional battles in Moscow with multiple contacts to rival contenders in an East European country can become an important source of instability. The problem of authoritative leadership and the succession at the very top is a key question for a communist system. It may yet play a crucial role in East Germany and Poland.

Having seen so many previously 'unthinkable' changes in the communist world, new upheavals in Eastern Europe cannot be completely excluded. Nevertheless on present assumptions it seems inconceivable to the author that any country belonging to the 'inner core' would be in a position in the foreseeable future to embark upon the Rumanian road to independence. Nor are the ruling bureaucrats in those countries (and in Rumania too) likely to tolerate the spread of the 'Yugoslav model' or to allow pressures of liberalization and access to mass media to escape strict control from above.

The maximum the East Europeans can hope for is slow progress toward the Hungarian mixture of 'domesticism' and controlled 'revisionism' based on a tacit agreement between rulers and ruled, and granting significant concessions to the population without courting

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major political risks for the regime. Only time will show how much of the Hungarian experiment (inconclusive as it is) is applicable to other communist states. It will be a slow process with the pace varying from country to country and ultimately determined by internal developments in the Soviet Union. But without indulging in far-fetched speculations concerning the possibility of future turbulence in 'safe' regions, we may safely state that the extreme disjunction between the two main aspects of Soviet foreign policy—formal *détente* in the West and reassertion of real hegemony in the East (both profoundly affected by the ramifications of the conflict with China)—is bound to intensify rather than mollify nationalist tendencies and to compound social and political strains in Eastern Europe.

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TITO'S LEGACY

Ilija Jukic

ON 21 September Tito announced the creation of a State Presidium, a body designed to deal with any succession crisis that might arise after his death. But the problem for post-Tito Yugoslavia is not confined to the question of succession. It is aggravated by the increasingly acute tensions between the various nationalities. The federal system adopted in 1946 to cope with the delicate nationalities problem is now in a state of crisis. The federal republics looked very impressive on paper, but in reality they had little power. There were six of them: Croatia, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Serbia, Montenegro and Macedonia. Slovenia, Croatia and a part of Serbia are the most developed areas while Bosnia-Herzegovina, the southern part of Serbia (including the Kossovo region inhabited by a compact and numerous Albanian minority), Montenegro and Macedonia are the most underdeveloped. Being composed of peoples who differ considerably from each other in economic development, culture and historical development, Yugoslavia fell prey to outbreaks of nationalist feeling in the various republics after the establishment of the communist regime. The rigid centralism—an essential feature of such regimes—laid a solid basis for the economic exploitation of the richer parts of the country to the benefit of the undeveloped regions and of the centre of the Federation. Slovene and Croatian communists began to complain about the exploitation, according to Bakaric's statement to P. Lendvai, 'sometime after 1952'.[1] Kathleen Stahl wrote at the beginning of 1953 that the Croats and Slovenes were thinking 'of the perpetual drain of capital from the North to the South' and that it seemed to many of them that 'the fruits of the revolution have been reaped by the southern Republics'.[2] The revolt of the richer republics against this situation destroyed another facile and optimistic view of the Yugoslav communists, namely, that the introduction of a communist regime would automatically bring with it harmony between the various peoples. The shattering of this illusion prepared the way for all the subsequent divisions and conflicts among the Yugoslav communists.

THE conflict with Stalin and the necessity to ingratiate themselves with the West forced the Yugoslav leaders to make some changes in their regime. The Sixth Congress of their Party, held in Zagreb at the end of November 1952, introduced reforms aimed at democratizing the Communist Party and liberalizing the regime. In accordance with these reforms the Party was renamed the League of Communists. Djilas and Kardelj were the chief sponsors of the reforms and expected

[1] P. Lendvai, *Eagles in Cobwebs* (London, Macdonald, 1970), p. 151.
[2] *Manchester Guardian*, 27 February 1953.

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these reforms to facilitate the rapprochement between Yugoslavia and the West.

However, Tito, Rankovic and other powerful elements in the Party hoped that Stalin's death would enable them to re-establish some form of relationship with the Soviet Union. With this in mind, they stopped the implementation of the reforms four months after Stalin's death. Djilas did not accept this decision as final. A few months later he launched a campaign in support of the reforms. At the beginning he could count on the sympathy of the majority of the members of the Central Committee, but he was later deserted by all but two of them when Tito brought matters to a head in that body in the middle of January 1954. Djilas was condemned by the Central Committee for his ideas and was later jailed.

At this time a new conflict arose in the League of Yugoslav Communists. It had its roots in the failure to implement the decision to decentralize the administration, adopted in the middle of 1952 together with the introduction of self-management in industrial enterprises and all economic units and social institutions. The reformers viewed self-government of the administrative bodies as the first step leading to the greater degree of self-government in the republics. The disagreements over the implementation of that reform were soon extended to embrace demands for the introduction of more freedom in Yugoslavia and for the relaxation of controls in the economy. The elements which demanded these reforms were known as reformists and those which opposed them, conservatives. The conservatives accused their opponents of favouring the dissolution of the secret police and of bringing chaos into the Yugoslav economy by their reforms. The reformists charged their opponents with making economic progress impossible by sabotaging every reform.

This struggle continued after the adoption of the new constitution of 1963. Rankovic, using his strong position in the Party, created around himself a kind of government of his own. Kardelj, in his position as President of the National Assembly, countered Rankovic's attempts to control the legal government. Well-informed people maintained that Yugoslavia at that time had in fact two governments. Tito was clearly dissatisfied with this state of affairs, and threatened repeatedly that he would resign unless the conflicts in the Party ceased.

Rankovic's followers, using this threat as a pretext, decided to try to get their leader elected General Secretary of the Party at the next congress, a post which had been occupied by Tito since 1937. The overthrow of Khrushchev in October 1964 gave them encouragement. Tito cut short his visit to Archbishop Makarios the moment he heard the news of Khrushchev's fall, fearing that the same danger threatened him.

The Party's Eighth Congress opened in Belgrade on 7 December 1964. Tito, Kardelj and Bakaric already had in their hands the report of the Chief of Military Intelligence, O. Kreacic, on Rankovic's conspir-

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acy against Tito. To Rankovic's great surprise, the executive committee of the Party was urgently summoned to meet in the late evening of 9 December. There, in Tito's presence, Kardelj accused Rankovic of conspiring to take over. Rankovic, excited and flushed, denied the charge. Kardelj persisted in pressing. Kardelj-Bakaric line which prevailed at the Congress, once more endorsed economic reform, decentralization and self-management. From that moment the struggle between Slovene and Croatian communists on the one hand, and the majority of Serbian and Montenegrin communists on the other, became the struggle for and against the transformation of the Yugoslav Federation into a confederation of semi-independent republics. It is still going on.

RANKOVIC never recovered from this setback. All that remained for him and his followers was to attempt to sabotage the Party's decisions and to regain their former position and influence by an underground plot. But their opponents were not idle either. They cleverly exploited the rotation principle, incorporated at their instigation in both the new Constitution and the new Party statutes, to place their own men in the posts formerly held by Rankovic's followers. Rankovic was gradually being surrounded and his position was more and more undermined by his loss of control over a large section of the secret police. He and his allies were able to quash the economic reform of 1961, for which Yugoslavia was granted an international loan of 275 million dollars, and to delay the acceptance of international aid, arguing for a whole year in the Central Committee that acceptance of the conditions laid down by the International Monetary Fund would mean the Party's rejection of Marxism.

But when by the end of the spring of 1965 there had been no improvement in the parlous state of the Yugoslav economy, Rankovic and his friends gave in and accepted the IMF's conditions. On 24 July 1965 the so-called 'great new economic reform' was passed unanimously by the National Assembly. The granting of new aid by the IMF and its release of the 60 million dollars held back from the previous aid commitment were announced the next day. This time Tito himself had to pledge his word that the conditions of the IMF would be strictly observed. They were: stabilization of the dinar; abolition of state subsidies and export premiums; and the introduction of all necessary measures to pave the way for linking the Yugoslav economy with the economies of the West. The dinar was devalued from 750 to the dollar to 1250 to the dollar. Other reforms introduced at this time gave greater freedom to industrial enterprises for planning and fixing prices, and the share of profits left to their free disposal was raised. The fixing of prices was to be established by economic criteria rather than by the Party bureaucracy, and the allocation of investment funds was to be made according to market requirements rather than by a central bureaucracy. The central fund for investments was to be abolished and its functions transferred to the republics. All

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enterprises unable to maintain themselves without subsidies were to be closed down.

Rankovic's followers took the initiative to sabotage the reform from its very inception. They never tired of pointing out that the reform would be to the advantage of the developed republics of Slovenia and Croatia and that it represented a deliberate policy of creating unemployment. Considering that the anticipated shutdown of 2,000 non-viable industrial plants would mostly affect the less-developed republics, where they had been built for political reasons and not on economic grounds, the emotional force of the conservatives' arguments was strong.

The Central Committee meetings held at the end of February and in the middle of March 1966 could not resolve these issues. A stalemate developed between the opposing forces in the Party, and it became clear that the unresolved deadlock would cause the republics of Yugoslavia to move in different directions, both economically and politically. This tendency, if unchecked, might conceivably lead to the break-up of Yugoslavia. It became clear to both factions that a settlement had to be reached. This awareness made them redouble their efforts to plot each other's overthrow.

Rankovic's followers tried to enlist support from a section of the army, alleging that the Serbs in the army were being discriminated against in favour of the Croats. The reformist wing increased its pressure on Tito to settle accounts with Rankovic while he was still undisputed commander of the army. Military intelligence was consequently ordered to keep a close watch on the movements and activities of Rankovic and his supporters.

The final showdown between the leaders of the reformist and conservative wings was provoked by two events. Tito had planned to visit India and Japan in the autumn of 1966. His journey would have lasted at least two months, during which time Rankovic would have acted as head of state. The reformist leaders recalled how Ghana's Nkrumah had been overthrown while he was out of the country, and warned Tito of the possible danger to himself. Tito therefore ordered military intelligence to search for hidden microphones in his office. Eventually listening devices were discovered. They were removed quietly. Rankovic fell into the trap. They were reinstalled with the help of Tito's aide de camp, General Bozovic, Rankovic's trusted friend who had served under him in the secret police and who had been given the rank of general when appointed chief of the security service. The devices were linked with a listening post in Rankovic's villa, situated near Tito's.

At a meeting of the Politbureau, held in Belgrade on 16 June, Rankovic was confronted with the evidence of bugging Tito's office and of those of his chief opponents. He denied the charges levelled against him but resigned all his posts. A meeting of the Central Committee was called for 1 July. The strictest military measures were

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imposed to prevent anything untoward happening, and two divisions were ordered to surround Belgrade. Tito's residence on Brioni island, where the meeting of the Central Committee was to take place, was also heavily guarded. At the meeting Rankovic and his supporters were accused of using the secret police in a bid for power and also of trying to enlist the support of a section of the army in their plot. They were further accused of having sabotaged Central Committee decisions and of having used terror and corruption while in charge of the secret police. All the speakers (many of whom had been Rankovic's most ardent admirers until the eve of this meeting) made merciless attacks on him and his closest associates. The Central Committee ordered a complete purge and reorganization of the secret police, and a noisy propaganda campaign was immediately launched throughout the country against Rankovic and the secret police.

Everybody was now eagerly awaiting the fate of Rankovic and his followers and the political consequences of their downfall. Two special commissions were set up, one to investigate their abuses of power and the other to study the reorganization of the Party. The reformists proposed the early convocation of an extraordinary Party congress to consider sweeping changes in the Party programme and organization. The results of the work of both commissions were bound to be affected by Moscow's reaction to Rankovic's downfall. Brezhnev had already tried to save him by intervening on his behalf through Gomulka. Then he decided to make a private visit to Tito from 22 to 25 September. He had two main objectives: to persuade Tito to send delegates to a proposed world congress of communist parties; and to convince him that the projected reforms of the Yugoslav Party, if carried out as intended, would definitely alienate other communist parties and lead to a new break. Exactly three weeks before his visit to Tito, Brezhnev approved the agreement for a long-term Soviet loan of 160 million dollars to Yugoslavia in order to bring influence to bear on Tito.

A few days after Brezhnev's departure Tito suddenly cut short the discussions on a full-scale Party reorganization. The Central Committee met on 4 October and accepted a very modest reorganization. The post of General Secretary was abolished and a Presidium of 35 members was set up as the supreme organ. The executive committee, composed of 11 younger members, was assigned the task of carrying out the policy determined by the Presidium. Nobody was satisfied with this change. Tito let it be known that this was only a stop-gap settlement and that the next Party congress, scheduled for 1968, was to adopt measures for a complete reorganization of the Party. In an effort to appease Moscow, the Federal Assembly was persuaded to grant amnesties to Rankovic and 17 of his associates on 9 December, in spite of the fact that they were accused of anti-constitutional crimes. Tito also wanted to avoid making Rankovic and his associates martyrs of the Serbian cause. Djilas, who was jailed for far less serious offences

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than those of Rankovic, could not be detained in prison after the amnestying of Rankovic, if Tito wanted to avoid antagonizing the West.[3]

RANKOVIC'S downfall highlighted the Serbian question, in the sense that many Serbs, both communists and non-communists, began to ask themselves whether Yugoslavia's continued existence served the interests of the Serbian people. Tito carried out a purge of the Serbian Party and changed its leaders after Rankovic's overthrow, but even then some Party members remained hostile to Tito and the new leadership and violently opposed the demands of the Slovenes and Croats for the transfer of practically all Federal power to the republics. Tito was placed in a difficult position by these conflicting aims of the main nationalities of Yugoslavia. His position was made even more difficult by the campaign launched by the East European parties against the Yugoslav reforms, which were considered as being tantamount to the Party's abdication of its leading role in political life. This campaign, which aimed at putting pressure on Tito to take part in the planned world conference of communist parties, tended to strengthen the Rankovic faction.

In the immediate aftermath of Rankovic's downfall, both Rankovic's followers and the many non-communists who saw him as a victim of a Croat-Slovene plot directed against the Serbian people, considered making use of Soviet support against Tito. Wiser counsels prevailed, however, so that they were accused at the meeting of the Serbian Communist Party in November 1967 'of playing the card of Serbian nationalism' and 'of sheltering behind democratic aspirations', while in reality they were fervent supporters of the Party bureaucracy. The conservatives' rejection of Soviet support became total after the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia. But they continued to put forward the view that 'Serbia had been pushed back', that 'Serbian cadres had been driven out of Federal institutions', that 'Serbian economic progress had been retarded', and that 'other republics were benefiting at Serbia's expense'. They criticized Tito bitterly for having strengthened the Croatian and Slovene contingents in the guards division at the expense of the Serbs.

From now on Serbian opposition became Tito's greatest anxiety. As a sop to Serbian nationalism he arranged the removal from their posts of Gosnjak, the Secretary of Defence, and Kardelj who, as they were regarded as the chief instigators of Rankovic's downfall, were hated by the Serbian opposition. N. Ljubicic, a Serbian general, replaced Gosnjak, who became Tito's deputy in the Council of National Defence. Kardelj's place was also taken by a Serb.

In further efforts to appease the Serbs, Tito and Kardelj decided not to abolish the Federal Investment Fund, although this was quite

[3] The author has dealt extensively with the conflicts in the Yugoslav Party in two booklets: *Tito between East and West*; and *Kriza Titova rezima i Titove Jugoslavie*.

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contrary to the reform of 1965. It meant that Federal resources, which came chiefly from Croatia and Slovenia, would be used for the construction of a large hydro-electric plant on the Danube at Iron Gates, a refinery and chemical plant in Vojvodina and for the completion of the railway line connecting Belgrade to Bar on the Adriatic. All these projects were situated in Serbia, and the last-named partly in Montenegro. Apart from the benefits which Serbia is expected to gain when the plants under construction start production and the railway is completed, Serbia is already deriving great benefit from the employment which these projects have brought and from the contributions to the social security funds. In recent years some republics have had to borrow large amounts of money from the Serbian fund for their own less wealthy funds. Slovene and Croatian communists, who had been protesting for a long time against the Federal investment fund, finally secured a promise from Tito that this fund should cease to exist in 1970. This announcement was made on 27 September 1969 in a speech to workers at Iron Gates itself, where the building of the hydro-electric plant had been sharply criticized by the Croats and Slovenes. Nevertheless, the budget for the year 1970 has allocated one and a half milliard new dinars to this fund.

AFTER Rankovic's downfall, the Serbian opposition forced Tito to walk a tight-rope between the conflicting demands of the Serbs, Croats and Slovenes. Tito's efforts to appease the Serbs have angered his supporters in Croatia and Slovenia. As the implementation of the 1965 reform, which aimed at granting Croatia and Slovenia more economic and political power, did not make any headway, in spite of Rankovic's overthrow, the governments of these two republics began to make important economic decisions independently of the Federal government.

The situation was exacerbated by Croatian protests against the promotion of the Serbian variant of the Serbo-Croat language in Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina at the expense of the Croatian variant. A protest statement, signed by nearly all important Croatian cultural associations and institutions, was made public on 13 March 1967. It was meant to be and indeed was a political protest in the fullest sense of the term. The Serbs bitterly denounced the statement, and the Federal government was forced to instruct both the Croatian and Serbian governments to cease polemics on the subject. Some of the signatories of the Croatian protest were expelled from the Party and even lost their jobs.

Influenced by the Croatian protest, the Federal Assembly started to publish its debates in all the languages of Yugoslavia, and Federal authorities were ordered to conduct their correspondence with the republics in the language of the republic concerned. The language issue has, in fact, led to an upsurge in Croatian nationalism.

At the same time economists in Croatia and Slovenia embarked on

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an all-out campaign to highlight the economic discrimination against their republics. They used strong economic arguments to illustrate the harm in investing scarce financial resources in the building of non-profitable industries in the undeveloped regions, while profitable investments in the developed republics were being neglected. For instance, a meeting of Croatian economic experts held in Zagreb in May 1969 arrived at the conclusion that 100 dinars invested in the developed republics contributed nearly 250 per cent more in national income than in the undeveloped republics.[4] They also demanded the abolition of the National Bank's monopoly over the acquisition and sale of foreign currency. They proposed that the foreign currency earned in their republics should be sold to their banks, which would then hand over a certain proportion of it to the National Bank in Belgrade. M. Tripalo, a Croatian member of the executive committee, pointed out at the end of June 1969 that the existing system regulating foreign currency was causing hardship and thereby provoking the rise of nationalism. It is worth noting that Croatia is earning around 39 per cent of Yugoslavia's foreign exchange.[5]

S. Kucar-Dabcevic, before she became chief of the Croatian government, took an active part in this campaign. This appointment gave her the opportunity to practise what she preached. Consequently, in the summer of 1967, she sent a long memorandum to the Federal government asking for the return to Croatia of its share of the funds which had been transferred to Federal banks during the period of centralism. This demand for 'economic disintegration' initiated one of the longest and most bitter debates ever witnessed in the highest Party and state forums in Belgrade. Federal financial experts even considered calling in international experts to work out the amount of Croatia's share of Federal funds. The debate dragged on for nearly a year without the Croatian government receiving a reply. Mr. Tripalo has raised that issue again in the middle of September 1970.

The increasing pressure on Tito of Croatian and Serbian nationalism, both in the economic and in the political fields forced him to act against it. He began gradually to relieve the most ardent nationalists from their posts, men such as V. Holjevac, former mayor of the capital of Croatia and D. Cosic, the well-known Serbian writer.

At the beginning of 1968 a *ballon d'essai* was launched in some newspapers on the possibility of transforming the Yugoslav Federation into a confederation of states, in order to satisfy Croatian and Slovene demands for reform and to change the constitutional status of Kossovo and Vojvodina, the two autonomous regions of Serbia. In Vojvodina there are about 500,000 Hungarians, as well as Serbs, Croats, Slovaks and Rumanians. In the Kossovo-Metohija region there are about a million Albanians living alongside Serbs and Macedonians. Both

[4] *Kritika* (Zagreb), no. 6, 1969.
[5] *Politika* (Belgrade), 23 October 1969.

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Albanians and Hungarians were ruled by the iron hand of the secret police from 1945 until Rankovic's downfall. Tito deemed it necessary to make a gesture to the Albanians and Hungarians by raising the constitutional position of the provinces in which they lived. He even considered the idea of making Kossovo the seventh republic of Yugoslavia. The Serbs, of course, denounced both ideas as soon as they became known. A strong stand against them was taken at a meeting of the Central Committee of the Serbian Communist Party, held at the end of May 1968, by D. Cosic and J. Marjanovic. They protested against the systematic forcing of Serbs and Montenegrins out of Kossovo. They also condemned Croatian and Slovene demands for the establishment of a Yugoslav confederation of states, for the formation of Croatian and Slovene territorial armies and for recognizing the Moslems in Bosnia-Herzegovina as a separate ethnic group. Their views were condemned, however, by the majority of Central Committee members. On the very day the Committee met Tripalo published an article in *Borba* demanding that the relations between the Federation and the republics should be fixed 'on the basis of agreement between the republics on which functions should be transferred to the Federal organs and which functions should belong to the republics'. The different views regarding the reorganization of Yugoslavia caused Tito to tread very warily on the eve of the Party Congress which was expected to meet soon to settle the question.

TWO events prevented the Congress from taking place in 1968, however. They were: the student revolt which erupted in Belgrade on 2 June; and the sharpening of tension between Dubcek and Brezhnev leading to the invasion of Czechoslovakia by Soviet troops during the night of 20–21 August. The student revolt in Belgrade was on a very large scale. Smaller revolts also broke out in some other university cities. In their demonstrations the students carried banners on which were written biting insults and bitter condemnations of the iniquities of the Yugoslav regime and of the luxurious living standards and privileges enjoyed by its leaders. A special issue of the *Student* of 4 June demanded the abolition of all social inequality and privilege and the introduction of democratic freedoms. Leading Serbian communists were sent to pacify the students and to negotiate with their representatives. Eventually Tito himself had to take the microphone and promise to accept the students' demands so as to restore order in the university and the surrounding area. The students accepted Tito's assurance with the proviso that they would renew their demonstrations in the autumn if their demands had not been met.

The mobilization of the Yugoslav army, following the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia, made further student demonstrations impossible. Plans to mark the anniversary of the first demonstration and to protest against Tito's failure to fulfil his promises were nipped in the bud when the university buildings were occupied by police and

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army units. Thus student discontent was added to the many existing worries of Tito's regime.

They all grew in intensity after the meeting of the Ninth Party Congress held in Belgrade from 11 to 15 March 1969, for the results of its work did not satisfy anybody. Djilas, in an interview in Rome at the beginning of June, said that this Congress had not solved any of Yugoslavia's fundamental problems. There is no doubt that the Soviet overthrow of Dubcek and his regime had slowed down the development of reformism in Yugoslavia. Tito and his supporters believed that any radical innovation in the Party's programme might provoke Brezhnev to apply his doctrine to Yugoslavia. Some important political innovations were made a few weeks before the Congress, however. On 11 February 1969 the Federal Assembly had passed the law on the reorganization of national defence. It gave the republics the opportunity of forming their own territorial army units with their own staffs.

The Ninth Congress abolished the Central Committee. Its functions were divided between the existing Presidium and a new organ, called the Conference of the League of Yugoslav Communists. The Presidium was to have 52 members, comprising seven representatives from each of the republics, six representatives from the newly-created autonomous provinces and three from the army. Its fifty-second member is Tito, who is also its president. The Presidium elects an executive committee of 14 members with each republic providing two representatives and the autonomous republics one. Tito, the fifteenth member, is also head of this body. Many of the old leaders disappeared in this reshuffle. Younger members were now in the majority in all organs of the Party and in all Federal and republican elected assemblies. In fact, the executive committee is considered by Tito as the most important organ of the Party. Therefore, he took the greatest care in choosing its members. He expected them to show themselves strong enough to play an important role in the government of Yugoslavia should anything untoward happen to him or should he die before the meeting of the next Party Congress. However, the executive committee has not been considered good enough for that purpose. That is probably why Tito now proposes to set up a presidential committee, a strong body composed of representatives of Yugoslavia's six republics and two autonomous provinces as well as representatives of the main social and political organisations, including the Communist Party. But will even this new stronger body be able to hold Yugoslavia together, once Tito is gone?

THE changes in Kossovo and Vojvodina did more than anything else to harden Serbian opposition to Tito, Kardelj and Bakaric. Some Serbs complained that 'the Croats and Slovenes, with the aid of the national minorities, are dismembering Serbia'. Some of Tito's closest

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Serbian friends, expecting this Serb outcry, tried in vain to dissuade him from setting up a new separate republic in Kossovo. Why then was this reform sponsored? Some people maintain that Tito had agreed to the reform with a heavy heart seeing it as a means of depriving the USSR of a possible lever which could be used against Yugoslavia. But the most plausible explanation lies in the determination of Yugoslavia's rulers to try to enlist the sympathies of the national minorities and of the Moslems in Bosnia-Herzegovina, and to have them as allies against the larger nationalities who are for many reasons strongly and stubbornly opposed to their regime.

Already on 30 May 1968 D. Cosic had said that 'a feeling of injured national pride . . . and an all-embracing rage have seized very large numbers of the Serbian people', and that 'there is much that is murky and sick, much that is neurotic and psychologically unhealthy in our national life'. The situation became much worse after the constitutional changes in Kossovo and Vojvodina. Rankovic's adherents exploited this 'neurosis' to the full and declared that all Serbs should unite now, irrespective of their past differences, against Tito, Kardelj and Bakaric.

It is highly significant that the relations between Slovenia and Croatia and the Federal government worsened just at the time when a Croat and a Slovene were at its head. When M. Spiljak, a Croat, was head of the Federal government, there was disagreement over Federal banks as we have already seen. The sharpest conflict between Slovenia and the Federal government erupted at the end of May 1969, when a Slovene, M. Ribicic, became head of the Federal government. It arose over the government's refusal to allow Slovenia a share of the loan granted by the World Bank for the building of roads in Yugoslavia. Tito had wanted to remove the chief of the Slovene government. S. Kavcic, for having staged huge demonstrations in Slovenia against the decision, but was persuaded not to do so as he would have antagonized all Slovenes. From this it is clear that it is not important to the Croats and Slovenes whether a Croat or a Slovene has the post of chief of the Federal government. They believe that only a reorganization of the Federal set-up, as envisaged by them, can ensure the protection of their national interests. The present constitutional basis regulating the relations between the republics and the Federation is untenable. Party and government leaders in Belgrade are, with the exception of Tito, delegates of the republics. They are accordingly under constant pressure to defend the interests of the republics and the points of view of those who have sent them there.

It has been the practice since Rankovic's overthrow for important Yugoslav delegations travelling abroad to be composed of delegates from all the republics. Tito has admitted publicly that Yugoslavia is 'a kind of confederation in certain respects', but has declared in the same breath that it must preserve her Federal structure. He makes such contradictory declarations because he is pulled by the main

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elements of his Party into two opposite directions. He himself has mentioned the main problems with which he has to cope in the series of speeches made between August and November 1969. In a speech in Zadar on 29 August he said: 'We communists had a much easier task before the war than today. We worked then for the destruction of the old system. Even during the war we had a much easier task, because we had before us an enemy with whom we were directly confronted. . . . After the war we assumed the responsibility for the whole social development. That is, however, a very heavy and complicated task. . . . I have already said that it is not easy to harmonize all interests in a multinational commonwealth such as ours. . . .' In Sisak on 9 September he mentioned 'the appearance of antagonisms between the republics which are especially negative'. He said in Bar on 21 September that he had been 'confounded by the suggestion that confederation would be a better solution than federation. . .'. And in Iron Gates a few days later he pleaded for agreement between the republics on the best way to solve the difficulties between them. This presupposes, however, the existence of a confederation. At the beginning of October he declared that national problems were torturing him to such a degree that they 'do not allow me to sleep'. On 15 October he called on his former partisans to undertake a decisive struggle against 'nationalistic and chauvinistic excesses'.

The rise in local nationalism and the pressure this put on the Federal government were discussed at a meeting of Party leaders in Belgrade on 15 September. Nearly all the speakers said that lack of confidence in the Federation was the cause of the emergence of 'nationalistic and chauvinistic tendencies'. Some maintained that the non-solution of such concrete issues as the regulation of foreign exchange and the inequitable distribution of investment funds lay at the root of this lack of confidence. No one dared to mention, however, the Federal government's refusal to agree to demands for 'economic disintegration', as put forward in Kucar-Dabcevic's memorandum. Equally, nobody dared to raise the question of the reorganization of the army so as to give the territorial armies of the republics a real opportunity to become properly organized and equipped, although many of them had this subject very much in their minds. K. Zrvenkovski, an influential Macedonian member of the executive committee, pointed out that attacks on the Federation stemmed from two main points of view: some argued that their nations were exploited by the Federation through giving it more than they were receiving from it, while others believed that their nations were exploited by the operation of the market. He went on to warn his colleagues that chaos and political disintegration might arise if debate were replaced by any other form of settling problems, by which 'certain people' might attempt to establish order under any pretext. This was a clear allusion to the danger of Soviet intervention under certain circumstances.

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IN few economic systems is there such an inequitable distribution of incomes as there is in Tito's Yugoslavia. One writer concluded a survey of the Yugoslav economic system by saying that it is so chaotic that 'only God could bring order into it'.[6] The incomes of Party bureaucrats, managers, top administrative staff and army officers are 10–20 times higher than the wages of the vast majority of workers and peasants. Labour unrest is rife in Yugoslavia. Apart from wide-scale strikes, workers in many towns have even physically attacked the managers of their enterprises. The average monthly wage is the equivalent of 68 dollars—while a quarter of the workers get less than 50 dollars. In the last year, however, many enterprises have been unable to pay even these meagre wages. They were able only to give their employees advances of between 50 to 70 per cent. The managers defend themselves by pointing to the credit squeeze, the impossibility of selling their products and the crippling state taxes. The workers have tried on many occasions to prevent the managers from paying these taxes before they have received their wages in full. Yet the workers are afraid of losing their jobs. All manual and white-collar workers have to use bribes to secure employment today. These range from 2,000 to 10,000 dinars, according to the type of employment. Many of them try to go abroad to earn the money necessary for the bribes. There are in Yugoslavia today 450,000 to 500,000 unemployed workers, and their number is steadily rising. A much larger number is employed in some Western countries as 'guest-workers'.

The Yugoslav economic situation is exacerbated by its annual balance of payments deficit, which varies from between 650 to 700 million dollars. Short-term debts to foreign countries amount to about 2,600 million dollars. There is a saying current in Yugoslavia today that 'all men are born equal; in Yugoslavia they are born indebted'. The Yugoslav government may soon be forced to ask for a moratorium on servicing and amortization charges. Inflation makes further devaluation of the dinar inevitable and is pushing prices higher and higher, which is creating in its turn a sensitive social crisis. The governor of the National Bank, Dr I. Perisin, declared at the end of 1969: 'We are entering the new year with great anxiety.' The number of unemployed white-collar workers, including intellectuals, amounts to about 70,000. They are mostly quite young and, naturally, are sharply critical of existing conditions.

COMMUNISTS freely admit that today the ideology of nationalism has vanquished the ideology of communism in Yugoslavia. Nevertheless, they insist that this present nationalism has nothing in common with the nationalism which existed in Yugoslavia before the communist regime was established. But the fact is that even communist nationalism is shaking the very foundations of Yugoslavia. All the shibboleths of

[6] N. Krømpotic, *Vjesnik u srijedu* (Zagreb), 12 and 19 November 1969.

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the communist regime, such as communist monopoly of power, denial of all political rights to non-communists and purity of the revolution, are being attacked today from all sides.

Of all the difficulties confronting Tito the most serious is his failure to unite the Party leadership. The new executive committee, on which he pinned such great hopes, is already torn by conflict. Events in Yugoslavia are working against Party unity. It could be re-established only in the way that it was re-established in Czechoslovakia, by force of Soviet arms. Tito is determined to stop the rot spreading further. After he had patched up his quarrel with Moscow over Czechoslovakia (Gromyko's visit to Yugoslavia in the first half of September 1969 put the seal on this new reconciliation), he embarked upon a campaign against the growing liberal, nationalist and anti-centralist trends in Yugoslavia. Many journalists, intellectuals and newspapers have become victims of what has been termed 'the crusade against nationalism and liberalism'. This campaign provoked bitter opposition, particularly against the introduction of economic controls and cultural restrictions. The students added their voice to the protests in an open letter in which they accused Party leaders of resorting to coercion to suppress student newspapers. The letter went on: 'We believe that the press must be free, critical, truthful and democratic, so that everybody's opinion will be given an equal opportunity to reach the public.' [7]

Tito has so far managed to weather the storm, and he is likely to continue to do so as long as he remains in control of the army. But this situation will change radically once control of the army passes into the hands of the Council of National Defence, which since 15 July 1969 has comprised 26 members. Tito's prestige, gained during the war and the turbulent post-war period, cannot be handed on to his successors. It was this prestige and the loyalty of the army commanders which enabled him to purge the army of those generals in whom he had lost confidence. The purge was carried out at the end of 1968 under the pretext that these officers had overreached themselves in their contacts with the Soviet army. In all, 35 generals were pensioned off. They included 30 Serbian generals and, to make this more palatable to the Serbs, Gosnjak. The first news of the purge came five months later, although at this time only nine generals were admitted to have been dismissed. Who but Tito could have carried out such a large purge in the army? Certainly not the Council of National Defence. We can visualize all kinds of conflicts arising in the Presidium and the executive committee of the Party if Tito leaves them, as seems likely, to grapple with such unresolved questions as the transformation of the Yugoslav Federation into a confederation, the reorganization of the army which this would entail and the abolition of economic integration. To these serious problems must be added another—the lack of any firm and clear international guarantees for

[7] D. Trevisan, *The Times*, 6 December 1969.

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Yugoslavia's security, in the face of a possible attack from the Soviet Union.

SOVIET leaders make no secret of their desire to bring Yugoslavia closer to the Soviet orbit. Gromyko's visit to Belgrade in September 1969 led to an improvement in the climate of relations between the two countries. Moscow's intention of bringing Yugoslavia back into the Soviet fold was clearly illustrated in a speech made by Gromyko on 6 September, when he emphasized the necessity of 'the unity of socialist states'. All the present rulers of Yugoslavia are aware of Soviet aims. The majority of the members of the executive committee were opposed to accepting the Soviet proposal, made in Brezhnev's letter to Tito on 18 May, to normalize relations between the two countries. But Tito's view prevailed in the end.

Tito's reasons for seeking a rapprochement with the USSR lay in his belief that closer relations with the East would help balance Yugoslavia's relations with the West. He is aware that Yugoslavia's critical economic situation will force him soon to turn again to the West for economic aid. At the same time, he is seeking closer ties with Italy which, of all the Western countries, has the greatest interest in ensuring that Yugoslavia does not become a Soviet satellite. During President Saragat's visit to Yugoslavia in October 1969, Tito requested Italy to intercede on Yugoslavia's behalf with the EEC. An agreement, substantially improving Yugoslavia's position as an exporter to EEC markets, was signed in the spring of 1970. The EEC is already Yugoslavia's biggest market.

Yugoslavia believed that the normalization of relations with Moscow would enable it to take a freer line in its relations with the West. In this it was mistaken: the Kremlin began to exert pressure on Tito as soon as it saw which way the wind was blowing.

Bulgaria is Moscow's best instrument for exerting pressure on Tito because of its desire to annex Macedonia. In support of its claim, Bulgaria has consistently maintained that there is no such thing as a Macedonian nation and that the inhabitants of this region are, in fact, Bulgarians. The Bulgarian Foreign Minister, Bashev, reiterated this stand when he visited Belgrade in the middle of December 1969. To make matters worse, he also raised the question of the Bulgarian minority in Yugoslavia.[8] Bashev would never have raised these questions unless he had been urged to do so by Moscow.

Following the invasion of Czechoslovakia Brezhnev put pressure on Tito to stop him supporting Dubcek's resistance. It is no accident that the new *History of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union*, published at the beginning of January 1970, has resurrected the old charge of blaming Tito for the quarrel with Stalin. Yugoslav communists have linked this accusation with Brezhnev's enunciation of

[8] *The Times*, 29 December 1969.

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his doctrine allowing Moscow the right to intervene militarily in the communist countries. Soviet flirtations with Ustashi elements and Tito's other opponents, noticeable in the past few months, have added to the worries of the Yugoslav leaders.

In the middle of November 1968 NATO foreign ministers issued a statement warning the Soviet Union against the possible application of Brezhnev's doctrine to the states of the so-called 'grey zone', not covered by NATO's umbrella. It said: 'Any Soviet intervention directly or indirectly affecting the situation in Europe or in the Mediterranean would create an international crisis with grave consequences.' President Nixon's visit to Yugoslavia in October underlined that warning.

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ALBANIA SINCE THE FALL OF KHRUSHCHEV

*Peter Prifti**

THE fall of Khrushchev in mid-October 1964 was both a victory and a defeat for the Albanians: a victory because their arch enemy and debunker of their idol, Stalin, had been consigned to the dustbin of history; a defeat because Khrushchev's demise did not result in a change of course for the Soviet Union. The jubilation of the Albanians over the fall of the Soviet Premier was thus somewhat restrained by the uncertainty of what would follow in the Kremlin. There is evidence that the hope of the Albanian communists was that Khrushchev's successors would reorient the Soviet Union to a pre-1956 domestic and foreign policy. Therefore, in their initial comments on the power shake-up in the Kremlin, Albania's leaders generally limited themselves to pointing out its significance for the struggle against revisionism and the general line of the Soviet Union since the Twentieth Congress of the CPSU.

Albania's position on the Kremlin shake-up did not crystallize until 13 November 1964, when *Zëri i Popullit*, the Party's daily organ, published a long polemical article on the Testament of Togliatti, the Italian Communist Party, and the CPSU. Originally scheduled for publication in mid-October, the article had been delayed because of Khrushchev's fall. However, since the new CPSU leadership was continuing substantially the same policies, a kind of Khrushchevism minus Khrushchev, it was now published without changes. The interval between mid-October and mid-November was a momentous one for Tirana, for had there been a change of course in the Soviet Union, that could have meant a change of course for Albania as well, a shift of the country's political centre of gravity from Peking back to Moscow.

Yet in the end, the partial victory the Albanians had won with Khrushchev's fall failed to moderate their hostility towards the Soviet Union, and in fact incited them to intensify the struggle, and widen the breach still more between Moscow and Tirana. In this 'struggle to the end', Albania laboured at a disadvantage. Lacking economic, political and military power, it could not realistically hope to wage a successful struggle against the mighty Soviet Union, and had to rely largely on polemics. The awareness by the leaders of the Albanian Party of Labour (APL) of this unequal struggle, of their ambitious ideological aspirations, and most of all, perhaps, of the nearly successful economic, political and

* This paper is a chapter in a forthcoming book *The Communist States in Disarray* edited by Adam Bromke and Teresa Rakowska-Harmstone soon to be published in the Carleton University Soviet Studies Series. The author is grateful to Professor Bromke who suggested the writing of this essay on Albania, and to Professor William E. Griffith and Dr Robin Alison Remington of M.I.T. for their valuable suggestions in the preparation of the essay.

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'military' blockade which the Soviet Union mounted in the early sixties to topple them from power, accounts to a large extent for the fury of their polemics.

However, there was also a cultural factor in the dispute, stemming from the Albanian character. Albanian tradition did not allow for a middle position between friend and foe. This was reflected in political alliances, which the Albanians tended to perceive in human terms. Take for example the remark made by Premier Mehmet Shehu in October 1967, when he sought to explain Albania's loyalty to China. 'We Albanians', he said, 'love our friends with all our hearts, and we hate our enemies with all our hearts.'[1] Thirdly, the Albanians achieved the liberation of their country by means of a successful guerrilla struggle, hence they were less inclined to submit to Moscow's authority and more prone to resent Soviet attempts to dominate them—a fact which contributed much to the bitterness of their feud with the Soviet Union.

Albania's totally uncompromising position towards Khrushchev's successors revealed the depth of Soviet-Albanian enmity, and also the strength of Tirana's alliance with Peking. By this time, three years after her break with the Soviet Union, Albania shared a nearly uniform foreign and domestic policy position with China. Unlike the Soviet Union and East Europe, it rejected *détente* with the West in favour of an all-out ideological, political and economic struggle between the socialist camp and the West; dismissed the doctrine of peaceful co-existence as dangerous and counter-revolutionary; belittled the threat of atomic war; saw Asia, Africa and Latin America as the centres of revolutionary storms; and was confident that by waging a militant struggle against capitalism, imperialism and reaction, Marxism-Leninism would emerge victorious and socialism would triumph throughout the world.

On the domestic front, Albania, like China, hailed the dictatorship of the proletariat as a vital and indeed indispensable institution in a truly socialist country; rejected economic and cultural liberalization in favour of strict Party control over all facets of social and economic life, and remained vigilant against the penetration and spread of bourgeois and revisionist ideology among the population; in short, Tirana seemed thoroughly wedded to the Chinese version of Stalinism. However, it is vital to remember that in political life content is sometimes even more important than form. Albanian Marxism is undeniably Chinese in form, but it remains Albanian in style and content—a fact that is too often ignored by analyses focused exclusively on Tirana's role in the international communist movement. Therefore, let us first look at the country's internal developments.

THE period from 1965 to 1970 was marked by a number of events and developments in Albania, which had extensive influence in shaping the country's life, as well as determining its role in international

[1] *Bashkimi* (Unity), organ of the Democratic Front of Albania, 11 October 1967.

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affairs. During this period Albania embarked on its fourth Five-Year Plan, held the Fifth Party Congress, observed the 500th anniversary of the death of its national hero, Scanderbeg, and the twenty-fifth anniversary of its liberation. Above all, in a move superficially if somewhat deceptively resembling developments in China, it launched its own version of the cultural revolution, with the avowed aim of 'revolutionizing' every aspect of Albanian life, and turning the country's face irrevocably towards socialism and communism.

In his celebrated speech of 7 November 1961, Enver Hoxha, First Secretary of the Albanian Party of Labour, had said that the causes of the Soviet-Albanian split were 'entirely ideological and political' in nature.[2] True, there were both ideological and political considerations involved, but analytically emphasis should be on the political aspects, and most importantly on the role of Albanian nationalism in these events. For a close look at Albania's actions and statements by its leaders, especially with regard to the Soviet Union, Yugoslavia, and Greece, leads to the conclusion that beneath the surface the causes of the split were more nationalistic than ideological in nature.

In recent years nationalism was also a major force in internal Albanian affairs. In literature, the theatre, song and dance, folklore and handicrafts, the government of Albania encouraged the use and development of national themes, including such traditional patriotic virtues as heroism, self-sacrifice, and love of freedom and independence. The government also honoured prominent national and literary figures of the Albanian Renaissance, as, for example, Mihal Grameno and Bajram Curri, two noted patriots; Petro Nini Luarasi, a leading educator; and the poets Cajupi, Naim Frashëri, De Rada and others. As one Albanian publicist put it: 'Never before has the period of the Renaissance been so highly appreciated, and the works of its heroes so widely publicized as in the years of the people's power.'[3]

Thus, it is not surprising that during 1968–70 Albania observed with considerable fanfare the anniversaries of four milestones in its history: the 90th anniversary of the League of Prizren (established in 1878), which sparked the Albanian national movement[4]; the 60th anniversary of the Congress of Monastir (1908), which laid the groundwork for the alphabet now in use in Albania[5]; the 50th anniversary of the Congress of Lushnja (1920), convened to save Albania from dismemberment by its neighbours[6]; and above all the Scanderbeg anniversary, which was celebrated for an entire week in January 1968, and was

[2] *Zëri i Popullit* (The Voice of the People), 8 November 1961; Document 14 in William E. Griffith, *Albania and the Sino-Soviet Rift* (Cambridge, Mass.: The M.I.T. Press, 1963), p. 263.

[3] Zija Xholi, 'Dialectical Materialism—Our Guide in Education, Culture and Science', *Mësuesi* (The Teacher), 22 March 1968.

[4] *Zëri i Popullit*, 4 June 1968.

[5] Ibid., 14 November 1968.

[6] *Bashkimi*, 21 January 1970.

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attended by scholars from the West and East Europe, including Yugoslavia, though curiously not from China.[7]

The Albanian leadership took advantage of the Scanderbeg festivities not only to bolster nationalist sentiment, but even more to build up the party image and promote the Party line. 'Our party', wrote *Bashkimi*, 'as the worthy heir of the patriotic and revolutionary traditions of our people, raised to a higher level the unbounded love for the Fatherland, for freedom and for independence'.[8] Speaking at a commemorative meeting in Tirana, Mehmet Shehu, Premier of Albania, said that the legendary struggle of the Albanian people against the Turks in the 15th century inspired Albanians even today in their struggle against the imperialists and the revisionists.

In fact, nationalism operated both as a cause and as an effect on the development of Albanian politics. Acting as a cause, it pushed the Albanian leadership—out of concern for the country's sovereignty and independence—to break first with Yugoslavia in 1948, and then with the Soviet Union in 1961, thereby effectively isolating Albania from East Europe. The resulting isolation, in turn, induced the leadership to foster nationalism as a means of strengthening the country's defences, and promoting the party's programme for socialist construction.

Yet, while fostering national traditions and national pride, the APL continued to profess total loyalty to proletarian internationalism and to the teachings of Marxism-Leninism, as interpreted by Peking and Tirana. To be sure, Albania practised national communism, but in this case nationalism was used to reinforce communism rather than as an alternative to it. In other East European countries still under the influence of Moscow, nationalism as a force had tended to erode the power and authority of the communist party.[9] In Albania, the communist leadership, being relatively free of outside control, appeared more and more to be using nationalism for ideological ends; in particular, to advance the goals of the ideological and cultural revolution within the country. For example, Ramiz Alia, member of the APL Politburo, and widely recognised as Albania's cultural commissar, has said that the major preoccupation of the party now was 'to cleanse the superstructure of [Albanian] society of everything alien to it . . .'.[10]

Such was the general background of the Albanian cultural revolution, which was launched in strength early in 1966. According to the Albanian leaders, this revolution was but the latest phase of what they called the 'uninterrupted revolution', whose beginnings reached back to the Second World War, and whose end lay far in the distant future. This revolution

[7] Ibid., 12, 13, 16, 17, 20 January 1968.
[8] Ibid., 20 January 1968.
[9] In this respect, Albania and Yugoslavia fall in a different category from the other East European countries, for both of them achieved their liberation through their own armed struggle. Yet, interestingly, communism in the two neighbouring Balkan countries took different and mutually antagonistic directions, though both countries shared a common experience with respect to their quarrel and break with Moscow.
[10] *Zëri i Popullit*, 19 November 1969.

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was marked by three phases: the first, political, was the phase of national independence and the consolidation of communist power; the second, socio-economic, related to the building of the economic base of socialism; the third, ideological and cultural, was the continuing revolution whose aim was the destruction of bourgeois ideology and the complete construction of the socialist society. The central idea of this revolution, and the chief mechanism for its implementation, was the class struggle, which was conceived as being far more than opposition to the class enemy abroad, and to the former exploiting classes within. In his report to the Fifth Party Congress, held in November 1966, Enver Hoxha defined the class struggle as follows:

> Class struggle means struggle against . . . putting comfort, self-interest and personal glory ahead of the general interest, against bureaucratic manifestations, against religious ideology . . . and backward customs, against underestimation of woman and refusal to grant her equal rights in society, against the bourgeois way of life, against idealism and metaphysics.[11]

Going a step further, Hoxha refined his definition of class struggle to the point of making every man an object of the all-inclusive struggle. Speaking in almost purely moral and theological terms, he said: 'Let no man think that he is safe from evil. . . . The conscience of every man is a battlefield of the sharp struggle between the socialist and bourgeois ideology.'[12] Every man must therefore see himself as in a mirror, and as he washes his face, so must he cleanse his conscience daily.

THE first rumblings of Albania's 'uninterrupted' revolution were heard as early as the summer of 1964—well before the Chinese Cultural Revolution began—at the Second National Song Festival, when Albanian composers and musicians were attacked for failing to write national music, and abandoning themselves to the influence of decadent Western music. The tempo picked up in April 1965, when *Drita*, weekly organ of the Albanian League of Writers and Artists, accused three young writers of departing from socialist realism in their most recent works.[13] Not by accident, the same issue of *Drita* made a strong attack on Soviet art, focusing in particular on the writings of Yevtushenko and Solzhenitsyn. In fact, the 'evils' of Soviet society, brought on by revisionism, whether in art, political institutions, morals, education, economics or religion, were consistently held up as negative examples to the Albanian public, in the course of the ideological and cultural revolution.

It is not surprising, therefore, that artists, writers and intellectuals in general became the first targets of the developing revolution. In the

[11] Enver Hoxha, 'Report on the Activity of the Central Committee of the Albanian Party of Labour', (hereafter 'Report . . .'), *Fifth Congress of the APL* (Tirana), 1967, p. 136.
[12] Ibid., p. 137.
[13] *Drita*, 18 April 1965.

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eyes of Hoxha, artists and intellectuals—because they do not engage in direct physical work and hence are removed from close contact with the masses—make up the weakest link in the socialist society. They are therefore the most vulnerable targets of bourgeois and revisionist propaganda. Thus, the first concrete implementation of Albania's drive for the 'revolutionization of the entire life of the country' occurred in late January 1966 when 40 members of the League of Writers and Artists 'took the decision', at a meeting in Tirana, to go into the countryside and live and work among the people.[14]

The decision marked the Albanian leadership's first attempt at rectification of artists and intellectuals. Later that year, at the Fifth Party Congress, Hoxha remarked that in socialist Albania art and culture must be 'socialist in content and nationalist in form'. Since then, Albanian literature increasingly reflected the principle enunciated by Hoxha. Yet there was evidence of a considerable and potentially serious gap between the Party leadership on the one hand, and the intellectual community and the public on the other, in their respective understanding of socialist realism and the manner in which it should be applied in the realm of art.[15]

The dispatch of intellectuals to the countryside was the prelude to a novel and, for a while, puzzling political development the following month. On 10 February 1966, Radio Tirana announced that 12 high-ranking party officials, including politburo members Gogo Nushi, Manush Myftiu, Rita Marko and Haki Toska were assigned to different regions of the country to do grass-roots work for an unspecified length of time. Contrary to rumours at the time, the move did not signal a governmental or Party shake-up, provoked by disappointment with Chinese economic aid, since the officials affected by the move retained their full rank. More likely, the motive for the 'decentralization' measure was to increase the Party's control at the regional level, stimulate economic productivity, and rebuff in a rather dramatic way Soviet and East European attempts at the time to wean Albania away from China.[16] More important—from the viewpoint of the unfolding ideological revolution—the move was designed to bring party officials 'back to the masses', as well as to teach them the virtues of physical labour—two cardinal principles of the revolution.

It was not until March 1966, however, that the cultural revolution began to affect other significant sectors of society. On 4 March 1966, the Sixteenth Party Plenum met to discuss measures for dealing with bureaucracy, 'strengthening and modernizing the army', and reorganizing the Party and stage apparatuses. The results of the plenum became known the next day through the publication of the 'Open Letter of the

[14] *Nëndori* (November), monthly organ of the League of Writers and Artists of Albania, vol. XIII, no. 3 (March 1966), pp. 3–7.

[15] See especially *Zëri i Popullit*, 2 and 18 November 1969; 18 March 1970 in connexion with the Albanian theatre.

[16] *The New York Times*, 12 February 1966; *The Times* (London), 15 February 1966.

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APL Central Committee ', to ' Communists, workers, soldiers and officers of Albania '. The letter revealed that measures had been taken to lower salaries of high officials, eliminate ranks and insignias in the army, and reintroduce political commissars within the armed forces—a throwback to the period of the War of National Liberation. The letter was harshly critical of Party and government functionaries who had been infected by bourgeois vices, had lost contact with the masses, lacked self-discipline, and behaved like petty tyrants. It was the first time that a major Party statement called attention to the problems it was facing with its own members and apparatus, and to the urgency of dealing with them.

The changes resulting from the reorganization of the state apparatus were made known by Premier Shehu on 17 March 1966, at the conclusion of the Ninth Legislative Session of the Popular Assembly. He revealed that the number of ministries had been reduced from 19 to 13, and that the ministers affected by the measure had been assigned to new posts. The move to streamline the government was part of the drive to curb the widespread bureaucracy, combat the economic malaise, and—in line with the objectives of the unfolding cultural revolution—raise the political and ideological level of the cadres and the masses. This last point took on added meaning with the announcement at the Assembly that the Minister of Foreign Affairs, Behar Shtylla, had been replaced by Nesti Nase, former Albanian Ambassador to Peking.

Subsequently, a massive campaign was started to send cadres and functionaries to the production line. During the next six months, the campaign involved some 15,000 administrative personnel, plus additional thousands of intellectuals and youth. Although it would have been vehemently denied in Tirana, this mobilization drive had some resemblance to Khrushchev's attempts to force students to work on farms and in factories for the betterment of their ideological perspective and the economy. At no time did the Albanian cultural revolution go much deeper than the traditional self-criticism among Party cardes. The practice of public humiliation of functionaries conducted by the Red Guards in China did not occur in Albania.

The Fifth Party Congress, held in November 1966, was intensely preoccupied with the country's ideological and cultural revolution. Hoxha's report to the congress was in large part an appraisal of the revolution since its inception in January, and an outline of its future course. He called on all Albanians to place reliance first of all on their own forces, and to put into practice ' the great slogan ' of the Party to ' Think, work and live like revolutionaries '. He stressed the danger of the ' degeneration ' symbolized by the CPSU, and explained that this occurred ' as a consequence of its bureaucratization . . . which gradually stifled its revolutionary spirit and drive '. [17]

The next high point in the march of the revolution came on 6 February 1967, when the First Party Secretary delivered his programme

[17] Enver Hoxha, ' Report . . . ', op. cit., p. 89.

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in a speech 'For the Further Revolutionization of the Party and the Power'.[18] Subsequently, the speech assumed a status in Albania equal to, if not greater than the documents and decisions of the Fifth Party Congress, and initiated what may be considered the second phase of the ideological revolution. It showed Hoxha's exasperation with the bureaucrats, and the concern of the Party leadership over the growing alienation of the people from the government.

This time Hoxha appealed directly to the people, inviting them to criticize openly and without fear all bureaucrats and reactionaries who were violating party norms, socialist legality and the spirit of the revolution. The appeal resembled in some respects Mao's 'Hundred Flowers' call back in 1957. The reaction was an immediate, widespread, powerful, and in some instances explosive—if not totally spontaneous—outpouring of pent-up emotion and resentment on the part of the people, especially women and youth. Wall posters made their appearance, in some cases there were public denunciations of the offenders, women *en masse* clamoured for their rights, and a movement against religious beliefs and practices—first started by students of the 'Naim Frashëri' public high school in Durrës, Albania's chief seaport—began to spread through many parts of the country. There is no doubt that much of the resentment was genuine. However, the form it took and the objects of attack were strictly controlled from above to accomplish the regime's objectives—mobilization of women into the labour force and the elimination of a potential alternative centre of power in the Albanian Church.

There followed a three-pronged drive for 'the emancipation of women', and against 'religious beliefs' and 'backward customs'. The government saw these as serious obstacles to its programme for economic development, the elimination of all vestiges of feudal and bourgeois institutions, and the creation of the new communist Man, equipped with a new consciousness and a new morality. Religion as an institution was long suspect in the eyes of the Party leaders, in part because they viewed it as alien to Albanian culture, mystical and parasitic, and in part because belief in God posed to the people an alternative object of supreme loyalty. Accordingly, on 22 November 1967, a government decree abolished 'the material basis' of religion; i.e. it legalized the closing of all churches and mosques in the country.[19] The religious establishment thus became the first major victim of the ideological revolution and Albania earned the distinction of being 'the first atheist state in the world'.[20]

The government move stirred resentment among the older generation, and also among some communists; consequently, the Party leadership sought ways to fill the void in the people's lives, left by the disappearance of the religious establishment. In practice this meant substituting national

[18] *Zëri i Popullit*, 7 February 1967.
[19] *Gazeta Zyrtare* (The Official Gazette), 22 November 1967.
[20] *East Europe*, vol. 16, no. 11 (November 1967), p. 35.

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holidays for the forbidden religious celebrations. Victories won during the partisan war became feast days. Deaths of local heroes or other events with historical significance to a village or region were almost religiously commemorated.

Another major focus of the drive to revolutionize Albanian life was educational reform. Sparked off by Hoxha in a speech to the APL Politburo in March 1968, this move was elaborated upon in two major addresses by Premier Shehu in April 1968, and June 1969.[21] Shehu called for 'a qualitative leap' in education, which would rid Albanian schools of all harmful vestiges of Soviet influence, and educate a 'truly revolutionary and socialist' intelligentsia that would be 'loyal to the end to the Party's cause'. The new system was to rest on a tripod: theoretical learning, productive work, and physical and military training. Chinese influence in the new system was underscored by Shehu's remark that the works of Mao Tse-tung would be included in the programme of Marxist-Leninist studies, alongside the works of Marx, Lenin and Stalin.

By the summer of 1968, the revolutionary ferment reached the judicial system. As a result of action taken by the Popular Assembly on 24 June 1968, the court network was decentralized in favour of the establishment of popular courts at the village level, the aim being to bring the masses closer to the judicial organs and enable them to 'participate in the judicial process'.

AS for the economy, the years 1965–66 marked the end of the 3rd Five-Year Plan (1961–65), and the beginning of the 4th such plan, as the APL leadership intensified its efforts to turn Albania from an agrarian-industrial society to an industrial-agrarian one. According to Premier Shehu, the fourth Five-Year Plan was drafted in consultation with the largest number of working people ever to take part in economic planning in Albania, in line with the principle of relying on the masses as the surest means of avoiding the pitfalls of bureaucracy. Nevertheless, the problem of bureaucratic cadres and low productivity, especially in agriculture, persisted.

In 1968 the Party responded by instituting 'working class control' in the economy, a mechanism designed to check the power of the cadres by enlarging the workers' initiative, and making them the final arbiters in economic matters.[22] Organizationally, working class control was implemented by setting up workers control committees, as distinct from state control committees, to supervise—in effect, audit—daily operations of the enterprises. Workers committees represented control from below, while the state committees represented control from above. In theory

[21] Enver Hoxha, 'For the Further Revolutionization of Our Education', *Information Bulletin* (of APL-CC), vol. XX, no. 2 (Tirana), 1968, pp. 3–24; Mehmet Shehu, ibid., pp. 25–62, and *Zëri i Popullit*, 29 June 1969. For a detailed discussion of education in communist Albania, see John I. Thomas, *Education for Communism* (Stanford, California: The Hoover Institution), 1969.

[22] Enver Hoxha, 'The Control of the Working Class', speech delivered at the meeting of the Party Secretariat on 9 April 1968, but not distributed abroad.

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the two types of control complemented each other, but it was expected that the efficient exercise of supervisory power by the workers committees would in time render superfluous the state control committees.

As of this writing, there have been numerous complaints in the Albanian press about exploitation of worker committees by the state bodies amounting to attempts to co-opt the new focus of authority. It is therefore too early to determine the effects of ' working class control ' on the Albanian economy. The communist leaders of Albania, however, seemed convinced that central planning and direction of the economy was a *sine qua non* for the successful construction of socialism. They constantly attacked the free market economy as anarchic, and the profit motive as debasing. It was, in fact, in the area of economics that Albania attacked Yugoslavia most strongly and most often, charging Belgrade with abandonment of the socialist gains, and the restoration of capitalism.[23]

The Albanian leadership seemed bent on building a collectivized, egalitarian society, and towards this end worked steadily for ' the gradual narrowing down of differences between the working class and the peasantry, between city and town, between industry and agriculture, between mental and physical labour '.[24] For a country hampered by an underdeveloped economy, as well as the vestiges of nearly five centuries of subjugation by the Turks, it was an ambitious goal. Nevertheless the Party pushed forward concrete attempts to equalize wages and to require that students and intellectuals spend some time working in factories and on the farms. These efforts were complemented by periodic mass campaigns whereby thousands of factory workers and urban youth were sent to the countryside to help with agricultural work. The underlying rationale for this reshuffling was that if the various segments of the population mingled with one another on the work front, there would be a simultaneous social interaction, and the resulting exchange of knowledge, skills and experience would favour the elimination of differences among them. Again caution is suggested in attempting to evaluate success. However, in line with this goal, Albania completed the collectivization of agriculture early in 1967, introduced collective work norms in place of individual norms, made new moves to convert agricultural co-operatives into commune-type organizations, and enacted a law to transform artisan co-operatives into state enterprises.

In the course of the fourth Five-Year Plan, Albania experienced a number of failures, especially in its efforts to solve the endemic problem of bureaucracy, but it did bring about major changes, particularly in industrialization. Industrial development included textile combines, chemical fertilizer plants, cement factories, food canning plants and processing of metals. Advances were also made in lumber processing, oil

[23] Besim Bardhosi, ' The Marxist-Leninist Theory of Planning—A Target of the Attacks and Distortions of the Modern Revisionists ', *Ekonomia Popullore* (Popular Economy), no. 2 (March-April 1965), pp. 69–83.
[24] Enver Hoxha, ' Report . . . ,' op. cit., p. 49.

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refining, and railroad construction. Plans are under way for electrification of the entire country by 1971, and as of November 1969, the government had eliminated direct taxation of its citizens—thus becoming the first communist nation to abolish the income tax.[25]

The special characteristics of the fourth Five-Year Plan was that it occurred concurrently with the development of the ideological and cultural revolution, and as such the successes and failures of the plan were also a measure of the successes and failures of the revolution. Compared with the Chinese Cultural Revolution, the Albanian variety was moderate, orderly for the most part, and at all times under the direction and control of the Party. Moreover, unlike the Chinese revolution, which was basically political in nature, and involved a fierce inter-party struggle, Albania's revolution was—in effect, if not in rhetoric—a technique of economic and social mobilization, viewed by the APL leadership as a necessary stepping-stone towards the larger and more ideological end of building a communist society in Albania. To understand that end, it is now necessary to look at Albania's relationship with the rest of the communist world.

THE importance of China has been an overriding fact of political life for Albanian relations with other communist states and parties. In Peking the Albanians found a protector that not only could save Tirana from being swallowed by Belgrade—a long-standing Albanian fear reactivated by Krushchev's rapprochement with Tito—but could stand up to Moscow on more or less equal terms. As Hysni Kapo, third-ranking member of the Albanian hierarchy, has put it: 'If someone were to ask us how many people do we have, our answer is 701 millions'.[26] Moreover, the fact that China was far away was to Albania's advantage, since distance is not an insignificant consideration to a small state seeking powerful allies.

In the years following Tirana's break with Moscow, China's economic and technical aid proved indispensable to the survival of the Albanian communist leadership. It is a fact that Hoxha is unlikely to forget. The Party leaders have described those years as the most difficult period since the war of liberation. In June 1965, China reportedly advanced a 214 million dollar loan to Albania to finance the fourth Five-Year Plan (1966–70),[27] and in November 1968 an Albanian trade delegation to Peking concluded what Enver Hoxha enthusiastically called a 'brilliant' economic agreement. The agreement ostensibly included the largest amount of credit China had ever given to Albania, although no actual figures were disclosed.

[25] *Zëri i Popullit*, 13 November 1969; *The New York Times*, 19 November 1969.
[26] *Peking Review*, vol. 9, no. 19 (6 May 1966), p. 3. Kapo's remark brings to mind the attitude of the Montenegrins prior to the First World War, who said that a correct estimate of their strength had to take account of the combined populations of Montenegro and Russia.
[27] Jan S. Prybyla, 'Albania's Economic Vassalage', *East Europe*, vol. 16, no. 1 (January 1967), pp. 9–14.

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The Albanians distinguished sharply between Soviet and Chinese motives in giving economic aid. Chinese aid was 'disinterested', while the Soviets used such aid to pressure Albania into supporting Moscow's line. This is probably an exaggeration of the truth, yet the Chinese did profit from the Soviet Union's heavy-handed manner of dealing with the poor but proud and independent-minded Albanians, and took care to respect them and treat them as equals.

Despite their dependence on China and initial praise for the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution, certain aspects of that upheaval may well have created tension in the Albanian leadership. Certainly during 1968 Albanian interest in Chinese domestic affairs appeared to wane, for reasons not clearly known even now. However, one might speculate first that the Albanians feared that the inward nature of China's cultural revolution would tempt Peking to view its foreign commitments less seriously. Secondly, Red Guard activity had its disquieting, chaotic side. Hoxha believed in 'uninterrupted revolution' controlled from above. He could easily have felt threatened by spontaneous initiatives from below even when channelled by a somewhat organised group. That such actions frequently meant severe humiliation of Party cadres could have had perhaps more serious implications for Albania than China.

To illustrate the point, a look at the composition of the delegates to the Fifth Party Congress may be useful. Out of a total of 834 delegates, 374 or about 45 per cent were in the 40–50 age bracket, and that 72 per cent of the delegates had been party members prior to 1951.[28] The Party was aging, and as a consequence job security had become a matter of concern to large numbers of cadres. This 'generation gap' became a major cause of friction within the Party ranks, as the APL leadership sought to replace the older cadres with younger and better trained people. Given the ferment of the developing revolution, the situation could have got out of hand, unless the leadership maintained order in the process of transition of power and position. Therefore it is not surprising that the Red Guard phenomenon did not become a true feature of the Albanian counterpart to the Chinese cultural revolution.

The difference, however, in approach and style between the Chinese and Albanian cultural revolutions apparently did not damage state relations between Tirana and Peking. The Albanians extended warm greetings to the CCP leaders on the occasion of the Ninth Party Congress in April 1969, and reacted with great indignation to the Sino-Soviet border clashes in the spring and summer of the same year, placing the entire responsibility for the clashes on the Soviet Union. However, when Sino-Soviet talks on border issues began on 20 October 1969, *Zëri i Popullit* took note of the event, but made no comment, nor did it cease its violent attacks on the Soviet Union in the weeks that followed. This could have been an indication perhaps that the Chinese were not serious about the negotiations. Yet it could equally well mean that such negotia-

[28] *Fifth Congress of the APL* (Tirana), 1967, p. 346.

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tions were unacceptable to Tirana. It is a dangerous situation when your one ally sits down to talk to your enemy.

For the most part, Chinese and Albanian policies coincided on all the major issues in the years 1965–70. But it would be a mistake to believe that Albania was merely a mouthpiece of Chinese policy, with no initiative for independent action, or the capacity to influence Chinese policy. To a certain extent, there seemed to be reciprocal influence between the giant of the East and the tiny nation on the shores of the Adriatic. Thus, Albanian policy mirrored, for example, China's position on Japan, India, North Korea, North Vietnam and even Cuba—with which Albania had the most cordial relations before the emergence of Sino-Cuban differences in 1966—but it is equally true that China's policy towards Yugoslavia, Greece and Bulgaria invariably took account of the Albanian position with respect to those countries. Here again the Chinese profited, by negative example, from the Soviets who generally disregarded Tirana's own conception of her interests and role in the Balkans. The very fact that Albania was China's only ally during this period enabled her to exercise a measure of control over China—where Tirana's interests were concerned—that would not otherwise have been possible. There was some justification, therefore, for Albania's denial of the Soviet and Western thesis that she was a mere satellite of China.

THE foremost constant in Tirana's foreign policy in the second half of the 1960s, and the controlling factor in her relations with East Europe, was its implacable opposition to the CPSU leadership. The rule applied by Albania was simple: whatever policies the Soviet Union espoused or put into practice, Albania opposed and attacked. For example, Albania attacked all Soviet moves for a rapprochement with the United States, on the ground that they were nothing but Moscow-Washington plots for world hegemony. Likewise, Albania branded Soviet proposals for disarmament as treacherous manoeuvres intended to lull the peoples of the world into a false sense of security. In cases where Soviet and Albanian policies objectively coincided, as in their support of Vietnam against the United States, or the Arabs against the Israelis, Albania either belittled the aid given by the Soviets, or questioned Moscow's motives for giving such aid, and warned its recipients that they were being betrayed.

In addition to public polemics, the Albanian leadership avoided all contact with the Russians, and spurned all initiatives for an improvement of relations with Moscow. On 2 February 1965, Albania rejected a Polish invitation to attend a meeting of the Warsaw Pact countries. The invitation reportedly was a friendly gesture to Albania on the part of the new CPSU leaders, which may have opened the way to a Soviet-Albanian reconciliation. In January 1966, the Soviet Union and her East European allies invited Albania to take part in a conference of socialist countries to map a 'united action' strategy for helping Vietnam.

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Again, Tirana turned down the invitation, accused the Russians of supporting American aggression against Vietnam, and served notice that Albania would not participate in any meetings of East European countries as long as the Russians took part in them.[29] The following month the Soviet Union reportedly made a formal attempt to resume diplomatic ties with Albania. Shortly before the opening of the Twenty-third CPSU Congress, Moscow asked the Albanian Party of Labour to send a delegation to the Congress, but again met with a rebuff from Tirana.[30]

Indeed, not only did the Albanians spurn all Soviet attempts to break the Sino-Albanian alliance, but they repeatedly called for the overthrow of the 'Brezhnev-Kosygin clique', and claimed that revolutionary groups already existed within the Soviet Union.[31] Convinced that the dialectic of history was on their side, Albania and China worked energetically to promote factionalist activity within the Soviet Union and the international communist movement. Since 1966, Albania served as a base of operations for a Polish, anti-Gomułka communist party, headed by Kazimierz Mijal, a former Minister of Communal Economy in Poland.[32] At the Fifth Party Congress, the APL leadership announced with pride that 31 Marxist-Leninist communist parties and groups were present at the congress. Again, during Albania's celebration of her twenty-fifth anniversary of liberation in November 1969, no less than 22 'Marxist-Leninist' parties and groups were in attendance. Several of them, including the Dutch, Swedish, and Danish delegations, had high praise for the APL and Albanian socialism. The Dutch, for example, said that '. . . the Albanian people and its Party of Labour [are] the greatest example of inspiration for all Marxist-Leninists in the world'.[33]

Meanwhile, Tirana intensified her broadcasting activities in support of factionalist aims. A Polish source in London reported in September 1966 that Albania had begun broadcasting in the Polish language. The programme was said to be under the direction of Kazimierz Mijal.[34] And in October 1967, on the occasion and in honour of China's eighteenth anniversary, Albania inaugurated two new radio stations with the avowed purpose of furthering the aims of world revolution.

At the same time, Albania strongly opposed the holding of an international conference of communist parties, and when such a conference was finally held in Moscow in June 1969, *Zëri i Popullit* called it 'a yellow international' and commented: 'The current conference of the revisionists will seal their betrayal of communism, and effect the final

[29] *Zëri i Popullit*, 12 February 1966.
[30] *Die Zeit*, 22 February 1966; *Zëri i Popullit*, 22 March 1966.
[31] *Zëri i Popullit*, 20 December 1966.
[32] Ibid., 4 December 1968; 'Call to Communists, All Honourable Men of the United Polish Labour Party', *Rruga e Partisë* (The Party Road), monthly organ of APL, vol. XVI, no. 9 (September 1969), pp. 73–79.
[33] *Zëri i Popullit*, 4 December 1969. Pro-Albanian communist parties, as distinct from pro-Chinese parties, reportedly were active in Austria and Belgium in 1969.
[34] *Dziennik Polski* (London), 8 September 1966; RFE, 12 September 1966.

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split between Marxist-Leninists and revisionists'.[35] Tirana was confident however that centrifugal forces within the revisionist camp were driving it to its inevitable destruction.

Albania's attitude towards the Soviet Union determined also her policy towards East Europe. Short of abandoning socialism altogether and slipping into the Western orbit, the yardstick of Albania's relations with the East European countries was the degree of their collaboration with the Soviet Union, i.e. the warmer their relations with Moscow, the cooler Tirana's attitude towards them. Accordingly, Albania found herself at odds with all of the East European countries—with the partial exception of Rumania—until the Czech invasion. As for Yugoslavia, the APL leaders had long ceased to consider her a socialist country, and heaped scorn on 'the treacherous leaders of the Soviet Union who rehabilitated Tito's clique . . . and held out the Yugoslav way as a model that should be followed by others'.[36] By August 1968, Rumania was the only country in East Europe with which Albania maintained both state and Party relations—the result mostly of Rumania's pursuit of a course that was largely independent of the Soviet Union. Tirana nevertheless was not happy with Bucharest's neutrality in the ideological war between the Soviet Union on the one hand, and China and Albania on the other, or with Bucharest's expansion of political and economic relations with the West. The Albanians also criticized the Rumanian leadership in connexion with President Nixon's visit to Bucharest in July 1969, saying that the visit was incompatible with Rumania's declared position on the struggle against imperialism.

THE invasion of Czechoslovakia by the Soviet Union and four Warsaw Pact countries came as a shock to the Albanians, and resulted in a limited realignment in Tirana's international position. Hoxha did not expect the Soviet Union to use force against the Czechs. On 12 September 1968, Albania formally withdrew from the Warsaw Pact, which, according to the Albanians, had been transformed 'from a defence pact against imperialist aggression into an aggressive pact against the socialist countries themselves'.[37] China was quick to approve Tirana's move, and in a strongly worded telegram warned that aggression against Albania would meet with disaster.[38]

Meanwhile Tirana halted temporarily her polemics against Yugoslavia, and in a move intended apparently as a signal to Belgrade, charged that massive Soviet military forces had been stationed on

[35] 'Open Fire on the Revisionist Betrayal', *Zëri i Popullit* editorial, 10 June 1969.
[36] 'Mirror of the Degeneration and Failure of Tito's "Self-Administration"', ibid., July 1968.
[37] *Information Bulletin* (of APL-CC), vol. XX, no. 3 (Tirana), 1968, pp. 22–48. For a detailed discussion of Albania's reaction to the Czech invasion, see Peter R. Prifti, 'Albanian Realignment?: A Potential By-Product of Soviet Invasion of Czechoslovakia', Center for International Studies, M.I.T., C/68–10, October 1968. For text of Albania's Declaration on invasion, see Robin Alison Remington, *Winter in Prague* (Cambridge, Mass.: The M.I.T. Press, 1969), Doc. 48, pp. 329–31.
[38] *Zëri i Popullit*, 19 September 1968.

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Bulgarian soil, thus posing a direct threat to the Balkan peoples. The Chinese backed up Albania's accusation, even though there was no reliable evidence of Soviet troops in Bulgaria.

Presumably these developments were the result of a deliberate decision by Tirana to reappraise her relations with Belgrade. Although Belgrade had adopted a policy of friendship and co-operation with Albania following the fall of Rankovic in July 1966, Tirana had failed to respond in any meaningful way, prior to the Czech invasion. Albania continued, however, to expand trade relations with Yugoslavia, and showed some interest in developing contacts with the Albanian-populated province of Kosovo in south-western Yugoslavia. In May 1968, several Albanian scholars from the Tirana State University travelled to Pristina, capital of Kosovo, to take part in a commemorative conference on Scanderbeg. Contacts between publishing houses in Tirana and Pristina resulted in agreements for the exchange of books, periodicals and educational materials. The autumn of 1968 witnessed a series of violent demonstrations in Kosovo on the part of Albanian nationals, yet despite such incidents trade and cultural relations between Albania and Yugoslavia continued unhampered.

The fact that the Kosovo incidents were surmounted with such relative ease can be credited largely to the repercussions of the Czech invasion in the Balkans. For it was in the aftermath of that invasion that a new trend began to appear in Albanian-Yugoslav affairs, a trend which suggested the beginning, perhaps, of a new era in the relations between the two countries. From all indications, this new trend was the direct result of increasing Albanian fears of Soviet aggression against Rumania, Yugoslavia, and Albania, especially in the wake of the Sino-Soviet border clashes and growing Soviet naval activity in the Mediterranean during 1969. Tirana, therefore, moved to meet the apparent Soviet threat by forging what appeared to be tacit defence alliances with her neighbours.[39] Toward that end, in April 1969, Albania publicly offered to assist Yugoslavia and Rumania in case of Soviet aggression against them, and a year later an editorial in the Party's daily not only reaffirmed Tirana's pledge of assistance to Belgrade, but went so far as to praise Yugoslavia's National War of Liberation, 'led by the communists'.[40] It was a big concession for Albania to make to the hitherto despised Yugoslav communist leadership. For its part, Yugoslavia welcomed Tirana's moves for an improvement in relations. An article in the Zagreb daily, *Vjesnik* (25 April 1970), took note of Albania's favourable evaluation of the Yugoslav partisans' struggle, saying that 'our papers have . . . correctly appraised it as the expression of a new and more positive attitude toward Yugoslavia'. The article, entitled 'Our Neighbour

[39] L[ouis] Z[anga], 'Albania's Uncommonly Friendly Soundings Towards Yugoslavia', RFE, 9 April 1970.

[40] 'The Importance of the National War of Liberation in the History of the Yugoslav Peoples', *Zëri i Popullit*, 5 April 1970

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Albania' and signed 'B.M.', expressed the hope that the two countries 'will . . . find the solution to all major questions existing between them'.

As a further step toward realigning her position in the Balkans, Albania improved markedly her relations with Turkey and even signed a trade agreement with Greece, with whom she was technically at war since the days of the Second World War.[41] These modifications in Albania's position were accompanied by a steady stream of attacks on Soviet 'social imperialism', and on the 'Gustav Husak clique' which supinely submitted to Soviet occupation. Faithful to the doctrine of revolutionary struggle, Tirana kept calling on the Czech people to rise in armed rebellion against the Soviet occupiers and the traitorous Czech leaders, for that was the only way to gain their freedom, save their nation, and restore true socialism in Czechoslovakia.

FIVE years after Khrushchev's fall, and nearly 15 years since the Twentieth Congress of the CPSU, Albania had succeeded in disproving the domino theory within the communist world. A Stalinist country, practising a militant type of communism, it had withstood the 'revisionist wave' that swept over East Europe since the 1956 thaw. It had successfully resisted the pressures for liberalization, generated by the far-reaching political, economic, social and cultural changes in other East European countries. Rather Tirana emphasized reform from above without political relaxation. This pattern differed from the Stalinism of the late 1920s and 1930s in that the APL leadership showed considerable concern that improvement in the condition of the people go forward parallel to industrialization. The attitude was that modernization should not occur at the expense of human welfare, and an increasingly significant part of the Albanian budget was devoted to housing, education and health care.[42]

Yet Albania did not follow the Yugoslav pattern of facing simultaneously East and West after the split with Moscow. Indeed, often to the puzzlement of the Western press, and the undoubted annoyance of the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe, at the close of the 1960s Tirana was still isolated in Europe, its political, ideological, and economic orientation deriving basically from Peking.

The very fact of de-Stalinization in the Soviet Union—symbolized in Tirana's eyes by Khrushchev—and its powerful repercussions in East Europe, plus of course the new, internal developments in China, set off a counter-response in Albania. It triggered the ideological and cultural revolution which, in the late 1960s, became the major political fact of life in Albania's domestic affairs. In the face of the new political realities in East Europe, and the ferment in China, it became almost inevitable for the Albanian leaders to launch the cultural revolution, first of all to justify to their own people their policy *vis-à-vis* the revisionists, and

41 *Bashkimi*, 24 January 1970.
42 Ibid., 14, 15, 16 January 1969.

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thus consolidate their position; secondly, to complement the domestic developments in China and in this manner show their solidarity with Peking; and thirdly to inspire the Albanian people with the vision of a society and a way of life far superior to the one they knew.

Yet, stripped of its ideological rhetoric, Albania's experiment at revolutionizing the country's life, was in effect a bold, energetic, haphazard and risky attempt to bring about needed economic and social changes in Albanian society, which in many respects was still feudalistic, oriental, clannish and patriarchal.[43] In attempting such a massive social experiment, the Albanian leaders faced a paradox, for the very seclusion and isolation of their people—which was thought to be necessary for the experiment to succeed—cut them off from contact with the more advanced societies of the West and East Europe, and tended to perpetuate many of the backward features of Albanian life. On the threshhold of the 1970s, the results of Albania's experiment seemed inconclusive, but there was little doubt that the leadership intended to press forward.

As is the case with all revolutionary movements, the ferment caused by the intensification of the 'uninterrupted' revolution in Albania disaffected certain segments of society, including bureaucrats, religious elements and significant portions of the intelligentsia and the farming population. However, the discontent did not appear to pose a major threat to Hoxha's power. Hoxha apparently had the support of the army, loyal cadres, the youth and the industrial workers. Other factors in his favour were the rise in the people's standard of living, a tradition of authoritarian rule in the country, and an efficient state security system. Perhaps most important of all were the powerful nationalist sentiments which he continued to symbolize in the eyes of the population, in large part due to his role as leader of the National War of Liberation.

The ideological and cultural revolution was part of Albania's overall revolutionary stance. In line with this policy, Albania became the leading exponent of revolutionary propaganda in Europe, and the nerve-centre for factionalist activity by the pro-Chinese communist parties of West Europe. Such a role was useful perhaps to the Albanians as a means of overcoming their sense of isolation, but the prospects for success in terms of extending their political power and influence in Europe are limited. Moreover, their openly hostile position invited retaliation, and made Albania a natural target of attack by its enemies in the Kremlin and East Europe, as well as in the pro-Soviet communist parties of the West. Here again Tirana's role within the communist world seemed paradoxical, since her actual capacities were not commensurate with her revolutionary aspirations. On the face of it, the commitment to a revolutionary role on the part of Albania—a small,

[43] For some comparative statistics on the level of Albanian development between the First and Second World Wars, see Andrew C. Janos, 'The One-Party State and Social Mobilization: East Europe Between the Wars', in *Authoritarian Politics in Modern Society*, Samuel Huntington and Clement Moore, eds. (New York: Basic Books, Inc., 1970), pp. 204–236.

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weak and isolated country—would have seemed futile, if not ludicrous, except for the fact that she was allied with a militant and powerful China. That fact, coupled with a growing rebellious mood in many parts of the world among students, youth and various disadvantaged groups gave Albania's revolutionary stance a measure both of respectability and credibility. In any case, by the end of the 1960s, the austere Tirana communists were firmly committed to the doctrine of revolutionary change in Albania and the world.

Externally, the major political event which had an especially strong impact on Albania's foreign policy was the invasion of Czechoslovakia. The invasion had a traumatic effect on Albania's leaders, and made them fully conscious of the geo-political realities in the Balkans and Europe. In part, the sense of shock was the product of a misreading by the Albanian communists of the Kremlin's intentions and of the true aspirations of the Czechoslovak people.

The Czech crisis brought to the fore the national reflex in the Albanian leadership, particularly in view of the observation made by the Russians, following Albania's withdrawal from the Warsaw Pact, that they could not rely on China for help in case of national emergency. Apart from the question of its validity, the remark was a veiled threat which they could not afford to ignore. Accordingly, Albania moved gradually to de-emphasize her ideological and political differences with her neighbours, and to seek a *modus vivendi* with them, in the interest of national security. Only extreme concern for Albania's independence could induce Hoxha to draw closer to Tito's Yugoslavia or to the 'fascist military clique' in Athens.

Albania's overall response to the Czech invasion was to develop her ties both with China and her Balkan neighbours. And as long as Sino-Soviet tensions continued, and the 'Brezhnev doctrine' was in force, the prospects looked good for a steady improvement of relations, at a state level, between Albania and her Balkan neighbours, with the exception of Bulgaria. It was not likely, however, that Albania would abandon her Stalinist course, and turn to the West—at least as long as Hoxha was alive—unless major, unforeseen events altered the configuration of political forces in the area.

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THREE VOICES OF DISSENT

Among the most amazing exploits by a television reporter were the interviews by the Columbia Broadcasting System correspondent, Mr. William Cole, with three Soviet dissidents, Andrei Amalrik, Pyotr Yakir and Vladimir Bukovsky. They were filmed and tape-recorded in Moscow and then broadcast over the CBS television network in the United States on 28 July 1970 (and later in other countries). Shortly after the interviews were made, Mr. Cole was expelled from the Soviet Union. Amalrik was arrested not much later, on 21 May 1970. With the kind permission of the CBS we reproduce below the text of the three interviews. The translation is by David Floyd.

ANDREI AMALRIK

From your book I gather that you think China will play a role in the downfall of the Soviet Union?

Yes, I believe that a conflict with China will speed the process of disintegration of the Soviet Union.

Do you think it will be a major factor?

Well, that's not quite the way I see it. I think the most important factor will be the unwillingness of the ruling elite to change anything.

What do you mean by the unwillingness of the leadership to change?

What I have in mind is that the ruling class in the Soviet Union is directing all its efforts towards ensuring that the whole of the social and economic structure in the Soviet Union remains unchanged.

Why doesn't the leadership want to change?

Apparently because any change would mean for them the loss of a substantial part of their privileges.

What is privilege here today and who gets the privileges?

When I spoke just now of the privileges enjoyed by the ruling class I had in mind primarily the privilege of ruling the country without being subject to any public control, and, secondly . . . it's difficult to find the right words . . . to enjoy all those material benefits which their way of running the country gives them.

Is there any discontent among the people about the elite's privileges?

Yes, I think there is.

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Can you elaborate on that?

It has to be said that the ordinary people, including myself, are not well enough acquainted with the forms which these privileges take. But there is in any case among the people a great deal of dissatisfaction on account of the wide discrepancies in wage levels, extreme annoyance at the existence of special closed shops and stores, in which the ruling elite are able to buy goods which cannot be bought in the ordinary shops, and with other ways in which the nation's wealth is unfairly distributed.

You have described Soviet society as a layer cake, i.e. three social strata. What do you mean by that?

What I had in mind was that the top layer consists of the ruling, bureaucratic class, the class of party officials, the ruling elite . . . the middle layer I thought of as the class of specialists, the people with education, some of whom overlap with the lower layers of party officials . . . and finally as the bottom layer of the cake I had in mind the working class, the farm workers, unskilled employees and other people low in the social scale.

Do you think this could lead to another revolution?

Well, I consider that a second revolution will not result necessarily from the division of society into classes, because that is true of any society. What may lead to a revolution is the utter lack of good sense in the upper class which is trying to avoid any change and to prevent society from having any mobility, and which is always striving to preserve and make permanent the breakup of our society into tightly closed castes.

The United States is vilified everyday on Soviet TV, radio, and in the press. Why is it pictured to Russians as a land where everyone is starving, where there is no freedom, and as the enemy?

Well, in the first place purely by inertia. The anti-American campaign was started by Stalin during the cold war and it still goes on as before, sometimes subsiding and at other times growing noisier. In the second place because, if the regime is to make itself look attractive in the eyes of its own people, it must constantly depict in the most repulsive light all other countries, especially the economically advanced ones. And it has to be said that, for a considerable time now, this approach has been effective. For example, I have had occasion to hear Russian farm workers say: 'Well, life is very bad for us, but we are at least able to eat potatoes every day, and sometimes they deliver kerosene to us. But how on earth do people live in the capitalist countries? There's probably nothing at all to eat there.'

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But it has to be said that this campaign which goes on out of inertia is now, I think, having very little effect. And although no Soviet citizen, including myself, has a true idea of life in the United States, the idea which the average Soviet citizen has of the United States is at any rate very different from the picture drawn by the newspapers. But then I also think that not everything that is written in the papers about the United States is untrue: there is some truth in it, as it often happens.

You have written that you believe that China is the real enemy of this country. Then why does the Soviet press never mention China and attack America as it does?

Well, that's not quite true: they also talk about China in the press and sometimes in even sharper terms than about the United States. But since there is or there was a hope of coming to terms with China the campaign is sometimes halted. Moreover, what sense is there, especially in the press, in slanging China when it's already clear to Soviet citizens that life in China is even more difficult than in the Soviet Union.

Mr. Amalrik, you seem rather dissatisfied with things here. Would you like to leave the Soviet Union?

Yes, I am dissatisfied with this political system, but this is the country in which I was born and I hope that in due course everything will change. No, I do not want to leave this country. It is another question if I had been able to make a choice before my birth, then I would have preferred to be born in another country.

You criticized Anatoli Kuznetsov, the writer who defected to Britain recently. Why did you do that?

I criticized him because he tries to divest himself of responsibility—himself, other writers and the intelligentsia as a whole—for the system which exists in our country. But I consider that no system of rule by force can exist without the people who are ready to submit to that rule of force. And if we don't want the rule of force to prevail we must all fight against it and not just say the regime is bad, we are suffering, and so forth. It *is* a bad system, but that doesn't absolve us of blame for its being bad. But I don't want the impression to get around that I condemn Kuznetsov for escaping to England. If he, as a writer, was unable to work here, then it was not only his right but in a certain sense his duty as a writer to go somewhere where he can write what he wants to write and publish what he writes.

It's been over a year since you finished your book. Do you feel that your predictions are coming true?

It seems to me that they are. It seems to me that things are

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happening even more quickly than I thought. And as a concrete example I can cite the following. I said in my book that between the Soviet Union and China there would eventually be peace talks, and in fact three months after I finished the book a meeting took place between Kosygin and Chou En-lai. Again, I said that the bureaucratic system would not be able to cope with the economic difficulties, and in fact in the course of the last year the economic situation of the system has got so much worse that Brezhnev was forced in his December speech to admit it. Such things are always happening in our country, but things must have got extremely bad for it to be admitted publicly. Well, I could quote several other examples, but it would mean talking for a long time.

Is it true that opponents of the regime are put into mental hospitals to get rid of them?

Yes, it's true. I think it's the most disgusting thing this regime does. At the same time it seems to me this is a clear indication of the complete ideological capitulation of the regime in the face of its opponents. If the regime can't find anything else to do with them but to declare them to be out of their minds. I am very well acquainted with a number of people who have been put into psychiatric hospitals and certified as not responsible for their actions. There's General Grigorenko, there's Ivan Yakhimovich. The same fate now threatens Natalia Gorbansveskaya. And I want to say that they are completely normal, and clear-thinking people, and they have been meted out a terrible fate—to have to live among genuinely deranged people, and moreover for an utterly undefined period, since the period of detention in a psychiatric hospital is not laid down in the sentence of the court.

What does the man in the street think of this—ordinary people, farmers, workers?

Now that's a very difficult question. I don't suppose anybody really knows. But I have had a lot to do with factory workers and farm workers, and it seems to me that they haven't begun to think over the nature of this system at all . . . it just seems to them that it has always been and always will be. But at the same time there is evidence of very deep dissatisfaction with particular aspects of the system, and this can take on the most varied forms. Some are dissatisfied because they receive extremely little money by comparison with the others, so that they don't have enough to live on. Others are dissatisfied because they can't buy anything with the relatively high wages they earn. The farm workers are dissatisfied with their lack of rights, in that they cannot leave the villages. The factory workers are dissatisfied with their complete dependence on the factory management. People living in small towns are dissatisfied because they can't,

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they don't have the right to move to bigger towns when there's no work in the small ones. And some people, at all events, begin to have the impression that all these local problems have their origins in the imperfections of the political system under which we live.

What does the average man, the worker, think of Americans?

I believe the man in the street thinks that Americans live better than we do. And in general, in my opinion, the ordinary man is not badly disposed towards the Americans.

Are Americans disliked here because of the war in Vietnam?

I think they are. Although the overwhelming majority of the people are indifferent to the war in Vietnam, but the steady stream of newspaper reports about atrocities committed by American soldiers in Vietnam have an effect naturally.

There's one thing that is very difficult for Americans to understand, For example technologically Russia is very advanced, you have space hardware flying around the moon, but in the largest markets in Moscow there are very few eggs, little meat, few vegetables to buy. This seems strange to us. How do you explain this?

I think it is precisely because the Soviet Union devotes too much effort to research into outer space and on armaments, and the country's resources are not unlimited, and so for that reason things are so bad in all other fields.

What did the average man think when the Americans landed on the moon?

I think people reacted in various ways. Some rejoiced at it, as a great victory, not just for the Americans but for the whole of mankind. Others took it rather badly, because for ten years the Soviet people had had it drummed into them that the first man to set foot on the moon would be a Soviet man and that this would be complete proof of the superiority of the socialist system.

Has your book been published here?

Well, it has not been published here, but in perhaps the last month it has begun to be pretty widely distributed in typewritten form or as we say in *Samizdat*.

What is Samizdat?

Samizdat means that the author himself publishes his own work. It is a term for literature which appears without going through the censorship.

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You have already been exiled once to Siberia. On what charges?

Mainly on the charge that I had written anti-Soviet and pornographic plays. As a souvenir of that my teddy bear received this little badge, and moreover in Siberia he became a Maoist.

Does the Mao button mean that you are a Maoist?

No. Not me. Only my teddy bear.

You say your book was published here in Samizdat. What did the Russians, who read it, think of it?

Unfortunately very few people have yet been able to read it here, but I know that it has evoked a great deal of interest. In particular, yesterday I learned that Solzhenitsyn had spoken very highly about it. That is of course very pleasant for me. Although I suppose Solzhenitsyn would not agree with many of the things I say there. And I think that very few Russians would agree entirely with what I write. But interest in the book, I repeat, is considerable.

Why did you decide to write 'Will the Soviet Union survive until 1984?'.

There were three main reasons why I decided to write that book and to try to get it published. The first was my concern for the fate of my country. It was, alas, some years ago that I started to be concerned at the fact that my country was heading for a catastrophe in the not-too-distant future, and I wrote about it on two occasions to the editors of Russian newspapers in Moscow, but I received the most unconvincing replies, and then I decided to find another way of gaining publicity for my views. In the second place, since, as I understood it, my book would appear abroad, and would be distributed principally abroad, I set myself the objective of refuting those current and inaccurate ideas about my country which are widespread, mainly in America, about the liberalization of the Soviet regime which is allegedly taking place. And thirdly, I had the same reason as any author has who writes a book. Given that these ideas had come into my head it was natural that I should want to write about them. Although it is now only I who has in such a sharp and perhaps provocative form put these thoughts on to paper . . . but these are ideas which are, as they say, 'in the air', so that I don't know what people abroad think, but here my pamphlet, distributed by *Samizdat*, was very successful: it became a sort of 'best-seller' for *Samizdat*.

What in your opinion is happening inside the Soviet Union?

What is really happening to the Soviet regime, in my opinion, is not that it is getting more liberal but that it is getting senile. 'Liberalization' would presuppose that the regime was consciously

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undertaking some reforms, whereas in reality the regime is more and more losing control over the situation in the country. Of course, from the point of view of the Americans the Soviet regime exercises a far greater control over its country than, say, the American government does over its. But, for a totalitarian regime, the degree of control is already insufficient.

How widely read do you think your book was?

As an example may I cite the unusual popularity of *Samizdat* about which I have already spoken—that is the distribution in typewritten form of uncensored writings. This does not happen because the regime takes a liberal view of such things or deliberately permits it, but simply because the regime can't do anything about this problem, mainly because there has been an extraordinary increase in the number of people with education and in the importance of the role played by educated people in modern society. And this 'intelligentsia' can no longer and will no longer be satisfied with the miserable official writings which are offered. But I cite this only as an example of what I have in mind.

How dangerous is it to criticize the regime?

That depends on two factors. In the first place on how the regime is criticized and for what, and secondly who exactly is criticizing it. If the critic is a sufficiently well known person and he does it in a fairly cautious manner, as for example did Academician Sakharov, the punishment may be limited to dismissal from his job or take some other camouflaged form. If the criticism takes a very sharp form and the authorities see that the critic will not desist, then punishment will normally take the form of a concentration camp or—something that has recently become very widespread—a psychiatric hospital, into which are put completely healthy people, as for example Major General Grigorenko or the former collective farm chairman Yakhimovich. I have to say that this is the most loathsome form of punishment, and at the same time a form which bears witness to the complete ideological capitulation of the regime in the face of its opponents. And if, in reply to ideas—because actually the regime only represents an idea—the regime can find no better answer than to commit people to mental homes, that is also a characteristic symptom of our time. But even when it takes repressive measures the regime now tries to act rather carefully, without attracting attention to itself—an example of this may be my own fate and the fact that I now have the opportunity to say this here.

Why have you so far escaped arrest?

I think that, as far as I am concerned, the regime has not taken any definite decision, precisely for the reason that my book became, without

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my knowledge, very widely known and attracted a lot of attention to me. I thought at the beginning that the regime would simply ignore my book and that later, when interest in me declined, I would be arrested and tried for some secondary, cooked-up offence. But maybe I'm wrong, because, on 27 February the secret police carried out a raid on my apartment and took some films and pictures there, which led me to think that possibly some articles attacking me were being prepared for the Soviet newspapers—as illustrations—or that there was going to be a television film about me, which might serve as an ideological preparation for my arrest. But now some people in Moscow are putting round the rumour that maybe I am to be deported abroad out of the Soviet Union, but I personally don't believe this. Although such a step, from the point of view of propaganda, would be the most sensible, the regime will never take it, because considerations of personal revenge always outweigh, with those people, considerations of good sense.

What do you think your fate would be?

I think either a camp or exile.

Does this worry you?

Well, my life is pretty unpleasant, on account of the uncertainty.

Do you want to leave Russia?

No. Although I have no respect at all and no good feelings for the regime under which I am forced to live, it is still my country, in which I was born and grew up, and this is where I want to live, in my own country, and to hope that it will see better days. But at the same time I would gladly go and visit other countries, including America, if I knew that I would be able to return here.

Do you regard war with China as inevitable?

I cannot say with complete conviction that war is inevitable. But I consider that war is very probable because in my opinion China, post-revolutionary China, is now entering a period of external expansion which every great country goes through after a large-scale revolution. And China's natural enemy I consider is the Soviet Union—I have written in greater detail about this in my book. So I consider, not that war is inevitable, but very likely, and this likelihood must not in any case be ruled out when we are discussing our country's future.

Will this lead to the downfall of Russia?

I do not think that the war will in itself bring about the disintegration of the Soviet Union, especially since in such a war the military successes might fall to the Soviet Union. But I think that the war, if it is long and drawn-out, will to a considerable degree accelerate and intensify

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those internal processes in the Soviet Union which are leading to its break-up: that is, grave economic difficulties, local nationalism, dissatisfaction among the intelligentsia, and the complete isolation from one another of the various strata of Soviet society.

Is opposition to the regime limited to the intelligentsia?

No, not just the intelligentsia, the educated people. I think there is dissatisfaction among many sections of society. I mention the intelligentsia because, first, the intelligentsia succeeded in making their discontent public, and secondly because the intelligentsia understand most clearly what they are dissatisfied with and why. But there is discontent in many strata of society. The workers are discontented because of their low wages, high work quotas and the efforts to force them to stay at their workplace. The farm workers are discontented also because they are forced to remain at one place of work and their very hard working conditions. Some people are discontented at having so little money; others because there is nothing to spend it on. And so forth. But to be rightly understood I want to add that this discontent is directed, not against the regime as a whole, but against particular, immediate aspects of the system, and hardly ever takes any active form. I think it will be quite a long time before the great majority of the people begin to hold the regime directly responsible for all their problems. And it will be even longer before the people will make up their minds to take any active steps.

Do you think there will be a second Russian revolution?

I don't think there is any such possibility at the moment. But in 10 or in 15 years' time, as I have written, such a possibility may emerge and a revolution will take place. But what kind of revolution it will be and whether the regime produced by the revolution will be better than the one we live under now I do not know, of course.

PYOTR YAKIR

AFTER Stalin died, for a certain period people simply didn't know what or how to think. Various youth groups sprang up among the students which started to review the theoretical side of Stalin's theses. That was in 1956 and 1957. Many of them paid for it with their freedom and were arrested. At the Moscow State University there was the case of Krasnopertsov who was arrested with a large group of others.

But the most important turning-point in the way people thought was when Daniel and Sinyavsky were arrested. Many educated people thought that Daniel and Sinyavsky had done wrong in sending their writings abroad, and following their trial and after *Samizdat*—the word

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Samizdat refers to the system by which people simply reproduce and pass from hand to hand various writings—published the final speeches of Daniel and Sinyavsky, there came about a striking change. Because both Sinyavsky and Daniel spoke about what they thought, that they had written down what they believed, and did not consider themselves guilty. And many people began to think: really why should people be tried for their convictions? Why, simply for what he thinks, does a man have to be arrested? It was very similar to the Stalin times, when people were sent to prison, not even for what they thought, but for what they were thought to believe but had not said to anyone, but it had somehow been proved that they were dissenters.

So from that time on there were protests. First—you have no doubt read the 'White Book', which contains all the lists of people, even among the writers, who signed the protests against the sentencing of people for their creative work. Some time later people were arrested who had organized a demonstration on Pushkin Square and produced a book called the *White Book* and also the *Phoenix* 65—Galanskov, Ginzburg, Dobrovolsky, and Lashkova. In our country, for every bit of free thinking people were immediately punished.

But a year passed and then there was the trial of Galanskov and Ginzburg, and that was the time of the greatest enthusiasm, because first a great many people protested against the fact that the trial was held illegally behind closed doors. During the trial the situation changed a great deal. Whereas during the trial of Daniel and Sinyavsky it had been impossible to approach foreign correspondents—the vigilantes would take people straight off to the police—at the Moscow City court we all discussed the affair with the correspondents. True, they wouldn't let us in anywhere, but a certain contact was established, and everything we learned we passed immediately to the correspondents.

The trial ended. There were a great many protests against the trial. More than two thousand people put their names to various letters of protest against the conviction of people for their beliefs. Some time later—during the trial Larissa Daniel and Pavel Litvinov handed the correspondents a protest against the trial and appealed to world public opinion. That was the first, major step which was a breach with all previous traditions. Never before in Russia had there been a case of people appealing to the West with a protest against unlawfulness in our country.

Following that protest they interrogated and detained a great many people. There was the letter of the 180, of the 120, 67, 12, and so forth. It assumed what for our country was a mass character. In about February there appeared the letter of Ivan Yakhimovich, a collective farm chairman in Latvia, in which he dealt with the same things. That was actually an even more important development: a chairman of a collective farm of a whole village—protesting at what was being done in Moscow! It was evidence that people listened to foreign radio stations which were carrying all the news.

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After that, in Leningrad there were the brothers Vakhtyini who also wrote a letter. There were various other letters from students, schoolchildren and so forth, who all joined in the protest drawn up by Litvinov and Bogoraz.

Immediately following that speech many meetings were held, of course on orders from the Party, which discussed those letters. In fact there was no discussion, because the letters were not produced. The Party activists were brought together and so a few people framed a resolution in the name of thousands. Roughly in May or June, many people who had signed letters were dismissed from their work on various excuses. Many were expelled from the Party, all members of the Party who had signed letters were expelled. Many of them were from academic institutions, and some from the Academy of Science. About that time more than 160 people were dismissed and more than 40 were expelled from the Party. That of course affected the behaviour of people who were trying to promote democracy. Everyone had a family or children.

You asked what the people who are now in opposition to our government are doing. You don't understand the situation correctly. Those people who protest—they are not opposed to the government—they simply criticise its actions. The fact is that those who now oppose the actions of various illegal punitive agencies are simply people who are asserting themselves as human beings and on the basis of the Human Rights Charter of the United Nations which was accepted by our country. Of course people, I know, don't know everything. But every illegal act committed in our country they try to make public, so that all the world may know and they take no account at all of our state frontiers.

This is a great stride forward by comparison with Stalinism. Under Stalin there was always an iron curtain and no one knew what was going on here. Millions of people were destroyed and nobody knew anything about it. Now we try to publicize every arrest, every dismissal. We see in this the most important role—that is, informing people what is going on in our country and about those illegal acts. We consider this the main task today. In about March of the same year myself, Gabai and Kim drew up a letter appealing to the Soviet intelligentsia. It was addressed to people working in the field of culture, the arts and literature. In that letter we dealt with the question not only of the trial but also the question of all the discrimination taking place in our country—the question of the Crimean Tatars, who are still living outside their native land, in exile, although they were quite illegally deported in 1945; the question of the situation of the intelligentsia, of the natural sciences and letters. There we made the point that a person who could not protest against breaches of the law should not be engaged in scholarly work.

Following that letter, some time later, there was the letter of the Twelve, which brought together all the tendencies among the Russian dissident intelligentsia. The letter was addressed to the Consultative

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Meeting [of communist leaders] in Budapest. Authors included myself, Gabai and Kim, Pavel Litvinov and Larissa Bogoraz, the religious writer Lavitin-Krasnov, a representative of the Crimean Tatars, Zampira Asanova, Shragin, Glazov, Kosterin—a writer who had always fought for the liberation of small nations from their yoke in our country, those who had been deported, Chechens, Ingushi and so forth, the Volga Germans and the Crimean Tatars, Kosterin is dead now—Peter Gregorovich Grigorenko, who also linked up with Kosterin and in his own way conducted an active campaign for the liberation of the small peoples and for democracy in our country. That letter was regarded by our authorities—as was later said at meetings—as a stab in our country's back. Some time later there was a conference of the Moscow Party organization at which Brezhnev spoke and there it was said that they had a huge number of letters condemning those renegades who speak out against the Party's policy—by 'renegades' they meant people who defended the laws and civil rights in the Soviet Union.

You ask me why I think I will be arrested. It is very simple. All my friends—Pavel Litvinov, Larissa Bogoraz, Victor Krasin, Genrikh Altunyan, Peter Grigorevich Grigorenko, Ilya Gabai, and many others—have already been arrested for the same things as I have done. I don't know—I served 14 of my 17 years from 1937 and maybe that still protects me. I have acted just as they did. They were arrested and I wasn't. It seems to me that our government must arrest me, because I remain alone while other people are in prison who tried to make things public to the whole world. I consider that only the truth and only publicity will help to correct what is done illegally here.

Here is what I think. We are all being arrested—those who have taken part in the democratic movement. But that's not the point. We are being arrested because it doesn't suit the authorities to have people about who criticize them. But there's no going back. If we are not here there'll be others, and there are already many—many young people, and no independently thinking person in the Soviet Union will go back to what used to be. They beat us and they kill us, but all the same people will go on thinking differently.

VLADIMIR BUKOVSKY

You were sentenced to an insane asylum when you were 21. *What was your crime?*

I was arrested for the first time on 1 June 1963 because I had in my apartment two photocopies of Djilas's book *The New Class*. I spent some months in gaol and after the conclusion of investigation I was sent to the 'Serbsky' Institute where I was declared to be insane and not responsible for my actions. After that, in December 1963, I was sent to a special prison-cum-psychiatric hospital (mental home) in Leningrad, where I spent about 18 months.

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At first it seemed to me a strange decision. I couldn't understand the reason for it. I couldn't understand in what way the doctors who examined me found me abnormal. But once I got to know some of the other inmates of that hospital I discovered that it was the usual decision in such cases. The fact is that the inmates, the patients in that hospital, the prisoners, are people who have done things which from the point of view of the authorities are crimes but which are not criminal from the point of view of the law. And, in order in some way to isolate them, to punish them in some way, such people are declared to be insane and are detained as patients in these mental prison-hospitals.

Some time passed before I understood this and before I got to know my fellow prisoners (cell-mates). I believe this is the usual fate for a person who wishes to be himself, who wants to say what he thinks, to act in accordance with his convictions and ideas. Events of recent years confirm my supposition. Many people—tens, hundreds of people—have been declared insane and committed to various hospitals, mainly special ones, like those in Kazan, Leningrad, Chernigovsk, Sechyovka, and so forth.

What is life like inside an insane asylum for a dissident like yourself?

What sort of a place is the Leningrad psychiatric hospital? Imagine to yourself a prison—an old prison, that was a prison even before the Revolution—in which there are something like a thousand prisoners, more than half of whom are murderers, people who have committed serious crimes, at a time when they were out of their minds—people who are genuinely sick—and the remainder who are political prisoners, dissidents, for whom no article could be found in the criminal code, whom they could find no other way to deal with but in such a place.

The prison staff consisted of, primarily, warders—the usual kind of prison warders—who had taken off their uniforms and put on white smocks. The prison corridors were like that in any prison—locked cells—the number of people in each cell varied with the section—two or three in the observation section, 10 or 12 in the other sections. Apart from the warders there are the orderlies—they were prisoners, criminals, working off their sentences in that way. They are people quite indifferent to the fate of the patients: a patient is just a job. They are obliged to talk to them but they don't like it, so they lose their tempers with them. There's no supervision by the authorities over that department. So if a prisoner, one of the staff, beats up a patient, they can always say that the patient was over-excited, that he wasn't behaving properly, that his condition had deteriorated, was getting violent, so they were obliged to restrain him. That would be enough and they would receive no punishment.

It's much more difficult to get out of such a place than it is to get into it. First, in order to get out you must declare openly and officially to the doctors that you admit that you are sick—'yes, I was ill, yes,'

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'I didn't know what I was doing when I did it'. The second condition is to admit you were wrong, to disavow what you did. I know of several cases of people who refused to say they had done wrong and spent many long years in that hospital.

Nikolai Nikolayevich Samsonov, for example, a geophysicist from Leningrad, who was kept there simply because he refused to admit he was a sick man. Another of my friends in the mad-house was, for example, a French communist of Rumanian origin who had lived for more than 10 years in Marseilles and who came to the Soviet Union to learn, to see what communism was like in practice. He went to work in a footwear factory in Moldavia and worked there a long time. But he was displeased that the workers there received such low wages. He told his workmates that they ought to fight for better pay—they went on strike, he was arrested and declared insane. In the hospital he just couldn't understand what had happened to him, how communists could do such things. For him communism and the struggle for a better life were more or less the same thing—he just couldn't understand. Towards the end of his stay he really began to go out of his mind, it seems to me, because he was telling everybody that the Soviet Government was under the influence of the Vatican.

Another of my friends in prison was a Latvian by origin who had lived in Australia as an emigrant and who had returned to the Soviet Union to visit his relatives and friends. They wouldn't let him out of the Soviet Union, telling him that since he was a Latvian he was a Soviet citizen and that there was no other government of Latvia.

I have to say that while in prison I did not have the feeling of a lack of understanding on the part of the people with whom I was detained. Those, in spite of their different pasts, and the different crimes they had committed contrary to the law, were sufficiently identical in their attitude towards me, a person who was defending the civil rights of all of us together. It was sufficient for them to know that we, that is the group of citizens defending civil rights of the people of our country, were united by a common idea, the idea of the need to be aware of our civil rights under all the laws of mankind. This fact was sufficient for all of us. My comrades in prison understood well enough what I had done. They understood the need for my actions and they were ready to help me, in spite of the fact that they were people of a different social stratum.

I had a lot of friends there and all their cases were proof for me that the people who landed up in that hospital were those who had done things for which they could not be brought to court, who had committed no offence, and the hospital was simply a means of getting rid of them, putting them out of sight.

How are dissidents treated in an insane asylum?

The hospital regime was similar to any prison regime. One hour's exercise a day, locked cells, outside visitors once a month, one letter

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a month to relatives, one parcel a month. Exactly the same as in a prison. The doctors themselves realized that it was not a hospital but a prison and sometimes said so openly. If a patient misbehaved he could be punished.

It was very easy to get into trouble in that hospital, and the punishments were very severe. There are three kinds of punishment which are most commonly applied there. The first form of punishment is carried out by medical means. I think people know about a preparation known as Sulfazine, which is used if one of the patients—prisoners—in the hospital committed some offence or gave a doctor a rude answer to some question or declared that a doctor in the hospital was really an executioner in a white smock. Such a remark would be sufficient to involve punishment. Sulfazine is a pretty painful form of punishment: it causes your temperature to rise to about 40 degrees centigrade, you feel you have a fever, can't get out of bed or move about, and it goes on for a day or two. If the treatment is repeated, then the effects can last a whole week or 10 days.

A second form of punishment involves the use of the preparation called Aminozine, used in psychotherapy, also known, probably, in other countries. It causes the patient to feel drowsy, sleepy—he may sleep several days on end, and if such a treatment is given regularly he may go on sleeping as long as it is continued.

The third form of punishment we used to call the 'roll-up'—it involved the use of wet canvas—long pieces of it—in which the patient is rolled up from head to foot, and so tightly that it was difficult for him to breathe, and as the canvas began to dry out it would get tighter and tighter and make the patient feel even worse. But that punishment was applied with some caution—there were medical men present while it was taking place who made sure that the patient did not lose consciousness, and if his pulse began to weaken then the canvas would be eased.

Altogether the medical forms of punishment were pretty widely used and it was sufficient for a patient to appear cheerful or, on the contrary, miserable, to show dissatisfaction or to be too calm—any deviation which might appear suspicious to the psychiatrists—to give them grounds for believing you were ill. That would be sufficient for them to start using those treatments.

What about the second time you were put in an asylum. What was your crime then?

I was released from the Leningrad special hospital in February 1965 and was arrested again in December 1965 for organizing a demonstration in defence of Sinyavsky and Daniel who were then under arrest and were about to be tried. I was sent first to the normal civil hospital, then to the 'Serbsky' Institute, where I spent about eight months. The doctors—the expert commission which was appointed to deal with me—

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were very anxious to declare me a sick person, but there was disagreement among them and they could not reach an agreed opinion. Of the four professors who examined me two said I was sick and two said I was fit. That was the time when Tarsis went abroad—Valeri Tarsis, the well-known writer—and he made a great fuss there about my detention in the mental hospital. He knew me well and I knew him. As a result a representative of the 'Amnesty' organization arrived in Moscow and, as I learnt afterwards, threatened to carry out an inquiry into the affair and after that, in August 1966, I was released without any explanation.

I consider that the imprisonment of people like me is a nonsense and that people who are convinced of the injustice of the existing social system cannot be changed in their views by methods of political persecution, by means of terror, by being held in camps, and so forth. For us, for people like me, the deprivation of liberty cannot be a means of correction. I shall never change my political views. As I was, so I shall remain, in spite of the severity of the punishment, imprisonment, and so forth. I know a great many people who have been through no less suffering than I and been deprived of their freedom, but who have remained unchanged, have remained human beings, defending the civil rights of their people, and no means at the disposal of the authorities are capable of changing our opinions.

What made you a dissident in the first place? Both of your parents were communists. What made you first aware of repression in the Soviet Union?

It is difficult for me to say why I became an opponent of this regime. It seems to me as though all my life I was against the present system, that I was always an anti-communist. Maybe it wasn't quite like that, maybe sometime in my childhood I didn't understand what was going on, maybe had different ideas, but today I cannot recall a situation in which I approved of the regime. It was a long time ago, of course, and it's difficult for me to be more precise. I think I was always against this regime. Of course, gradually every person who grows up in this country comes up against the discrepancy between the country's laws—its facade—and its reality. And that is sufficient of a shock for everyone's organism, everyone's mind—for a logically thinking person, of course, that is a decisive factor. Maybe after he realizes the discrepancy he will go into opposition. But by no means everybody can speak out—that's the trouble—the most important is open resistance, and not secret disagreement.

You were sentenced a third time to a labour camp. What was life like there?

I was arrested in January 1967 for organizing a demonstration in defence of Ginsburg, Galanskov and other friends of mine who were

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being prosecuted under Article 70. I was sentenced to three years' detention in a camp and I completed the full sentence. My friends, Ginzburg, Galanskov, Laskova, and others were arrested in January of the same year for sending *Phoenix*, a literary review, to be published for the Western public. I consider that their action was in no way criminal, but revealed the intellectual maturity of the people and their desire to bring to the notice of the public the contents of those literary works.

Immediately following the trial in September 1967 I was put into the Voronezh prison, or camp, for special criminals. The fact is that people imprisoned under Article 190 usually serve their sentences in Kazan in the normal camps along with the common criminals, which I consider a crime in the face of society and against international laws.

I cannot say that I met with a lack of understanding there. On the contrary. People imprisoned with me understood well enough the aims which had brought me to prison and with which I face the world. It was pleasant for me that the people I met there were well enough educated and there was nothing else for me to do but to explain to them in concrete terms my aims in landing in prison. As far as life in the camps and the camp system is concerned one could talk for a long time. I don't think it is a very interesting subject because many people, many scores, even hundreds of people have been through the camps.

What is life like here for you now? Are you harassed by the secret police?

I was released from the camp in January 1970, but I did not change my opinions and did not give up my activity. I continue to do what I was doing before, and therefore it is possible that I shall be arrested any day. I can be arrested at any moment, when I meet foreign correspondents, when I am distributing written material forbidden in the Soviet Union and in other circumstances. It doesn't matter what excuse the authorities find for arresting me: the reason is unimportant for them. There's a saying in the camps: so long as they've got the man they'll always find the law to fix him. Of course, I know I am being followed, my telephone is always tapped, I feel that I am constantly under observation by the authorities. When I have to do something that I don't want the authorities to know about I find a way of getting away from them. But in general it's pretty difficult. I am unable to get the sort of work I like doing, if only because I am sufficiently well known or because there is a mark in my identity card from which anyone can tell that I have been in prison.

I am often asked about the prospects for change in this country, what we hope to get from our activity, how many supporters we have, and these are understandable and legitimate questions. But they are very difficult to answer.

You have to understand first of all what is the essence of our

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struggle. The essence of the struggle, in my view, is the struggle against fear—the fear which has gripped the people since the time of Stalin and which has still not left people and thanks to which this system continues to exist, the system of dictatorship, of pressure, of oppression. It is into the struggle against fear that we put our greatest efforts, and in that struggle great importance attaches to personal example—the example which we give people. I personally did what I considered right, spoke out on those occasions when I wanted to, and I'm alive, I am now sitting here and not in prison. I'm alive, I can get about, I can live. For me and for many people that is very important—it shows that it is possible to fight and that it is necessary.

It is difficult for me to estimate the number of people who follow us, who agree with us, who think the same way as we do. We are by no means in a position to know all the people of that kind. The fact is that I cannot know in advance who—on hearing what I say today or what I said in court or to other people, or who has read Solzhenitsyn, Marchenko or someone else—who else will take up the same kind of activity as ours. I can never know this, because it does not depend on me to let them know the things I know. It depends rather on the world around, the radio, Western broadcasts. Sometimes I recognise quite by chance people who are in sympathy with us, in completely different towns. If it is a question of those whom I know, as people fighting against the lawlessness existing in our country, in defence of civil rights, well I might estimate their number at about a couple of thousand in various towns of the Soviet Union.

Do you think there is any hope for civil rights, freedom of speech in the Soviet Union?

I consider that, if there is an attempt in our country to turn the system back to Stalinist ways, that will bring closer together and unite a vast number of people of various ideologies, nationalities and opinions to struggle against that turn of events, and it will create a common platform for a decisive and final battle against such developments. I do not believe that such a development of events could be successful in our country, for the good reason that there are enough people ready to lay down their lives to prevent it happening. . . .

What faith do I have in the victory of the cause for the sake of which I live and work? It's difficult to say—I'm not a prophet, and I can't foretell what will happen in a few years in the political world. But it seems to me that the number of people who understand the need for open, public protest against the lawlessness which goes on every hour and every second in this country is increasing every day. I am sure that the number will not grow less but more and that ultimately the cause for which I am working will triumph. Maybe it will happen in five years, maybe seven, I can't say exactly.

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MY APOLOGIA

Victor Velsky *

WHAT I have written here is both by apologia and my confession. I have described how I came or was led to that fatal decision that it is my purpose here to explain. I have hidden nothing, but maybe in my haste I have not been as explicit as I would have liked. I have told everything that had to be told, not concerning myself with style, but just with the truth of my own soul. It is indeed of little concern to me who gets hold of my notebook and when, and who reads it. I had to have it out with myself and that is what I have done.

Where shall I begin? I'll begin in the classical manner, with my uncle.

'My uncle has most honest principles. . . .'[1]

And I'm not joking. My uncle did a lot for me, he was like a second father to me.

My uncle was a professor, an art historian specialising in medieval art, and a solitary old man. In his declining years he wanted to share his learning with some youthful being. i.e. me. I was 14 at the time, my mother had just remarried after my father's death—he was a journalist—at the front. My mother soon consoled herself with her new family and found a modicum of happiness in its bosom. As far as I can remember, she did not get on with her first husband, my father, and they were virtually separated.

I began to hate her new family, her new children, and was glad when one day a dry, stiff, almost Dickensian gentleman appeared at the door and said that under the circumstances it was his duty to his late brother to see to the education of the boy, i.e. me. My mother and stepfather talked it over and decided that I could live with my uncle—he was a professor, and professors had lots of money. It took a load off their minds. Soon after I had settled at my uncle's, my stepfather retired, sold our Moscow flat and moved to the Crimea, where he bought a cottage with a vineyard in some small holiday resort. They're not too badly off, in fact they have a pretty cushy life, my stepfather gets his pension, sells home-made wine and lets out rooms to visitors. They have two children and hardly ever think

* When Yuri Galanskov was tried in Moscow, in January 1967 for publishing the *samizdat* underground journal *Phoenix*, the prosecution was particularly incensed about Victor Velsky's 'My Apologia' which appeared in it. The defence lawyer argued that it was not 'anti-Soviet'. 'It is no accident,' she said, 'that this tale has found no editor or publisher in the West', as in the novella Velsky finally turns against the West and rejects it. 'My Apologia' is to appear in a volume published by Longman *Russia's Other Writers* (edited by Michael Scammell). We print it here with the permission of the editor and the publishers. The translation is by Daniel Weissbort.

[1] The first line of Pushkin's novel in verse, *Evgeny Onegin*.

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of me and vice-versa, though sometimes, when I feel like seeing my mother, I pay them a visit. They receive me well but are even happier to see me go. . . .

So, a solitary child, virtually cast out by his family, I settled in the old bachelor's flat, never having known (and never to know) the joys of family life.

My life was unlike that of any of the other children of my age. The dark, dusty little flat was crammed with bookshelves, casts of statues from the portals of Gothic cathedrals, crucifixes, madonnas, stained-glass panels in the windows—even the sunlight could not get in to us. And silence, silence, silence. . . . Uncle was silent when he got back from his lectures; the old woman, Khristina Nikonovna, who cooked and cleaned for us, was silent. The books, relics, walls—everything was silent. Uncle had neither a radio nor a telephone. No one visited us, it was horribly dreary. So much for my 'sentimental education'. It had a traumatic effect on my spiritual development.

My uncle had no intention of educating me, nor could he. I was able to do as I liked, provided I did not disturb the established order of things in the flat. I did not become a madcap—I was always too calm and collected for that—instead I turned into a little mole, searching for a way out to the light. I had no friends at school or in the street, and no wonder—the other children instinctively sensed something different about me and victimized and tormented me. I read a lot, even too much—so much superfluous, heavy stuff indeed that it gives me a headache now just to think of it all. I was average at school, not because I didn't want to do my homework, but because I didn't like saying much and always answered in monosyllables. In the upper forms I was called 'the silent one', 'the hermit', 'the anchorite', but they admired me for my silence—reserved, close-lipped people always are admired. And that's how it was till my 17th year.

At 17 I read the whole of Nietzsche and the whole of Anatole France. France taught me how to use words, how to express myself freely and ironically. Nietzsche made me more conscious of my own personality, my own human dignity. New, paradoxical, daring ideas turned my head. 'Tra-la-la! Let's dance our own dance!' Long live 'the gay science'. We're not just mindless frogs, we'll be stronger, wickeder, profounder, lovelier! Spiritual convalescence was what I needed. Like Zarathustra I left my hated cave and returned to the people I had never loved.

IN the Lenin Library, where I started going to pursue my studies, I found company for myself. They were people older than me, some of them a lot older, who accepted me as an equal. They all wrote a bit, and dreamt of some extraordinary future. They understood everything and were clever and well-read, so their conversation was not

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just idle chatter, yet at the same time they used to have parties with girls and drink and fool around.

By this time I was already studying in the philosophy department of Moscow University. It was terribly hard for me to get a place and I managed it in 1948, thanks partly to my uncle's reputation and to the influence of his friend, Professor A. I entered full of dreams about making a systematic study of the science of sciences (at that time I could still dream), but soon regretted my decision. Philosophy never came into it, we studied Marxism. It was a terrible period. Zhdanov's [2] draconian decrees on ideology had just recently been issued and though Zhdanov himself died, his ferocious culture-hating spirit lived on. The words 'toadying to the west' flashed across the pages of newspapers and magazines, the rabble-rousing slogan, 'cosmopolitan', became increasingly current. The Museum of Modern Western Art was dismantled, jazz was banned, books of contemporary western authors were called seditious. The 'Kremlin Hermit' was silent, merely deigning from time to time to answer questions put to him by *Pravda's* correspondent. Large-scale arrests took place.

Intellectuals were arrested, professors were removed from their chairs. There were departmental meetings, at which students fulminated against cosmopolitan professors. The professors confessed their sins and heaped muck on one another. Each mounted the stand, expressed his gratitude for the principled criticism levelled at him, thoroughly depreciated his achievements, and then started abusing one of his friends. Back-stabbing flourished. In our department they removed Professor A. They said the old man never went out and since 1937 had kept a small suitcase with underclothes in it under his bed. His wife sold their belongings and his daughter left the parental home.

Naturally my uncle was removed too. He was, in any case, an obvious westernizer and 'toady', though as a matter of fact, all he recognised was the Middle Ages, in his view the most highly integrated period of cultural development. Some students jumped up and asked him what he thought about Soviet art! Uncle answered candidly that he didn't know there was such a thing. This imprudent remark lost him his job. Some young post-graduate took over uncle's course on medieval art. Strangely enough, the students thought a lot of uncle, and when he had been suspended they sometimes called on us with flowers and thanked him for his lectures. Uncle did not like displays of superfluous emotion and soon sent them packing. He started writing a book.

But it was not only adults and prominent personalities who were arrested, the terror also affected youth. Several students disappeared from our course. We tried to forget about them. At this time I felt that the black cloud might envelop me too. As soon as Uncle was

[2] Andrei Zhdanov (1888–1948) was a member of the Soviet Politbureau from 1939 until his death and immediately after the war was the Party's chief spokesman on cultural policy. Tr.

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removed, I noticed how the attitude of several of the lads, especially those involved in social work, changed towards me; people started avoiding me. But this was not the real danger. The real danger lay in our circle of friends. Although we tried to keep off risky subjects, it was impossible not to talk about what was going on. There was, besides, a certain intangible spirit of disapproval about our crowd. I had the sense to stop seeing them.

But it was already too late. One day N, who was in the philosophy department and worked on the next floor, approached me in between lectures and told me that they had taken T. T was not one of our crowd, but he knew us all well. The circle was closing in on us. What did it matter if the hares caught in that circle were harmless—who cared? The hunt was on, and it was late in the day to start arguing one's innocence. The main pieces of 'evidence' that could be used against us were as follows: first, there was this group of friends, and a stable group at that; secondly, the purpose of this group was obscure; thirdly, all its members were near relatives of people who had been repressed or had fallen into disgrace. The inference was clear—our group was up to no good.

This sense of being accused without there being any cause for it was a terrible, desolate feeling. It seemed we were internally guilty! Although we did not give expression to our sentiments, we were against what was going on, or rather we were not 'for' it, and also we stuck together to some extent. Someone already had his eye on us, that was clear. Maybe there was already a traitor in our midst. This was a constant nightmare. There was, in fact, something essentially dream-like about it. I had had a dream like that when I was a child: a German officer points his pistol at me, I fall to my knees, implore him, scream, then there's a shot, but I can't wake up. . . . This strange, elemental feeling of horror now had substance to it. There was no escape. There was just the fear. In vain I tried to reassure myself that nothing had happened, that this was a lot of nonsense, that I was scaring myself. I was literally quaking with fear all the time. The fear that was hanging over all of us achieved its quintessence in me. I couldn't stand it. I lost my nerve.

One episode, which could hardly have been a coincidence, made a particular impression on me. The teacher who took the seminar on dialectical materialism called me out. As it happened, for some reason the Party organizer of the course was present, though he was not in our group. I answered satisfactorily. But the point lay not in my answer, but in me. This was no new ploy for them. The same tactics had been used with an Uzbek student. This youth, who was rather frail, got carried away by Gandhi (whom he read about in Romain Rolland) and started preaching his ideas to all and sundry. He was cunningly provoked at the seminar, spoke his mind and a few days later, early one morning, was taken straight out of his warm bed in the hostel. It seems he was a 'bourgeois nationalist'.

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There was no doubt about it. Probably they wanted to catch me out in the same way. The instructor asked me some crafty questions on the relation between theory and practice, on dogmatism, on the correct interpretation of the party resolutions with regard to ideology, but behind it all there was this feeling that I would slip up at some point. I gave all the right answers, but even so, this character felt he had to expatiate at length on the evils of dogmatism, on the fact that a mere verbal knowledge of Marxism did not mean much, one had to be devoted to it body and soul, etc. The finger was pointing at me and I had to do something about it—there was no time to be lost. There was nothing for it but to stake everything on one last desperate throw. This was my knight's move. Desperation cleared my mind and lent me strength.

When the instructor had finished what he had to say and just as he was about to set the work for the next seminar, I got up and asked for permission to speak. It seemed to me as though his eyes and the Party organizer's gleamed with malicious joy. The room grew tense. I began speaking in a deliberately quiet, calm voice. I said that you (i.e. the instructor) have spoken today of the relationship between theory and practice, of dogmatism and bigotry, with someone clearly in mind. As no one besides myself has spoken today, this person is obviously me. I don't know what fault I am supposed to have committed to deserve your criticism. I have only just started on my studies and you've got nothing against me. The only thing you have is that my uncle, Professor Velsky, has been called a cosmopolitan in the wall newspaper. But why should a nephew have to answer for his uncle? (At these words the audience began to laugh, though everyone realized it was a nasty situation.) I've nothing in common with my uncle. (So much for Uncle!) You are purposely singling me out from the collective. (I turned his own weapons against him—used demagogy against a demagogue.) You are creating impossible conditions for me to study in. I feel obliged, therefore, to leave your seminar and to ask the dean's office to transfer me to another instructor. With these words, I left the lecture room.

They took fright. I had chosen the right tactics—I didn't defend myself or confess, I did my own attacking and exposing. Also I brought things out into the open, called a spade a spade, and anyway it was a recognized fact that children were not responsible for their parents. In the interval between classes the Party organizer sought me out, and putting on a friendly voice (what scum they were!) said that I'd lost my temper over nothing, that no one had me in mind and it was pointless my going to the dean's office, that everything would be fine, that, of course, my uncle was irrelevant, that my comrades thought a lot of me, etc. It was obvious he didn't want me to make the quarrel public. I answered that I didn't bear anyone a grudge but I was transferring to another group. It was impossible for me to retreat, they would have tried to finish me off (which they succeeded in doing

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later anyway). The other lads congratulated me, criticized the instructor for his tactlessness (was that all it was?) and indeed began to see me in a different light and even to respect me.

BUT there was nothing to respect in me. Now I have to come to the hardest part of my confession, in comparison with which the escapades of that unhappy sexual psychopath, Jean-Jacques Rousseau, seem like so many childish pranks. I shall not try to glorify or belittle myself. The shame of it will stay with me all my life. I became a traitor.

I had in my possession some manuscripts belonging to R, one of our group. Not long ago he had brought them to me and asked me to keep them; he himself then disappeared. R wanted to be a writer. He had stacks of poems and stories. Apparently he was talented. He let me read his work and I read it. There was nothing particularly inflammatory about it, but there was something 'not right' there, as they say. Now I wondered in alarm what would happen to me if they decided to carry out a surprise search in my home. And this was bound to happen now they had taken T. Even if T kept silent, my name was in his notebook. They would ransack the homes of everyone, participants and non-participants alike. What could I do? How could I save myself? There was direct evidence against me. Keeping seditious writings, concealing them, failing to report them, this in itself made me an accessory. And anyway I was a participant in the group. There was no way out. I had to commit myself.

My reasoning was as follows (for my eighteen and a half years I reasoned pretty well): I ought to seek out R and give him back the manuscripts, but . . . (1) R had vanished somewhere, (2) he had evidently suspected something and brought me the manuscripts to hide, (3) the manuscripts ought to be destroyed, (4) it was useless destroying them, since R might reveal their existence to the MGB [3] and then I'd be done for. Even worse, if I burnt the papers I would simply be compromising myself still further—it would be clear that by destroying the evidence I was behaving like a criminal. Finally, (5) R might be a provocateur, palming off papers on me he was frightened to keep himself, or (6) at best R was just an idiot who was involving others in his own downfall.

Yes, I was older and wiser than my years (wiser!) and realized only too well where the danger in all this lay for me. Once, before the war, when I was about ten, I had overheard a conversation between my mother and father about 1937 [4] and I could still remember how people had been ruined because of a Trotskyist book by someone else.

There was no other way out. I had to commit myself. I had to

[3] Ministry of State Security, predecessor of the KGB and likewise responsible for administering the secret police. Tr.

[4] 1937 was the year in which Stalin's 'Great Purge' reached its height. Tr.

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take the manuscripts to the MGB and tell them the whole story. Thus I would betray everyone and save myself. The alternative was to sit and wait patiently for the inevitable to happen.

I walked along the street and, despite the gloomy autumn weather, the world seemed a lovely place to me. People were walking about, laughing, leading their normal lives, and even if something awful was happening close by, life carried on. And I was going to be cut off from this life and why—because of someone else's stupidity! Besides, what were these people to me, did I care for them? No! It made no difference to me if they existed or not. All I had to do was commit myself and my life would be secure. Nothing could save them now anyway, whereas I still had a chance to extricate myself.

Walking the streets in this manner, I managed to convince myself that I had no alternative. So I'd be a scoundrel, but wasn't R a scoundrel for dumping those crazy bits of writing on me? In any case, one way or another all of them were doomed and one would escape. So let that one escape at least. They had brought it all on themselves. That was true, but then what about me? I had done the same, by being so careless. But less than the others, so why should I have to suffer the same as them? No, I wouldn't! They were them, but I was something different, a living being apprehending a world that would cease to exist without me. So my youthful solipsism came to my aid, saving me and ruining me at a single stroke.

The most awful part of it was making up my mind. Far worse than simply waiting. Because making up my mind was something positive, a harder thing than waiting passively. And how I wanted to avoid making a decision! How the soothing thoughts came flooding in—that my fears were uncalled for, that I was imagining it all, that I was in no danger. But finally I convinced myself. I knew that thousands of people as guiltless as me had been taken away. Nothing saved them. There was no miracle. It was no use my waiting. I had to save myself.

In a panic, I grabbed the papers and rushed to the MGB. I knew that the Reception Centre was at Kuznetsky Bridge and went there. Even today, ten years later, it disgusts me to remember what I did and what I said. I was referred to an ordinary-looking, rather uninterested individual in plain clothes. I said that I wanted to make a special statement. I said that by mischance I had found myself in possession of an acquaintance's papers. . . . (Like a flash came the question: 'His name?' 'R.' He wrote it down. 'All right, carry on!') I hadn't read them for some time, but now I was convinced that their content was suspicious and I had come to find out what I should do. Questions followed: 'Who is this R? How do you know him?' etc. I told him about our circle, I gave everyone away. He asked me to sit at a free desk and to put it all down in writing. I wrote down everything I had told him. He skimmed through the sheet and said casually: 'All right, we'll look into this. Are the papers

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still at your place?' 'Yes.' 'You can go. If you're needed, you'll be sent for.'

I went out into the street with a strange, incongruous feeling of relief. Life was going on around me and I could start living again. Strangely enough there was no consciousness of having done anything shameful. That came later. But for the time being I strolled about carelessly, feeling free. Inside, perhaps, in my innermost self, I had shrivelled up and hardened and my youthful greenness and naïvety had vanished forever. I was half-damned already. But now that I'd actually committed myself everything was allowed. Yes, it was exhilarating to feel no fear of heights—to look down and not be afraid.

To test myself, I visited a girl I knew, who always made me feel shy. I was worked up, animated and bold. I caught her looking at me in astonishment. I could feel that she liked me. But I no longer needed her. I no longer needed anyone.

That evening, at home, I felt afraid again. But the day had tired me out so much that I slept well enough. The next day I was tormented by fear. I didn't go to the university. I was totally incapable of doing anything those days. All I did was wander about and pass the time in bars. I felt better amidst the noise and hubbub of anonymous, drunken people. And I could hide in the cinema too, in the darkness.

BUT after two days, returning home late one night I found a search in progress and some men waiting for me. They took nothing at the time, even apologized to Uncle, but they asked me to accompany them. However, no warrant for my arrest was produced and this was a hopeful sign. Uncle completely lost his presence of mind and gazed after me in a state of shock.

I was taken to the MGB. (We went by car—it was parked on the same side as our building.) I was led along deathly silent passages—a long corridor, a straight carpeted path, a line of ceiling lights stretching into the distance, identical numbered oak doors leading off and nothing else, not even ashtrays.

I was interviewed by three men in plain clothes. One of the senior men, I realized, was in charge, though he sat apart from the others. They questioned me, tried to catch me off guard, to trip me up. 'You'd better get it into your head that you've got to tell the truth here,' they said. 'It'll be better for you if you do.' They were civil enough and didn't threaten me. I answered all their questions briefly and clearly, without saying anything defamatory. But this gave them little joy. They kept on hoping for something more, something out of the ordinary—they were dreaming of an underground, terrorist organization, and decorations and bonuses for them for uncovering it. I couldn't oblige them, I was a traitor, but not a slanderer. . . . However, once a scoundrel, why try to excuse myself?

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I said that there were some unhealthy tendencies in our group, as R's papers had shown me, but nothing worse than that. 'Are you sure?' asked the most junior member of the trio with an ironical smile. He was sitting at a table and writing everything down. 'That's my opinion, yes.' 'Ah, your opinion. . . .' 'And where, in your opinion,' said the second one, 'where might these unhealthy tendencies lead?' 'I realized they couldn't lead to anything good, that's why I came to you.' 'You're being frank with us, are you, Velsky?' said the man in charge. 'How did you fall into these ways? How is it that you are involved with enemies of the people?'

I realized that things might go badly for me and the only way I could save myself was by advancing even further into the mire. I writhed and squirmed and said that it had taken me a long time to realize it, but that I had realized it finally and had come to them myself. (I stressed this.) 'I'll tell you all I know and answer any question you like.' They wanted me to describe each member of our circle, and this I did. They wanted me to remember what one or another of them had said, and I did. I spilled everything. I was so mesmerized by the whole situation that I really believed all my former friends were enemies. 'Go on, go on,' they urged. 'We know everything about you, don't worry.' When I'd nothing more to say and they were tired, two of them, apparently satisfied, went out and the one at the table sat for a long time writing the examination record. There were 32 pages of it. He handed it to me to read through. The record was drawn up so cleverly and convincingly that my comrades really did look like enemies from it. I signed each of the 32 pages without hesitation. It didn't make any difference to me now, I would have signed anything. 'You have nothing to add?' asked the MGB man. 'I should like it to be noted that this is a frank confession!' 'That's unnecessary', he smiled. 'We've your statement—that's enough.' He stacked up the sheets neatly and laid them in a drawer which he locked. Then he started smoking contentedly, looking at me with a smile. He was silent, the swine, enjoying his power over me and my nervous apprehensiveness.

He smoked his cigarette half-way through and extinguished it, then took a form and scribbled something on it. What was this? My heart missed a beat. But why, I'd told them everything. . . . 'Let's go. Put your things on.' He led me out of the office, closed the door, went into the adjacent office, quickly reappeared and led me through corridors and down staircases. Finally, we emerged into the side entrance lobby where there was a man on duty. My companion handed him the form and I realized it was a pass—a pass back to life. 'You can go,' he said drily by way of farewell, turned on his heel and disappeared. The duty man checked the pass and my passport, glanced at the photograph and at my face, returned the passport and silently nodded towards the door.

I had never been so thirsty for the cold autumn air. It was already

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morning, the sky over the houses was blue, crows were flying and cawing above the town, the yard-keeper's broom was rustling over the asphalt. I was free. Behind, the windows of the MGB building blazed like ever watchful eyes.

At home my uncle, who of course had not slept all night, was waiting for me with a pale, frightened face, and I realized how much he loved me! Me, a scoundrel and a traitor! But was I alone guilty? Who had driven me to it, who had turned me into a traitor? Was I the only one? It was going on all round me! And who still had a clean conscience, who could tell me that? We were all traitors, to a greater or lesser extent, in one way or another, traitors by virtue of our passiveness, our fear, our hypocrisy, our lying! So what had I, a frightened eighteen-year-old child, to be ashamed of! There were worse cases than me. Shame on us all!

I gave Uncle a shortened version of what had happened, begged him not to worry. I told no one of my treachery, and anyway there was no one to tell, as I'd never had any close friends. In any case what close friend could you tell such a thing to! Not even the friends I'd betrayed found out about it, and indeed some of them, I gather, shielded me, testifying that I was not involved. Even those who survived don't know. Let whoever reads this account, whether he be friend or enemy, know the truth and learn what it means to be a traitor!

IT is agonizing to recall all this, and even more agonizing to realize that I ruined innocent people and that if it had not been for my cowardice, nothing would have happened. Now it seems to me easier to serve any sentence, rather than to bear such a stigma, but I've no illusions about myself; these positive feelings are just superficial and I shall always be a scoundrel and a traitor.

If only it had not happened, if only it had not happened!

As they say in novels, 'time went by'. They called me twice to the department again, asked for more evidence and clarified my earlier deposition. At my last meeting with the interrogator, he had a few parting words for me: I should think about all that had happened, it would be a good lesson for me. I wasn't going to be put on trial, but I should remember that they would not forget me. He hinted that from now on they would keep an eye on me and they might use me again. I remembered this conversation two years later, but at the time I rejoiced that the nightmare was over. Wounds heal quickly when you are young. (Am I so old now?)

I began to live, as they say in novels again, 'for sensual pleasures'. I did not get close to anyone, did not make any intimate friends. My acquaintances were just companions in pleasure. Naturally, no one at the university knew anything of my private life. The prevailing atmosphere was one of asceticism and bigotry and any diversion—drinking or intimacy with a woman—was regarded as a sin for future

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workers on the ideological front. (In those blissful years you were expelled from the Komsomol for fornication. Thank God I wasn't a member, and our activists always avoided me, sensing something strange about me, and did not try to draw me into the organization.)

Meanwhile, public hysteria was growing. If, before, it had affected only the upper strata, leaving the masses more or less untouched, now everyone was in the grip of its evil spirit, everyone wanted to destroy the cosmopolitans—they'd smelt blood. The glorification of Stalin became wildly fanatical. Banshees of both sexes fought frenziedly on platforms. When his health was proposed, everyone rose simultaneously and drummed their bony knuckles on the table, these skeleton people. As the cult developed, it became increasingly necessary to seek out new enemies. Saturn was devouring his children. The gods were hungry.

Something was up with Uncle. He spent every day reading Latin books, muttering to himself the whole time. One day I was coming home from my mistress—one could call her that. She was a real woman, proud and beautiful, who knew what she was worth. My liaison with her flattered me inordinately. She lived in a narrow street, near a Catholic church, and just as I was leaving her, feeling very self-satisfied, some people were coming out of church. I stopped to look at these eccentrics who still believed in God, when suddenly, in the crowd of venerable old men and women, I caught sight of my uncle. He must have noticed me, but gave no sign—nor did I. My uncle had become a practising Catholic. The Middle Ages had finally devoured him.

I did not discuss the matter with Uncle, at that time we hardly ever conversed. There was nothing to talk about, we hid from each other. We led a strange life. Uncle had some savings and we lived on these. In spite of our straitened circumstances, we never made use of my grant and I did what I liked with it. I had a tremendous intoxicating thirst for life. That which had always been foreign to my nature, now practically obsessed me. I frequented parks and dance halls, cafés and restaurants and the sports stadium, and loafed about Gorky Street. I even learnt to dance. I must taste everything life has to offer, I thought. At the university I was an average kind of student, doing what was asked of me. It wasn't very hard. The main thing was to enjoy life to the full.

TWO years after that episode—it was summer—my friends from the secret police came to life again. One morning, when I was alone in the flat, the bell rang. A young man entered whose appearance spoke for itself. I understood at once. He showed me his identification card and glancing about him, started saying something like: 'It's a real museum here. . . .' Then he asked me politely if I had the time to accompany him. I went, wondering what was up and what else they wanted from me.

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This time I was taken to a different office. There were two men there, one of whom was that same senior officer. 'So, you see, we haven't forgotten you,' he said, laughing softly. They were silent for a while and then asked: 'Comrade Velsky, do you know why you've been called?' 'No.' 'Tell us what you've been doing since last time.' I said that nothing very interesting had happened to me. They asked me about my studies. Then something else. When they learnt that I wasn't a member of the Komsomol they shook their heads. And so they felt their way for a time, talking of this and that. They were interested in the frame of mind of my fellow-students: 'Have you noticed nothing out of the way?' I realized what all this was leading up to and steeled myself. Now I was not frightened, but furious. So that's what they wanted me for! I had been a scoundrel once, I would have to go on being one for ever! No! I wouldn't—never again!

Finally, they came to the point: 'Comrade Velsky, can't you help us?' 'How?' 'I'm not telling you how yet, I'm asking you to agree to help us.' 'I can't agree if I don't know what it's all about.' Then the second one patiently started explaining things to me, hinting more and more broadly that the doctor's job is not only to cure illness but to prevent it too. The same went for the public doctors—the security organs. Of course, this was a thankless task, but a necessary one—what do you think? I agreed that it was necessary (to hell with them!). They were interested in what people were thinking, what they were talking about, what their state of mind was, and so on. I mixed with students and so might be able to give them information of this kind. They would go into the details later. 'I see, you want me to be an informer?' I asked straight out. I was no longer frightened of them. They nodded. 'I'm afraid I won't be able to live a double life. It's not my style. I'm a nervous type and I'll make a mess of it.' Then one of them said: 'You're a clever fellow, Velsky, so don't make out you're some kind of innocent. We let you off the hook once, now you've got to make it up to the country for your lapse.' The second one said more softly: 'You can take your time, we won't hurry you. We'll give you a week, say, to think it over. Come back in a week's time and tell us what you've decided. A pass will be made out to you.'

Leaving the MGB building, I found I hated them all in a way that it is impossible to hate any single individual. If only one could blow up this Bastille and put up a notice on the site saying 'Dancing here!' Yes, but who could be sure that people wouldn't built a new Bastille, even worse than the old one?

All I wanted to do was to find some hole in some God-forsaken place and crawl into it. But where? Where could you hide from them? The only thing was to face the music. So I'd be punished for my treachery after all. I deserved it and now I'd take what was coming to me. I even began to feel grateful for this opportunity to redeem myself by doing something honourable.

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What saved me? Was it God or the chance intervention of circumstances? (And indeed, what is it that protects me in life? What force? Who is my master and who preserved me from the abyss? God or the devil, good or evil?) I received a telegram from the Crimea to the effect that my mother was dangerously ill. I put the telegram in an envelope with an accompanying note and handed it in at the little window of the booth like a public call-box in the reception office.

Fortunately my mother recovered and everything turned out all right. I swanned it at the seaside, returned after a month, towards the beginning of term, and wasn't called to the department again. Whether they had forgotten about me or whether they were having one of their periodic upheavals, I don't know. Anyway matters of great moment were being settled and there was no time to bother with small fry. Shortly afterwards, the 'doctor-poisoners'[5] were arrested. It smacked of anti-Semitism, which was receiving official encouragement at this time.

At the university things went badly for me. Either I was being mistaken for a Jew, or else they were looking for new 'enemies' to rout; at all events the storm was gathering over me.

Yes, those were terrible, bloodthirsty times and I still cannot understand how we managed to live through them. Something sinister, perhaps even apocalyptic, was in the air. Public hysteria was mounting by leaps and bounds and it seemed that everyone around, including oneself, was about to be overwhelmed by a fit of monstrous convulsions. Enemies were supposedly everywhere: one had to war against them outside and now it seemed they were inside too and had to be exposed. Speeches were made about the need for vigilance. People no longer just saved their skins by informing, as before, but also were given medals in place of those ancient pieces of silver (e.g. the celebrated 'unmasker' of the doctors, MGB agent Lidia Timashuk). It seemed that what lay ahead would be so terrible that the years 1937 and 1949 would pale in comparison. There was no escaping the nightmare, a giant hush descended before the gathering storm.

The glorification of Stalin reached such stupendous, outrageous heights that the whole thing began to look like a joke of the devil. There was certainly something diabolical about it, showing the hand of the prince of darkness. A new work (at that time no one guessed it was to be his last one) by the 'supreme genius of our age, the oracle of science . . .' appeared—and our teachers went into transports over it. The wretched, primitive, puny thoughts of this senile oracle were slavered over everywhere in specialist seminars held on 'this work of genius'. This cud, chewed by so many mouths, sickened even the most loyal Stalinists (and nearly all those in our department were loyal).

[5] A reference to the so-called 'Doctors' Plot' of 1952.

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THE clouds gathering over me were bound to burst at any moment. The department, the activists on our course, desperately needed something sensational to happen—the vigilance campaign was then in full swing. Progress with us always means that there has to be someone against. That's how it was at the beginning and that's how it has remained. It is inevitable. A villain was needed, our latterday idolators needed a human sacrifice. The masses already had it in their blood, they had been raised on trials and sensational exposures. 'Force is the midwife of history'—our Marxist Aztecs have assimilated this idea better than anyone.

(Men! You are more idolatrous than peaceful heathens, you sacrifice a million times more human beings than all the bloodthirsty cults of the past, yes, you, you men of the twentieth century! Underneath this mask of civilisation lurks a beast that has no equal among the natural world of beasts. This beast is capable of destroying everything—and really will destroy it.)

Eventually I too slipped up—at a time when everyone around was shouting about vigilance, I relaxed my own vigilance and one day was caught out. I failed to prepare myself adequately for a seminar on production relations and burbled some sort of nonsense, or rather, forgetting what the 'oracle' had said, simply gave Marx's interpretation. There was a subtle discrepancy on this point in the oracle's work and every effort was being made to gloss it over. My mistake was regarded as nothing less than a 'hostile attack'. Soon afterwards a denunciatory article appeared on me in the departmental newspaper. It said that apart from his 'attack', Velsky did not take part in the life of the collective, avoided the collective, showed himself to be a man of alien views and a peddler of bourgeois ideology, as witness his third year essay in which he defended a bourgeois, voluntaristic view of economics. It is absurd and ridiculous in retrospect, but at the time it was grim. A special meeting was called for the purpose of unmasking me. Again I was caught in a trap.

The answer was brutally simple. To go to the MGB, remind them of the conversation we had had and tell them I was ready to become an informer. The whole thing would stop immediately, I would be able to carry on with my studies and even do myself some good. But not only could I not bring myself to do this, the whole idea was so absolutely repugnant to me that anything else—death or prison—seemed preferable. I developed such a loathing for my surroundings that not only could I not stand classes and seeing the faces of my lovable colleagues, but I could not even bear the sight of the university building, built, as the inscription tells you, by the architect Kazakov and rebuilt by Gilliardi. I would go a mile out of the way to avoid it, just as I did with the MGB building. These two establishments merged into one in my mind. The MGB was everywhere.

I became apathetic, lost my desire to do anything or to achieve anything. I finally lost all belief in human values. Perhaps it would

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have been easier for me if I had been shut up. I was already under self-arrest, more or less prostrate and inert. Shigalev's [6] system embraced me too. 'We shall stifle every genius in the cradle,' he would say. And it was even easier to reduce non-geniuses to this infantilely imbecilic condition. I even stopped hating the system and the organs of oppression. I lived a life of fantasy. I could not bear the daily round as such, with its people, newspapers, radio. My mornings began at dusk. Either I sought out the company of ordinary, uncomplicated youth, or else I hung around libraries and clubs, or dropped in on evenings at the institute, where there were young people and at least some sort of semblance of life. In the 'afternoon', if there was no sequel to all this, I lay on my couch smoking a pipe, making up imaginary works in my mind or reading some light piece of entertainment. I dropped off in the morning and slept long. This routine had such a shattering effect on me that even Uncle was astonished. However, he also led a hermit's existence: he sat writing day and night and went out only to go to church—I don't know when he ate and slept. When I told him I had stopped going to the university, he didn't even ask me why. His savings ran out and he sold his lovely stained-glass panel. The money had to last a year. We went underground like two moles and waited there for whatever the unknown future held in store for us. Actually, we didn't even wait, we placed ourselves under house arrest and fell into a kind of nerveless silence, without hoping, thinking or feeling anything at all. And that's how everyone lived. Others only pretended to be living—in fact, they also had stopped hoping, their thoughts had been put there by others, while their very feelings were borrowed. At the time we didn't realize and didn't expect what today seems obvious, that it all had to end some time. We had reached a state of blank indifference. But the end was near, unless, that is, it was not merely the beginning of the real end.

STALIN'S death was a shock to us all, it was even a shock to me. Even if many intelligent people hated the Stalinist regime, we were all, in one way or another, his offspring, we had got used to him and his horrors, we were his slaves. The slave had grown conditioned to his terrible master and did not know what it would be like without him. Up till now everything had been controlled or justified in the name of this divinity. And suddenly the 'god' was no longer there. People felt terrified without him, as though their 'collective father' (as Freud would put it) had died. They had been conditioned to love him and this made them grieve and mourn his passing, while mass hypnosis still paralysed all critical activity. And I too felt the full force of this historic event. But I saw a bit deeper than others, I realized that, though nothing would alter basically, times were changing

[6] The hero of *The Devils* by Dostoyevsky. Tr.

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all the same. Of course, one couldn't hope for an improvement—we had stopped expecting anything like that—but apparently things were not going to get worse.

The changes soon became apparent. Stalin's praises were sung, he was mourned, and suddenly, as though at a word of command, all the voices fell silent simultaneously. No new Mayakovsky was allowed to go through his paces. No mourning bolshevik was put on show in the museum. A month after Stalin's death, to everyone's surprise, the survivors of the 'doctors' plot' were released. This was more than just astonishing: for the first time the organs of repression were going back on their word. People waiting their own turn began to hope again. And then, after the oppressive days of mourning, the heart-rending speeches, the music, the darkness and gloom of it, we saw that spring had arrived. (Ehrenburg later called this period 'The Thaw'—a very apt description.) The sun shone and I felt I was 17 again, the past was just a nightmare and the future was bright. It was as though I was seeing this sun for the first time. It was easier to breathe, a heavy load had been lifted off our shoulders. One day I met a colleague of mine in the street, a Jew, quite a decent chap, one of those who had stood aside from it all. Without hiding his joy, he told me that the Central Committee had passed some resolution with regard to historical names and the cult of personality, that now there wasn't going to be a 'Stalin constitution' or 'Stalin hawks', but 'Soviet hawks' and a 'Soviet constitution'. Also there were not going to be any historico-biographical films. Thus the notorious expression 'cult of personality', soon to become current (though for the time being it was used cautiously without it being made clear who the personality was), came to our ears as early as March 1953, before people had even had time to take off the shoes in which they had followed the coffin of their 'teacher and leader'. And soon after, two other extraordinary things happened: Beria was arrested and farm taxes were reduced. The first affected the intelligentsia, the second the peasants. Beria's arrest inevitably meant changes in the security apparatus and now I could forget my past (if that were possible!).

I came to life again. I had been dropped from the university long ago for failing to turn up at classes or for exams. If I appealed, I might be able to get myself reinstated, but everything there so revolted me, I was so sick of going round and round in the closed circle of Marxism and parroting its hoary axioms as though they were revelations from on high. . . . Anyway, the department that went under the high-sounding title of philosophical faculty didn't qualify you for anything. Who wanted to specialize in dialectical materialism and dispense that indisputable truth you did not believe in yourself? As I was not an activist, not a member of the Komsomol bureau, there could be no question of my doing research. I already had enough experience of life to have lost my rose-coloured spectacles and I knew that in our age a man could only be sure of his bread and butter

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if he was a technician. I had to get into a technical college. Once again I was to go against my natural bent. By inclination and character I am an arts man, designs and formulae have always scared me. But I had to overcome this in myself. And I did. An acquaintance of mine, a final-year student in a technological institute, introduced me to a spinster who worked as secretary to the selection committee. This spinster (who was already getting on) pulled wires for her favourites. I managed to gain her favour and not having done so badly in the entrance exams, became a technical student.

But my heart wasn't in my technical studies, I stuck it somehow or other, trying to get as much time off as possible. My life had changed. Lately my uncle and I had grown closer and, for the first time, really got to know one another. Uncle's condition had deteriorated visibly, he became talkative after the manner of old men, something that hadn't been a characteristic of his before. But his mind was as sharp as ever. His public standing improved, some colleagues who did not hold official positions started visiting him, they prophesied that he would soon have his chair back. If only they had come earlier! Five years of isolation had taken their toll of the old man. . . .

Only now did I realize what an unusual, pure-hearted, righteous man was my uncle—or truer to say, my spiritual uncle. He told me a lot about his life and he had plenty worth remembering. In his youth art had been his religion. He described how the first time he came to Paris and saw Notre Dame, he wept for joy. Life made him outwardly hard, but he was always an astonishingly unselfish and good man. There was in him something of the good old Russian saint, something pure and holy that one didn't see straightaway, but that was suddenly blindingly clear (you can't find that quality in people of my generation).

MOST of all we talked about God. Uncle explained with great sincerity and conviction that he had found supreme happiness only in God, that all his life he had striven to serve God, only before he had thought about Him less, taken up as he was with the bustle of everyday life, and had neglected the ceremonial side of things. I asked him why he had chosen an alien faith, as we Velskys were a clerical family descended from Orthodox Russian priests. He said that God was the same for everyone, but he had dedicated his whole life to the art that had developed within the bosom of the Catholic Church; its spirit, its images were close to him, he could not be unfaithful to it. Possibly Orthodox religious people would not have understood Uncle, I did completely. Uncle did not preach to me, did not try to win me over like other believers, but after these talks I started pondering questions of faith on my own.

Uncle was convinced that ours was an age of unprecedented, secret, religious searching, that no other age had stood so in need of religion as ours. An unprecedented reappraisal of values was taking

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place in the world, humanism was going by the board. Man cannot live without faith in higher values. These values are given him not by science, art, politics, but by religion. But ideology cannot resolve the ultimate questions of life and death, man's place in the world. Whether mankind accepts God or rejects Him, it continues to live in Him. To the question as to whether he believed in an after-life, Uncle replied with some lack of assurance that he did, but that this was a matter of the utmost mystery and complexity, that a mere man could not hope to grasp it and must believe like Tertullian—'*credo qui absurdum*', i.e. what from the human point of view is absurd is the truth from the divine point of view and for that reason Divine Revelation is within the reach of man's earthly vision. We do not need more. I objected to this. I accepted man's need of God, but could not believe in an after-life. Uncle could give me no proof here, nor did he try to, but simply said that one must approach God with an open heart and believe, and then everything would follow of its own accord. Happiness lay in faith and man's best work is dedicated to God.

At the time all this was just so much puzzling sophistry for me. I did not myself experience the need for God. (I am only just approaching that now, though I haven't yet arrived.) I was in the full flood of youth and how I regret now that I frittered those years away. Youth is a time of untapped possibilities.

Again I wasted time in the pursuit of knowledge I didn't need. True, I didn't overburden myself. There were several lads at our college who were so-called 'teddy-boys', and I used to have a good time with them. And again my fellow students started regarding me suspiciously—I didn't belong anywhere. At this time I started to earn a bit of money on the side. I needed it to enjoy myself, I'd long known that without it you couldn't get anywhere. I asked a journalist I knew (I had first met him at the 'Cocktail-Hall' and afterwards often used to stand him a drink) to find me some hackwork. He recommended me to a friend of his on the radio. I started knocking out pieces on all kinds of trivial subjects. Things continued like that for a bit. Soon it gave a new turn to my life.

Conditions were changing visibly. A sort of spiritual emancipation was taking place. First it affected the youth. 1956 came, the 20th Party Congress, Khrushchev's speech on the cult of Stalin and Stalinist repressions. Even if it was all only words, people dared to think now. In 1955 one could already talk to one's friends openly and freely about anything. In 1956 there was a further advance, people started asking—true, only cautiously and tentatively—for spiritual freedom. Literature got a bit more lively, Dudintsev's novel on the top Soviet bureaucracy, *Not by Bread Alone*, appeared and caused a sensation. There was a definite intellectual crisis. The whole thing ended with Hungary and retreat. A few hotheads set off on the old, remembered route, some were intimidated and everything returned to the old familiar ways.

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I kept out of all this, remembering the recent past, and in any case something much more important happened to me, knocking me off balance for quite a while—in 1956 Uncle died. It was the most tragic experience of my life. I loved him more than anyone else in the world, even more than my mother. The days preceding his death, his last hours, his death itself shook me so much, made such a profound impression on me and are so painful to recall that I shan't say anything about them. Anyway, whom does it concern, apart from me? This episode I am leaving out of my confession. I am writing about myself to explain my own actions and I shan't touch on the memory of this beloved man. Suffice it to say that from then on I started visiting the Catholic church from time to time and each year I had a mass said in his memory.

NOW I was completely alone and had to see to my own future. My hatred of the system grew, I wouldn't and couldn't be its submissive slave. I was fairly clear about how ideological oppression worked. In bureaucratic socialism, status depends not on wealth and distinction, but on the post occupied. The post confers both wealth and distinction. Official demagogy and the doubts of the public as regards the ethics of wealth creates an illusion of equality. The ignorant—one is completely justified in calling them the herd—continue to wallow in obscurity. Those who understand and who hate the system can achieve something, cynicism enables them to use their initiative. No one nowadays believes in Marxism, except those who find it convenient to, and apart from them, the stupid and depraved. Neither is extreme subjection valued. Nowadays you have to be unshakeable as regards the whole and critical with regard to particulars. This was the wisdom with which I now had to enter adult life. Already at that time I began to glimpse a distant goal. . . .

I realised that it would be considerably easier for me to gain my ends than for others. I was materially secure and had no moral obligations. On my own, with no family, I had a home and means. This was through the sale of Uncle's library to the Architectural Institute. It contained some unique items: albums, folios, old books, even an incanabulum of Aldo Manuzzio. Thus I performed this good deed and carried out Uncle's wishes not to sell the library privately. All I kept for myself were the books on philosophy and Uncle's Latin prayer-book. So, if need be, I could withdraw and sit it out.

It was pointless continuing my course at the technical college. What for? I would never make an engineer anyway. To get one's miserable ration, to go to work everyday and to live without a glimmer of hope was ridiculous. Ridiculous for anyone who understood the basic truth about our society: namely that everyone exploits everyone, everyone works for nothing except for those few who profit by it. It would have been ridiculous to become an engineer when some lousy journalist could make more than a good engineer without men-

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tioning Party, Komsomol and trade union parasites. And the importance of money was steadily growing in our society, it gave you more freedom than ever before over the previous 40 years. In Moscow there were 600 people with over a million, 1,500 with close on a million. Parasitical millionaires springing from the upper levels of an intelligentsia that had sold out—'servants of the beloved Party'—began to appear on the scene. It was stupid to be an honest worker in a society based on fraud. You had to fix things so that you could get the most out of the world, giving as little as possible in return. The decisive factor again was not the quality of your work but the position you occupied.

The position of journalist might do the trick for me. The conditions were right—editorial staffs were being expanded, new papers and magazines were coming into being. I mustn't miss my opportunity. With an easy mind I left the technical college and became a freelance journalist. I took on any work I could find. I wasn't concerned about how much I earned, the main thing was to be noticed, for my stock of pulp literature to grow. I turned out hack work for three years. Meanwhile my resolution matured and took on a concrete shape. I was not prepared to go short of money—that was certain. However much I loathed the philosophy department, I returned to it. I had only the state exams and degree still to take. Thanks to the help of Professor A, who had returned to the department again, I managed to get permission to sit these exams and present my thesis. Finally, after a year, by God's grace I got my degree. My salvation was now assured. I had a degree, an indifferent one maybe, but a degree all the same, a piece of paper which people would trust. Now I was fully entitled to look for the position I required.

The job came fairly dear—about 3,000—i.e. I spent that much on drinks for my journalist friends, they got in touch with their acquaintances, made enquiries, and finally, after drawing a number of blanks, a job in broadcasting on the German service was found for me. It fitted the bill. I knew the language, had a degree, had some journalistic experience and was already working on the radio. I managed to hold off two competitors and became a staff literary contributor. I was nearing my goal, but it was still to take me two years to reach it—I was too scared the first year. However, it was no use hurrying, everything had to be calculated precisely and prepared for in advance.

At work I tried not to stand out in any way from my colleagues. I was so successful in this that sometimes I caught myself swelling like a turkey-cock and beginning to look all too smug and vulgar. Like everyone else I tried not to show too much keenness, but when necessary I worked like hell and even stayed on late. It was terribly difficult living this kind of double life, and I could feel my nerve going more and more to pieces.

I was growing extremely tense and everything that happened in the outside world touched me on the raw. The globe became a ball

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of sheer nightmare for me. Over the last few years there had been repeated threats of war. The West retreated, our foreign policy achieved more than even Stalin had dreamt of. The struggle over spheres of influence grew sharper, and we were victorious. But these victories are worse than defeats. And the climax of this is unavoidable unless a miracle intervenes.

A GENERAL fatigue settled on society. Ideology had been put to flight and now the country was suffering from a hang-over. Ideas became a mere screen behind which inevitable historical processes took their course. Khrushchev skilfully dealt with his opponents, mounted Stalin's throne and played the fool, like Old King Cole. Gradually he strengthened his hold over the people and moved towards establishing his own cult or mini-cult. It was exactly like Krylov's fable about the snake: 'Even when your skin has changed your heart is just the same.' In spite of Khrushchev's assurances that there were no political prisoners, the KGB secretly went on arresting people, though for the time being there was no full-scale terror. Apparently, that was for the future.

Under Stalin we had lived for the spirit (even if in a distorted way). The main thing was ideological values, communist ideas, enthusiasm —material considerations were insignificant in comparison. What of it if there was a shortage of accommodation, clothes, food—the main thing was our glorious ideas and the future in store for us, the main thing was that we had Stalin the Omniscient to lead us. Khrushchev's historical importance lay in the fact that he played down ideological values and substituted economic, material ones. Under him people did begin to live better, to live materialistically, i.e. for themselves and not for the sake of unrealistic goals. This again has another side to it. The concentration on material objectives led to a spiritual decline. If, under Stalin, this spiritual life had been monstrously distorted, now it ceased to exist altogether. Spiritually people had nothing to live for. No one was attracted by the official ideology and there was nothing new to put in its place. There was a certain revival of interest in religion and, to counter this, anti-religious propaganda was stepped up. But the main thing was that people wanted to enjoy life and get the most out of it, especially the young. Young people changed, became perhaps more egotistical, but also more courageous. An irreversible process of disintegration set in.

Despite some superficial improvements in people's lives, there was something menacing about the internal situation. There was a shortage of money in the country, it was going into the arms race, into feeding the allies. The state liquidated loans, rather than publicly acknowledge its bankruptcy. This caused little surprise, as no one had believed in them before, they were regarded as just another form of taxation, and there was even some satisfaction that they had been abolished for the time being. Labour productivity did not improve. The feudal

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system of the collective farms was retained. There was no freedom and no hope, just social apathy and general political indifference. 'It's all the same, it makes no difference, it's always been this way.' My task was to break out of this diabolical, diminishing circle and escape to freedom.

No, I've never lived well or peacefully (except at intervals, perhaps, but then only relatively). I'm astonished that people can smile, laugh, enjoy themselves in our time. One has to be too much of an egotist (such as I too have been in the past). Sometimes I wonder how my nerves stood the constant strain, but they did, they got used to it. A man can get used to anything.

I am horribly alone, I have never had any real friends, nor have I now. I've no one I can bare my soul to. At best, a part of it perhaps. I kept on switching friends and I felt that none of them really knew what I was like. With some of them I could talk about women, with others about literature or politics. With some perhaps even about myself. But not frankly, not really exhaustively. And there was no one I could really unburden myself to. I've no one friend who could be all things to me. And I needed this so badly! In due course, these casual acquaintances simply got in my way, and their place was always being taken by others. But after a while, these relationships too became irksome, I found them strangely oppressive and realized that the time had come again for me to withdraw and be on my own, until, at last, I realized that I was a true solitary and was destined to be on my own. It was the same thing with women, though something different occurred recently—but more of that later. . . . For the time being I shall speak about my journalist brethren, about the people I was brought together with every day.

I FEEL like venting 'all my spleen and frustration on them'. How hopelessly, miserably impoverished they are! How little has remained sacred to them! They know this and even boast about it. When I started, my immediate superior, quite a decent young chap on the whole, said to me: 'Do you know what journalism is? Do you know about the "second oldest profession"? That's a pretty accurate description. . . .' The oldest profession is, of course, prostitution, and we members of the second oldest were cheap, vagrant, intellectual whores. People who knew nothing, read nothing, either naïve youths or out and out cynics (this is the case with the majority), self-seekers, money-grubbers. I was the only one among them who had ever heard of Cima di Conegliano, but, of course, I kept it to myself. The main thing was to be known as 'a good chap', not to refuse to drink with the others, to join in conversations about women. In actual fact, this life, real and sober enough on the surface, was just as dreamlike as the fantastic life I had been living prior to 1953. For instance, some character would come into the room and joyfully announce that Moscow Dynamo had 'taken a dive', and everyone

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would start excitedly discussing the game, points for and against, the championship position, and so on. And when women got together they started gossiping about clothes, examining a nylon slip, going into ecstasies over it, etc. It was a kind of dead land. Most of the people were young, but how dead!

One of them, for instance, a fat, thirty-year-old, balding philanderer with a wife, not averse to a drink (he usually drank at someone else's expense), was the reviewer L. He would greedily grasp at any filthy job asked of him, which others, worse than him, avoided. As a result, he was allowed to go on a mission abroad once a year. He loved everything there (even the urinals). He hated everything here, and especially the people he was deceiving—for the very reason that he had to deceive them. There was F—such a squirt—an insignificant looking chap with a mouth full of porridge. This young fellow, my superior, was very successful and lived with the most arresting of our female colleagues, much to everyone's astonishment. Then there was C, an extremely nice kindly fellow, the boon companion of a revolting, prominent writer, and a womanizer who'd drifted weakly into marriage but wasn't living with his wife. . . . I won't go on, there were countless numbers of them and I've no desire to describe this low life, it's time I had done with them even in memory. It has given me a headache again just to think of them, so we'll leave them as they are. The two years' hard-labour I spent among such worthless people, 'godless, uninspired, feelingless, loveless, inert', were enough for me.

THE task of writing all this down has tired me out, but there is not much further to go. All that remains is to talk about love (that can't, after all, be missed out) and then to append my indictment.

With women it's best either to speak approvingly or to say nothing at all. I shall do the first. I am a sensual creature and love women. Several times I have fallen seriously in love, sometimes my feelings have been reciprocated, but always the affair has been short-lived. Sooner or later we'd have our fill of each other and part, and I never felt inclined to attach myself to one woman and settle down. It was the same as with friends. I asked too much of life, my ideal remained unrealized. But very recently, only this spring, something rather different happened. . . .

I met her at an art exhibition—everything was so simple, so unforced. She was cultured and completely unspoilt, and knew something about painting—and we talked. I was with another chap and she was with a girl friend. We walked round the exhibition, chatted, laughed. They decided to leave and we did likewise. She had been looking at me furtively all the while, right up to the moment we approached them, and now, when I helped her on with her coat, her eyes lit up happily. We failed to get into the cinema, her friend wanted to go home, my friend went with her, and we went to a café,

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had some ice-cream and drank champagne. Then I accompanied her through the light frost, with my arm round her shoulder. In the doorway I kissed her, she at once recoiled and grew embarrassed, but then let me do it again.

I walked home happily excited, feeling the warmth of her fresh, still childlike, unkissed lips on my own. A light, gentle breeze caressed my face, bringing a breath of still distant spring with it—April in February. I walked and thought: 'To the devil with you, Victor Velsky, what on earth do you think that you, a man that thought himself up, are worth in comparison with the freshness of this unspoilt girl, this first fugitive breath of a spring breeze—how little you still understand the world and value it!' I had been thrown completely off balance. It was the same banal old story, only different this time, for I was now a grown man and she but a child; I was ten years older than her and our intimacy meant more to me than just a casual affair. And she was also dangerous for me: my own youth had passed, so that the love of a young, good and trusting soul was all the more precious to me. Yes, set against her I was an old man. In ten years I'd learnt things that God forbid she should learn about in a whole lifetime.

Our meetings filled me with joy. And she, pure child, fell in love with me, creating in me her ideal of an extraordinary man. I probably started loving her—it's not too hard for a lonely heart. . . . But what could I give her? Make her my mistress? One could sense the sensuality in her, her curiosity had been aroused. But it would have been a scandalous defilement of her virginal desires. And besides, I'd be really tied to her then. She would make someone a good wife, but not me. When I realized that I too was beginning to fall for her, to lose my head, I paused and thought the whole thing over. It was unnecessary and harmful to both of us to carry on. I felt sorry for her as a child. Also I had to punish myself for my faint-heartedness and for letting myself get diverted from my goal. Now at last I was conscious that I didn't need anyone. But there were moments, of course, when I wanted to forget this, to live with this single love. She was capable of love and worthy of it. But what about afterwards? Love would pass, become habit, mere affection, and then you'd be back with that same oppressive system you had forgotten about in the flush of it all. There was only one answer—not to be deflected, and to give up everything to achieve my object.

In any case, quite apart from that, it would be better to give up everything. Ordinary human happiness was not for me. Besides, I was close to my goal. I must hang on. One day, still in this childish, playful stage, she asked me to send her a letter poste restante—she wanted to get a letter from me. It was a joke and we timed it for April 1. I wrote her seven vulgar words: 'Do not trust the first of April,' and did not go to our rendezvous. The whole thing was over for me. It was harder than I had thought. I also got a letter poste

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restante (that's what we'd agreed), and it was filled with such heartfelt emotion that I was reduced to tears and in a frenzy of despair murmured 'Oh my love, my love . . .!' and my heart was broken. . . .

She had understood me better than I thought. In her simple straightforward way she sensed that I was hiding something from her, realized that we were to part and begged me to tell her this wasn't so, that she was just a foolish little girl (as I'd once affectionately called her)—she wanted to see me so badly. I felt like rushing straight over to her, begging her to forgive me, saying it was just a bad joke, telling her everything about myself, everything, and becoming worthy of her love. But I overcame these impulses, the voice of reason had always prevailed over the emotions with me and it did so now. But I am still conscious of the fact that I committed a new act of treachery. . . . Damn these wretched times in which we live! And damn me too!

Farewell, my youth, farewell, my darling girl! No, Ophelia was not to save doomed Hamlet. 'I am alone, all is sinking into pharisaism. . . .'

Probably that's enough about love, probably it would be better to say that I don't know what love is. And who does know, who knows how to love nowadays, who is willing to sacrifice all for it? The age of great lovers has long since passed. Men, warriors and poets are no more—all that is left are sensible, egotistical creatures. Woman has sunk even lower and cheapened herself as never before, losing her dignity and pride. There is no longer an aristocracy or an élite. There are too many people. In this savage, kaleidoscopic ant-hill the value of the individual human being and the significance of his experiences have been lost. Everything has become commonplace, vulgar, available. What else is there to say? Everything is clear. And yet, it seems to me that *she* was special. . . . But—enough. . . .

NOW it is night, I am sitting at Uncle's desk, before a crucifix, writing this, I have been writing continuously for three days. I am close to my goal. In another three days I am going to East Germany as a tourist, I shall be in East Berlin and then I shall step over the line. That is my goal, that is what I have been striving for all these years. The plan first came to me four years ago, over the intervening period I have been working at it continually, and now it is nearing fruition. My heart is beating in trepidation. Maybe it won't work? It must. Up till now everything has worked for me, I have managed to survive the last two unbearable years. And yet I feel uneasy. I picture all the difficulties that lie ahead.

I had intended writing my apologia with the object of establishing the reasons that led up to my decision. It seems to me I have not really done this yet. I must put it more clearly.

I cannot live in my own country. The existing order conflicts with my convictions and my dignity as a human being. I have been too

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often abused. In my youth, the most sacred period of a man's life, I was corrupted, turned into a traitor and a cynic. Like every normal human being, I was born with a capacity for good. As in the fairy-tale, a splinter of ice was thrust into my heart, and it froze. I might have loved people, but instead I hated them. I wanted to follow my own vocation, wanted to think and write, but I had to hide my thoughts and do hack-work. Marxism was always alien to me, I was always interested in more profound, more enduring spiritual questions—I used to have some insight in respect to these, but I wasn't allowed to impart it, I had to become a grovelling nonentity. Even by the nature of my mind, I am unfit for our (no, not my!) society. I cannot live under a dictatorship, in a slave society, where all the rights of thinking man are flouted. I am a Russian European and my place is in the free world. Where a man does not have to hide what he is thinking and doing, where there is not this constant feeling of fear and humiliation. Man's home is the whole world and happiness exists where life is happy.

I must hurry now, hurry. . . . I shall take my place in the Moscow-Berlin express, and then it's 'Goodbye, great unwashed Russia!' Nothing has changed you, you're still the same evil step-mother to your sons, bureaucratic and cruel. I damn you! Damn you for all the humiliations you have inflicted! Damn you for all those innocent, ruined lives! Damn your tyrants and your servants!

For the first time I damn you to your face, without concealment, heaping my hatred and fury upon you. I damn the Soviet system that has defiled Russia. How have I damned it! It is built on deception and self-delusion, it is in its very essence inimical to the best human impulses. Having been born and having lived under this regime, having seen through it and endured it, I have become its enemy. To tell the truth, I did not want to and no one encouraged me. It was the system itself that brought me to it.

I know that an unjust, oppressive system must vanish one day. The horrible thing is that it will bury the whole world under its rubble. We are all witnesses to the collapse of a mighty social experiment. People wanted to live better and ended up with a police state. What was supposed to be the greatest freedom turned into the greatest oppression. The highest justice dissolved into torrents of blood. It is worth while for people to ponder in the future how all extreme, intolerant but grandiloquent ideas lead to this. The French Revolution degenerated into terror. The same thing has happened with us.

History is indifferent to the individual and his sufferings. I cannot wait any longer for things to work themselves out. There is only one answer—to escape. Holding the views I do, I cannot go on living here. It's not even honest to do so.

Oh, how glad I will be not to have to read your newspapers any more, to listen to your lying radio, lying speeches and eulogies, to lie and pretend to myself. All I must do is take this one step to rid

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myself of this whole monstrous apocalyptic contraption. And I shall take it.

Even if they find my manuscript, it will be too late. I hope they find it and read all the right bits. I spit in your faces, monsters! Read this and learn how our—no, your—society nurtures its enemies in its bosom. And I know quite a few of these silent, passive enemies. You have done this with your words, your cults, your terrors and prisons. Think it over, again I advise you to give some thought to how ideas of the greatest justice have led to the greatest violence ever done to man. Sooner or later these still-born ideas will vanish or evolve into something else. But I won't take part in the struggle against them. I am too tired and worn out. There is only one thing I want, to forget it all and live in a different society, to be reborn. I have chosen that society. I shall leave and not return.

This is the end of my apologia. There is a lot more to tell, but I lack the strength. It is now five to twelve. Midnight. A long time to go till morning. Dark night over my country. When will morning come?

That's all. Goodbye, step-mother country!

The clock has struck twelve. My new day is dawning.

Victor Velsky
6 August 1960

I HAVE returned.

How ridiculous and embarrassing it is now to read what I have written in this pitiful exercise book! What a storm in a teacup! How a man shows off and gives himself airs, even when alone with himself! And how weak and pitiful he is!

Yes, I have returned.

I couldn't do it, I lost my nerve, I lacked the will that gives a man the right to cross frontiers. My only consolation is that no one has that will. Not even in the West. The West is barren of ideas, except, as Herzen saw, for that of vulgar materialism. But that's not what I need. I did not go there for scraps and titbits, but for salvation. I went there looking for the ideal. But where could I find it, if it didn't exist in myself? All I had was negation and bitterness, but no ideal that was worth living or dying for.

I could have accomplished all and I accomplished nothing. I could have become 'a citizen of the free world' and I did not. There is no 'free world' for us, there is a foreign world, a world of foreigners, of people who are more fortunate and yet, in their own way, also unfree.

Yes, I could have taken that step, I was in West Berlin. I spent a few hours in that other world, walking among that other, foreign, people. And that is the crux of it—they were foreign to me.

In the beginning I thought I would go up to the first policeman

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and ask him to take me to the police-station. My heart was beating wildly. Everything was about to be decided. . . . But it all took place in my imagination, I could not act it out in reality. I kept on putting it off. I had thoroughly thought about 'before', but had failed to ask myself about 'after'. To become a citizen of 'the free world' it was not enough merely to be in 'the free world'! If they took me to the station, they would start interrogating me, checking up on me, and then probably send me to a camp for displaced persons, after which they might make use of me as a journalist on the staff of some foreign language radio station. And 'make use of' is the *mot juste*, for I myself wouldn't mean a thing. I would be just an insignificant cog in a vast political machine, the same as at home. I was not needed there, I was alien and there was no other work for me apart from a filthy mirror-image of what I had been doing before. I would not be able to become an honest exile, I would have to become a hired traitor. A traitor again?'

No, I couldn't resolve to commit myself as quickly as that. I had to go on walking a bit more, to think it over. For some reason nobody took any notice of me, nobody was concerned about me. But I was concerned about everything—I looked into people's faces, into shop windows, through the windows of houses—I had to understand it all.

I inspected palaces, went into parks, walked along the river Spree; time was passing inexorably and I found it impossible to make up my mind. A new betrayal, more self-abuse? I did not want this, although I tried to convince myself that I ought to go through with it this last time. But would it be the last time? Wouldn't this set off an endless chain of events? And the thought flashed across my mind more and more frequently that I was a foreigner here and that I'd never be 'at home'. On the surface the life around me was peaceful, calm and sedate, but I sensed something wrong about it. This feeling that there was 'something wrong' grew stronger and stronger, while my saving reason remained passive, and then this feeling grew into a protest against the decision I had made.

And—I don't know why—the image of my homeland impressed itself more and more insistently on my imagination, the image not of a step-mother, but of a meek, good, attentive, but humiliated mother. Could this feeling really be so strong in me? I never knew I even had it, I had regarded myself as a 'European Russian', a 'citizen of the world'. It seems a Russian cannot exist without his country. And I am a Russian! Not a European, not a citizen of the world, but a Russian! A Russian in my dissatisfaction, a Russian in my thirsting after the ideal! A miserable, eternal, Russian nomad!

This awareness that I was inseparably linked with my country came to me as a revelation. No, my forefathers, honest Russian priests, had not worshipped and prayed so that their descendant should go seeking the truth in foreign lands and faiths! If it wasn't to be found at home, then I would find it nowhere! Their prayers must

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have helped me. My eyes misted over with tears at this sudden, moving perception. This clear insight into something ideal and holy, that could not be ignored, stayed with me for a while. I knew that if I didn't carry out my plan, I was doomed to a moral death, but I couldn't take that final step.

I returned to the eastern sector, went to the hotel and collapsed on the bed completely worn out. The others had not yet returned from their excursion to some factory. Probably no one knew of my trip. They got back late, came trooping into the room and started to tell me about their own experiences, but I was totally apathetic. They were concerned about me—I probably looked feverish. They thought I had caught a cold—that being the reason why I hadn't gone on the excursion. One of them brought me a bottle of Stolichnaya that was being saved for a different occasion, and the vodka, that bitter liquid of my homeland, burnt my throat. I finished the whole bottle practically on my own, though without getting drunk, and then fell asleep immediately, sinking into a dark, bottomless pit. . . .

And now it's time I brought this account to an end, if only provisional. This self-analysis, this self-torture, has exhausted me. I can't read over these pages any more, bragging and gibbering! I have had enough. I'm a broken man. I am tired, tired, tired. This is a sad and pitiful story. I cannot stand on my own. I cannot live in this insane world. The only way out is to commit suicide. But even that I won't do—I am a coward, the instinct for life is too strong in me. I can no longer go on working and living like everyone around me—there is a pressure inside my head. I am writing all this through a thick mist of tiredness, using up my last resources of energy—I must finish off this chapter of my life. Here ends the apology, beyond is pathology. I know what lies ahead of me. Terror. Madness has long been dogging my footsteps. I have neither the strength nor capacity to go on living in the real world. I am finished. My idea is finished and, with it, me too, like a spasm of anger. I did not master it and could not commit myself. This feeling for my homeland is not enough to live for, it flared up just once in me. What is there to live for? I have neither negative nor positive convictions, just an enormous, oppressive feeling of fatigue. What can save me now? I am dead. I need nothing. I do not need even myself. I am the victim of deception. We are all being deceived by something or someone. I no longer have the energy to write. The horror of loneliness is upon me, the prison of the soul. They have finished me off. I am suffocating, no air, no light, no people, no laughter. . . . God, if you exist, help me!

I am dead! dead! dead!

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DOCUMENTS: SOVIET UNION

SOVIET MENTAL PRISONS

We publish below a covering-note and letter from S. P. Pisarev to the Presidium of the USSR Academy of Medical Sciences about the use of the Serbsky Institute for political repression, with two appendices: First, S. P. Pisarev's memorandum of 20 April 1970 about his own detention in the Serbsky Institute and secondly Mrs. Z. M. Grigorenko's note of 7 April 1970 endorsing Pisarev's letter. We also reproduce below General P. G. Grigorenko's prison diary which appeared in the Soviet Samizdat publication, A Chronicle of Current Events (No. 12, February 1970), *and a note on him which appeared in the June issue (No. 14) of that journal.*

RESPECTED Comrades,

You are the leaders of medical science in our country. In addition, many of you are members of Lenin's communist party, i.e. convinced fighters for the triumph of Leninism and for the overthrow in your sphere of everything that is a hindrance to it.

No one but you is in a position, with full cognizance of the affair, to delve into the problems set forth below, a problem that is a profoundly medical one. Furthermore, a problem that, if wrongly resolved, would inflict outright damage on our country and would undermine the reputation of its medical science.

S. Pisarev

20 April 1970

P.S. If the idea were to occur to you to refer this matter to someone else, the *first* word still lies with you. There can be no competent decision of the problem without a second opinion. But only your judgment can form the starting point for any present or future consideration of the problem.

To the Presidium of the USSR Academy of Medical Sciences

RESPECTED comrades, decade after decade—continuously—the unending and frequent mistakes and diagnoses made by the Serbsky Institute of Psychiatric Diagnosis compel me to ask for your attention.

The causes of the mistakes lie in the fact that this purely medical institution is *de facto not subject to constant supervision and control by the public health authorities.* The special hospitals for its 'clients', which are used in the first instance (and in recent times predominantly) for political prisoners are even formally not subject to their control. Both the Institute (although formally transferred to the management

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of the Health Ministry) and the special hospitals form part of the system of the administrative investigation organs and are used by these organizations for their own purposes, which are frequently completely irreconcilable with the objective facts of medical science.

The numerous specific cases in which the Institute has pronounced people who are in fact absolutely healthy—scholars and people active in public life—to be mentally ill and then, on this basis, condemned them to compulsory 'treatment' for unlimited terms, have recently, with extremely damaging effects for our State and for the reputation of its medical science, become the object of close scrutiny by public opinion abroad, by the United Nations and by a number of progressive organizations starting with the International Association of Democratic Lawyers.

This shameful practice is not something new. As far back as 1955–56, on the basis of hundreds of facts of illegal punishments based on grossly subjective diagnoses made by the Institute's experts, both before and after the so-called 'personality cult' period, I raised this question with the CPSU Central Committee. In doing so I specifically named a large number of innocent persons who had been the principal sufferers—party workers, scholars and figures in literature and the arts. I cited the cases of scholars such as Lapin, Nikolsky, Kharitonov, Shafran, the eminent communist film-director Petrov-Bykov, the well-known Soviet writer and poet Barenskov; the veteran security agent of the F. E. Dzerzhinsky period M. I. Klaider; Vasily Shevandrov, honoured architect and father of the Soviet artist Irina Shevandrova; the writer and member of the Writers' Union [illegible]–upov (formerly, incidentally, a psychiatric physician) and many others. Some scholars whom I met, though they were not lunatics and had committed no crimes, had been imprisoned along with mentally-sick patients for eight years and more.

In order to check on the arguments advanced in my detailed report the Central Committee appointed an authoritative commission headed by a senior official of the Committee, A. I. Kuznetsov, and including well-known professors of psychiatry and leaders of the most important psychiatric institutions in the country who were communists. The commission carried out many searching investigations in the Serbsky Institute and also made trips to Kazan and Leningrad, where two special hospitals were then situated.

All the facts I had presented were completely corroborated by the evidence and the commission supplemented them somewhat with facts unknown to me personally.

Among the types of 'mentally ill' people sentenced to indefinite isolation the commission discovered hundreds of absolutely healthy persons. It *listed systematically* the perversions of the truth in the diagnoses given by the Institute, in particular by D. R. Lunts (at that time a senior lecturer) and a number of other people. It was documentarily proved that, through the fault of the diagnostic institute

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under investigation, Soviet psychiatric hospitals throughout the country, and above all the two notorious special prisons for political prisoners in Kazan and Leningrad had, year after year, been filled up mainly by sane persons (by that time this had been admitted in three-quarters of the cases) who had been the *innocent sufferers* and victims of illegal repressive measures. Both the political prisons (the 'inventions' of Yezhov's collaborator Vyshinsky) operated under the inappropriate official description of 'psychiatric prison-hospitals', although no one ever even thought of giving any kind of treatment in them (for the *really* mentally ill people).

The fact is that, for the special purpose of camouflaging the situation, and in order to 'justify' the spurious description of 'hospital', both of them were about half-filled with *genuine lunatics*, confined in these institutions as alleged 'political prisoners'. Not less than half of these 'political prisoners' consisted of persons born mentally defective, severe chronic cases (sufferers from oligophrenia, from severe hereditary and acquired illnesses involving organic damage to the brain and reduced consciousness, from the most acute forms of epilepsy, etc.). For specialists it is completely obvious that hereditary idiots and the varying types of abnormal people listed above could in no sense of the word be 'political prisoners' and yet they were deliberately held in the MVD special prisons for political prisoners without being given any kind of special treatment.

The commission arrived at the unanimous conclusion that there was a need for a radical, fundamental *reorganization* in the field of psychiatric diagnosis and in the provision of medical help for the mental defectives among persons sentenced for criminal offences.

The commission decided it was essential to reform thoroughly the diagnostic institute and the then existing two hospitals—namely, the so-called 'psychiatric prison-hospitals' specially established during the era of Nikolai Yezhov's crimes in Kazan and Leningrad—and convert them into top-level medical institutions. Second, while unreservedly removing them from the sole control of the administrative-investigation organs, to transfer them *in toto* to the supervision of the USSR Ministry of Public Health.

Nevertheless, in spite of the insistent efforts of the commission and the Central Committee officials who supported it (V. V. Lukyanov, Kuznetsov and others), its report *was not considered*, either in the Committee's Secretariat or its Presidium or in any other bodies, and accordingly no decisions were taken. The official whose subordinates Lukyanov and Kuznetsov were at that time, and who prior to 1953 actively participated in rather senior posts in the policy of large-scale illegal repressions carried out by Yezhov, M. F. Shkiryatov and Vyshinsky (it is common knowledge that this policy was soon afterwards condemned by our Party at the 20th Congress)—this individual *

* Almost certainly V. M. Churayev.

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laid a 'veto' on the whole of the immense and extremely valuable work done by the commission, concealed it from the leaders of the Central Committee and, after surreptitiously retaining for two years *all* the materials produced by the investigation in his own personal possession, consigned them quietly to the archives. Every single one of those who initiated or took part in the vast work of investigation carried out for the leaders of the Central Committee were shortly afterwards removed under various pretexts from the Committee's apparatus. Thus the abnormal position of the diagnostic psychiatric institute and the 'psychiatric-prison-hospitals' in Kazan and Leningrad, so injurious to the cause [of the Party] and discreditable to our medical profession, in fact *remained unaffected.*

It cannot be said that no changes were made. Much time elapsed. Considerable improvements were made in both the hospitals in so far as political prisoners (now sentenced under articles 70 and 190 of the Criminal Code) now constitute only a part of the whole group of people held in isolation; the percentage of psychiatric patients, especially those not sentenced under articles 70 and 190, has become markedly higher than before the time when the investigation was held; a start has been made in giving genuinely ill patients some kind of special treatment; it is becoming more and more frequent for the hospitals (which now have quite a few young, freshly-trained specialists) to *repudiate*, ultimately, some of the unfounded diagnoses of the Institute. But it is an indubitable aggravation of the abnormal situation described by the Central Committee's commission and a frightening proof of the increase in the illegal political repressions assisted in by the Serbsky Institute to find that—instead of the complete abolition of the two special hospitals outside the system of Ministry of Health psychiatric establishments—*additional new hospitals of a similar type* have in recent years appeared in other cities.

As regards the work of the Institute itself, even though it is now formally listed as administered by the Ministry of Health, it is a regrettable fact that no changes of direction have occurred in it. The concealment from the country's leaders of the results of the valuable work done by the commission has enabled the principal officials of the Institute from the personality-cult era to stay on in their former jobs and assiduously continue the evil practices of that era. Incidentally, not one of the persons guilty of the crimes uncovered by the commission in 1955–56 has been *prosecuted under the law.* On the contrary, more and more fresh personnel have been trained and educated in the Institute precisely under the pernicious guidance of notorious criminals.

This is the reason why, right up to the present day, the Institute frequently continues, on the orders of the various officials concerned, to assist in the illegal isolation—on the pretext of their being allegedly 'mentally ill'—of many people who are in fact absolutely healthy and fit for work. It helps certain officials of the organs of administrative

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investigation to remain unpunished and uncorrected in those cases where an open judicial inquiry might prove there was no justification for the repressive action taken by them. Thus, to the prejudice of our State and Party and to the discredit of Soviet medical science, the Institute in such cases complacently utilizes pseudo-scientific phraseology in order to cover up the dishonest actions of officials in the investigation and Procuracy organs.

There can be a radical elimination of these harmful abnormalities *only* if the supervision of all special hospitals is transferred in its entirety to the public health departments so as to ensure that both they and, more especially, the diagnostic institute are placed under the *direct, continuous and exceptionally vigilant control and management of the USSR Ministry of Public Health*, with the participation in such control of the whole of our medical community.

In the unavoidable close study which you and the USSR Ministry of Public Health must make of this problem, it will unquestionably be appropriate to base your work on the materials and proposals of the 1955–56 commission, which have been deliberately concealed from the leaders of the Central Committee and which, in their essence, have in no way become obsolete.

Sergei Petrovich Pisarev

Moskva, K-9, B. Gzezdnikovsky per. 10, kv. 632.

Appendix I

I—a communist since the age of sixteen, since 1918—was officially admitted to Party membership on 4 May 1920 but even in 1919 suffered from White repression in the cause of the Party. Over a period of five decades not only did I commit no criminal offences, I was guilty of no Party deviations—I have not even committed a single misdemeanour as regards Party discipline. By profession I am a Party official; in the second half of my life I have done scholarly work in the field of bibliography. The whole of the Great Patriotic War I spent as a political official at the front, I was decorated, and I became an invalid of the Patriotic War (2nd grade).

In January 1953, immediately after the publication of the notorious 'TASS communiqué' about the nine medical professors alleged to have been found guilty of poisoning Party and Government leaders, I sent a report to the general secretary of the Central Committee about the misdeeds of the security organs from top to bottom and, in particular, about the need to verify the charges made against the 'poisoners', bypassing the security organs. On the day the general secretary died I was arrested and thereafter was held in confinement for some two years, 49 days of these in the Serbsky Institute and nearly a year and a half in the Leningrad psychiatric prison hospital. I was rehabilitated (in my absence) by the RSFSR Supreme Court on the personal protest

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of the USSR Procurator-General Rudenko after Shatalin, a secretary of the Central Committee, had been given a copy of my 1953 report to the general secretary—the very same report on the basis of which I had been punished.

What were the circumstances surrounding my certification as mentally ill? Never once in my life have I been psychologically ill. I have never once had occasion to consult a psychiatrist or, in the last 40 years, to require even neuro-pathological treatment. I have normal control of myself and experience no lapses of any kind. Not once in my life have I suffered even a headache. And yet the Institute, after an 'examination' lasting 49 days, labelled me with the 'diagnosis': schizophrenia. Following this diagnosis I, along with other 'clients' of the Institute just as 'ill' as I was, had to spend four months in the psychiatric department of the Butyrka prison and nearly a year and a half in Leningrad (1953 and 1954).

On three occasions during those 18 months the head of the department (No. 10) where I was being held in prison conditions, the prison psychiatrist L. A. Kalinin, reported to sessions of the prison psychiatric commission (as I found out later) that I was healthy and fully capable of accepting responsibility for my actions. However, as it transpired, on all three occasions the commission—obedient to the administrative investigation organs (frequently even chaired by an official of the Main Prison Administration who came from Moscow)—though, unlike Kalinin, it had no idea whatever of my condition, 'disagreed' with him. On all three occasions the head of my department recorded his personal opinion in the files, my problem remained 'open', and they continued to hold me in detention.

In order not to compromise the Serbsky Institute, on all three occasions the commission suggested that the diagnosis 'schizophrenia' be replaced by the diagnosis 'paranoiac psychopathy'.

In order to disprove both of these diagnoses, I was obliged, at my own insistence, instead of being given my freedom, to spend in the hospital of the RSFSR Gannushkin Scientific Research Institute for Psychiatry *a further two and a quarter months* (December 1954–February 1955). It was only after this that it was finally proven that I was neither schizophrenic nor even any kind of 'paranoiac psychopath' (on this point you may, if need be, make direct enquiries from the Gannushkin Institute).

S. Pisarev

20 April 1970

Appendix II

To the Presidium of the USSR Academy of Medical Science

Having read the letter of S. P. Pisarev I fully endorse his position on the question raised. I know the tragedy of the present-day

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psychiatric prison hospitals through the bitter fate of my husband P. G. Grigorenko. I *annex* as a document a reasoned petition in the case of my husband.

Mrs. Z. M. Grigorenko

7 April 1970

My address: Moskva, G-21, Komsomolsky pr-t, 14/1, kv. 96, telephone 246-27-37

Note: The petition was refused. On a decision of the Tashkent City Court of 27 February 1970 P. G. Grigorenko was sentenced to indefinite compulsory treatment in the special hospital in Kazan.

[*In June 1970 Grigorenko was transferred to the prison mental hospital in Chernyakhovsk.*]

GRIGORENKO'S PRISON DIARY

3 May.—Arrive in Tashkent by air, go to Ilyasov's flat. The call to appear in court at Tashkent turns out to be a provocation. Decide to return to Moscow, but fall ill.

4 May.—Notice that the flat is being watched.

7 May.—Arrested just before the departure of flight for Moscow, after a search which furnishes the investigators with no evidence.

15 May.—Charged under article 190–1 of the Russian Criminal Code.

8 May–11 June.—Statements to Procurator-General of the Uzbek Republic, Ruzmetov and to the Procurator-General of the USSR, Rudenko. Demands: to release me or to transfer the investigation to Moscow, my place of residence, and (in accordance with the Criminal Procedure Code) the 'scene of the crime' (the incriminating documents were found in Moscow); or to permit me a meeting with my wife.

If none of these demands are met, I announce a hunger-strike.

13 June.—Hunger-strike begins.

15 June.—Forced feeding begins. They beat me, half-choke me.

16–19 June.—Forced feeding. They're beating me, making me choke. They twist my arms. They beat me on my wounded leg, on purpose. The most zealous are the 'Lefortovo [Prison] boys' sent specially from Moscow.

17 June.—Statement that my continued hunger-strike will be in protest at this bestial treatment.

18 June.—Write a statement about whom to blame for my death. After these two statements the acts of cruelty are cut short. They begin simply using force to bundle me into a strait-jacket. I resist. The number of my attackers rises from five to 12. The struggle goes

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on and on. Most often I collapse with terrible pains in the heart. I hope that my heart will give out. I long to die, calculating that my death will serve to expose this tyranny.

20 June.—Naumova, the procurator responsible for ensuring the observation of legality, comes to my cell and gives me to understand that my death is desirable. She confirms what Major Lysenko, the head of the detention prison, had told me earlier: 'Don't you think you'll earn yourself a funeral with lots of speeches. No, you won't get the sort Kosterin got. And we won't hand your body over to your relatives. They won't even learn the exact date of your death. They'll be informed perhaps three days later, or perhaps three months, or perhaps six months. And the exact place of your burial won't be revealed.'

Why am I helping them to achieve their aims? I begin to waver in my decision to aim for death.

24 June.—Investigator Berezovsky informs me that my family has been deprived of its pension because of my arrest.

Grigorenko goes on to write about: the end of his hunger-strike (28 June); a complaint addressed to Rudenko and Kosygin (Why have a sick wife and a disabled son been deprived of their livelihood?); the outpatient forensic psychiatric examination of 18 August (see *Chronicle* no. 11), which judged Grigorenko to be of sound mind; eight interrogations (late August to October): from the nature of these—the carelessness and lack of interest of the investigator, who was unprepared for them—P. G. Grigorenko concludes that the aim is now to proclaim his 'insanity' and try him in his absence, and that a second forensic psychiatric examination is therefore to be expected.

Apart from physical torture, Grigorenko also speaks of the methods of *moral* pressure: his illegal arrest in Uzbekistan ('Get this,' he was told, 'the laws weren't written for *us*; we'll do just as we like with you.'); his imprisonment in a KGB cellar (cases under article 190 of the Russian Criminal Code *should be* dealt with not by the KGB but by the Procuracy; and as a rule persons under investigation are kept in a normal, communal cell); his double guard: one for the detention prison as a whole, plus a personal one consisting of *Lefortovo* warders; denial of the use by him of the Criminal Code and the Criminal Procedural Code; the absence of any answer to his formal complaints to Ruzmetov and Rudenko (15 in all); from October onwards Berezovsky did not answer either; the denial of any contact whatever with his family; the failure to present an appropriate warrant when he was taken to the second examination in Moscow; the result of this diagnosis was not revealed; he was placed under a strict isolation prison-regime at the Serbsky Institute; he was deprived of the right not only to receive visits but also to receive parcels (others got theirs *daily* in accordance with the rules).

'While preparing me for "lunacy", Berezovsky spread slander about me. I chanced to hear that such slander had reached the ears

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of Obushayev, the KGB investigator, and Rutkovsky, the investigator from the Uzbek Procuracy. Berezovsky even resorted to outright provocation: on 26 September, while he was preparing a question for me, and rummaging among his papers, Obushayev and I started a discussion on our own. Suddenly Berezovsky interrupted Obushayev, shouting at the top of his voice: "What are you arguing with him for? You know he'd happily hang us from the nearest tree!" He went on shouting variation on this theme, obviously expecting me to explode. But I just waited until he'd finished, and said calmly: 'Let me answer with a paraphrase of Lydia Chukovskaya's words: 'Perhaps you deserve to be hanged, but our people doesn't deserve to be fed on hangings any more. I refuse to hang you—out of respect for our people".'

'It is clear to me that the whole situation has been designed to inspire a feeling of "no way out"—of hopelessness and despair. What the head of the detention prison had said about the consequences of my death was aimed to produce the same result, for it emphasised that "you're utterly at our mercy, even after death". Nor is it surprising that people seek death in such a situation. It was chance that saved me from death.

'Only now have I realized the special horror of the fate which overtook those unfortunate people who perished by the million in the torture chambers of Stalin's regime. It wasn't the physical suffering—that's bearable. But they deprived people of any hope whatsoever; they reiterated to them the omnipotence of their tyranny, the absence of any way out. And that *is* unbearable.'

Second diagnosis, 22 October–19 November 1969. By air from Tashkent to Moscow. Taken from the aerodrome to the Lefortovo Prison. 'I am invited to climb into the "box"—a tiny cage (aboard the prison "microbus"), in which someone my size can only sit doubled up, back and sides jammed up against the iron plates. The cold outside has made the iron cold, too. I am not even wearing an autumn coat. . . . I'm travelling in a light summer suit. . . . Add to the uncomfortable position and the cold . . . the exhaust fumes which somehow penetrate my "box". Reach the Lefortovo Prison in a semi-conscious state.'

From Lefortovo to the Serbsky Institute. Department Four. Solitary confinement. Special guard by the door. 'Persons charged under my article (art. 190) undergo examination in a ward for petty criminals. I have been placed in a section for politicals (art. 70 of the Criminal Code), but have been isolated from the others. I am the only person in the department on a prison regime.

'Throughout my period in solitary there is no psychiatric investigation of any sort. True, Maiya Mikhailovna does invite me once for a chat. But the chat doesn't come off. I put a stop to everything by announcing that I don't want the doctor to note my answers down just as he wants. "I'll talk about anything you like, on one condition:

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that *I* note down the content of my answers." Past experience had taught me that this was vital.

'The doctor responsible for me in 1964, Margarita Feliksovna, wrote down my answers in an unbelievably distorted form. And she did so not just because of her fervent desire to present me as "of unsound mind", but from sheer political illiteracy and ignorant narrow mindedness. It was perhaps the last that prevented her from understanding me. For example, she asked me: "Pyotr Grigorevich, at the Academy you used to get 800 roubles a month. So what turned you to your anti-state activities? What did you lack?" Glancing at her, I realized that any answer would be fruitless; for her, a man who made material sacrifices was "of unsound mind", however lofty the causes which prompted him. So I answered briefly: "You won't understand. I couldn't breathe." And you should have seen the joy that flashed in her eyes, how quickly she jotted down my answer in her notebook, because in her opinion it testified to the fact that before her sat a crazy lunatic.'

The solitary ends (on the eighth day), the investigation begins. Conversation with Professor Lunts. [We do not reproduce the contents of this conversation, since it closely resembles the one which Grigorenko cites later in these notes—a conversation with the chairman of the diagnostic team.] Next comes the psychological examination. Grigorenko quotes two problems set him by a professor of psychology—the two which seemed to Grigorenko 'the most taxing': to solve a problem involving nothing more than a knowledge of the four rules of arithmetic (let us recall that Grigorenko headed the department of cybernetics in the Frunze Academy) and to explain the meaning of a picture (evidently taken from *Krokodil* [a Soviet humorous periodical]).

'Perhaps such conversations are necessary when one is dealing with a cretin or someone in his dotage. . . . The Professor . . . behaved throughout as if he felt embarrassed. I was probably no less embarrassed myself.'

This was the end of the preliminary meetings with the doctors.

19 November—the diagnostic commission: Morozov, director of the Institute of Forensic Psychiatry and corresponding member of the USSR Academy of Sciences; Lunts; Maiya Mikhailovna; and a man in a brown suit (the only one not in a white coat). The questions are asked by Morozov, the chairman of the commission. They all involve an attempt to reveal some inconsistency in Grigorenko's view of himself and his attitude to his actions. The line is: 'Grigorenko has no doubts about the normality of his actions, which have led to this diagnostic session; yet Grigorenko himself recognized, after treatment in the Leningrad special psychiatric hospital, that similar actions of his which led to the diagnosis of 1964 were mistaken. As a result of the intervention of the psychiatrists Grigorenko had been behaving "normally, in the accepted way"—before he "went back to his old ways".'

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Grigorenko answers that he considers his previous activities (before 1964) to have been mistaken in the ideological and political senses, and in no way because of any damage to his psyche ('not every mistake a man makes is the result of damage to his psyche'); he testifies that the cause of his so-called 'normal' conduct was not the influence of the psychiatrists but completely independent factors (particularly his exhausting work as a loader). (By 'normal' conduct is meant that for some time Grigorenko did not write anything for circulation.) He declares it wrong to believe that he has 'gone back to his old ways', since his activities over the last two years have not borne even a superficial resemblance to what he did before.

This last statement of Grigorenko's makes the man without a white coat ask him: 'What's the difference? Your tactics may have changed, but in essence there's no difference. . . .'

'No! The essence is different,' says Grigorenko. 'The old approach was typically Bolshevik: the creation of a strictly conspiratorial illegal organization and the circulation of illegal pamphlets. But now there's no organization, no pamphlets; just open, bold attacks on obvious tyranny, falsehood and hypocrisy, attacks on the perversion of truth. Before, the call was for the overthrow of the regime of that period and for a return to the point at which Lenin left off. Now the call is to remove the visible evils of society, to fight for strict observance of the existing laws, and for the realization of constitutional rights. Then the call was for revolution. Now the struggle is an open one, within the framework of the law, for the democratization of the life of our society. What, then, is there in common, either in tactics or in essence? Of course, if it is only a person who bows submissively before any arbitrary act of the bureaucrats who is considered a normal Soviet person, then I am "abnormal". I am not capable of such submissiveness, no matter how, or how much I may be beaten up.

'I have said, and I repeat once again that in 1963–64 I made mistakes. But I did not need psychiatry to correct them. I had already begun to understand these mistakes before my arrest.'

Comparison of the two diagnoses

After the first (Tashkent) examination, when the investigators had the diagonsis of a highly competent commission that Grigorenko was of sound mind, against all common sense it appointed a second commission, wishing to obtain at any cost the diagnosis that he was of unsound mind.

The Tashkent commission had at its disposal the following materials: the results of the clinical examination performed in the Serbsky Institute in 1964, including a psychological examination and an encephalograph; papers from the Leningrad special psychiatric hospital; the observations of the psychiatric out-patients unit of the Leningrad district of Moscow; the observations of the prison administration and the laboratory analyses made in the prison clinic.

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The Moscow commission, in addition to everything listed above, had another encephalograph and the results of a further psychological examination.

The Tashkent commission's examination lasted about three hours. 'They chatted to me for a long time. Then they examined me. All four participated very actively in the conversation. During the examination all four considered it their duty to test my reactions. All the while they were discussing some point at length, using Latin words, and sometimes even arguing. There was one moment, when Professor Detengof asserted something while examining me. Kagan at once came up, did the same thing as the professor and said, "Gracious me, Professor, you're quite wrong." Both the lady doctors came up and checked. Then Detengof checked again, and all agreed, as it seemed to me, with the opinion of Kagan.'

The Moscow commission examined Grigorenko for twenty minutes. 'After what I had seen in Tashkent, what took place in the Serbsky Institute can only be considered a mockery of the concept "expert diagnostic team." There were no examinations. There was a straightforward question-and-answer conversation, led by one man. (. . .) Lunts was so wrapped up in his own thoughts that when the chairman addressed a question to him, he had to repeat it. (. . .) My general impression was that everything had already been decided.'

The fate of Pyotr Grigorevich Grigorenko

SINCE June P. G. Grigorenko has been held in the special psychiatric hospital in Chernyakhovsk.

At the beginning of June he was visited in hospital by two 'plain clothes' men who, without giving their names, suggested that he should renounce his beliefs. Grigorenko refused to talk to them. After this he was attached for the exercise period to a group of aggressively-inclined inmates. On 15 June he was visited by his wife. She was kept waiting for eight hours. Representatives of the hospital administration were present at their meeting.

Most of the inmates of this special (i.e. prison) hospital are really mentally ill and have been convicted for rape and murder. The hospital ward is a cell of six square metres. It contains two people: Grigorenko and his cell-mate, who stabbed his wife to death and is in a constant state of delirium. There is room to take only two steps—one can merely get up and get dressed. There are about two hours' exercise a day, the rest of the time being spent in the locked cell. Pyotr Grigorevich has been deprived of paper and pencil.

His enforced immobility, the acute pains in his wounded leg, the

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ceaseless effect on his mind of having a mentally deranged cell-mate—all this gives cause for serious concern for the life of 62-year-old P. G. Grigorenko. His address: Kaliningradskaya oblast, g. Chernyakhovsk, uchrezhdeniye 216/st-2.

ERRATA

M. S. writes: "My brief note on the Soviet sculptor, Vadim Sidur (*Survey*, No. 74/5), contained two errors that I would like to take the opportunity of correcting. The untitled drawing of 1969 has in fact no connection with the events in Czechoslovakia of 1968; and Sidur has not done a bust of Solzhenitsyn, but only the sketch drawing illustrated."

Owing to an unfortunate error the article by Professor Gerhard A. Ritter (*Survey*, No. 76) has been published without incorporating the author's corrections in the English translation of his text. We express our profound apology to Professor Ritter for this mishap.

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THE WARSAW UPRISING: ANOTHER VIEW*

Geoffrey Hudson

TWENTY-SIX years is a long time, but it is not long enough to assuage the emotions of men who were deeply involved in great events which happened that time ago and which have shaped their whole lives ever since. To no event of recent history is this consideration more relevant than it is to the Warsaw Uprising of 1944. The whole destiny of the Polish nation has been conditioned by what then took place, and this includes the individual fates of those who have remained in exile from their native land. It is natural that bitter feelings should colour any Polish retrospect on the Uprising and that the recriminations which follow any great national disaster when the question of responsibility subsequently arises should have been prolonged over the years. To at least one British historian it seems that the acerbity of the Polish experience has prevented Professor Andrzej Korbonski in his article *The Warsaw Rising Revisited* * from doing full justice to those leaders of the Polish Government in London and of the Polish Home Army in Warsaw who took the decision to launch the insurrection. In this article certain points are made in criticism of Professor Korbonski's argument from the point of view of one who at the time in London was aware of the international implications of the dilemma which faced the Polish Government and its commander-in-chief.

In his chronology of the period Professor Korbonski states that on 14 July the commander of the Polish Home Army, Bor-Komorovski, reported by radio to London that there was no justification for an uprising in Warsaw at that time, but on 21 July 'another dispatch contained an entirely new appraisal of the military situation and envisaged the possibility of an insurrection'; on 31 July the Home Army command ordered the Uprising to begin in Warsaw on the following day. Korbonski argues that the resistance leaders in Warsaw had no sufficient reason for changing their minds between 14 and 21 July and that the Prime Minister of the Polish Government, Mikolajczyk, gave his consent to the Uprising because he believed it would strengthen his position vis-à-vis Stalin in the negotiations he went to Moscow to pursue; further, Korbonski, admitting that General Sosnkowski, the commander-in-chief of the Polish Army, who had supreme authority over the Home Army as well, 'had been strongly opposed to the Uprising', claims that he was to blame in that he 'chose the second half of July as the time for an inspection tour of the Polish forces fighting in Italy' and by his absence from London was unable to control the situation as he should have done.

* Cf. *Survey*, No. 76, Summer 1970.

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The deliberations of the Polish leaders must be considered in the context of the relations of the Polish Government in London at that time with Britain, the United States and Russia, or more concretely, with Churchill, Roosevelt and Stalin. On 22 February 1944, Churchill, having secretly accepted at Teheran, with Roosevelt's consent, Stalin's demand for most of the pre-war Polish territory annexed by the Soviet Union in agreement with Germany in 1939, and having failed by diplomatic pressure to persuade Mikolajczyk to submit to this dictate of the Big Three, made a speech in the House of Commons which was in effect an attack on the Polish Government. Henceforth relations between the Polish and British Governments were extremely strained. In this situation all Polish hopes were set on Roosevelt, who had not openly supported Churchill's pressure on the Poles and was believed by them not to have endorsed the British policy. Jan Ciechanowski, the Polish Ambassador in Washington at that time, whose book *Defeat in Victory* gives a full account of Polish-American relations in 1944, was recalled to London for consultation and records that ' my continuous conferences with the President of Poland and with Mr. Mikolajczyk and the members of his Cabinet revolved around one all-important question: Can we or can we not rely on President Roosevelt's support? '[1] What the Poles did not, and could not know, was that Roosevelt at Teheran had agreed to the deal over Poland made by Churchill and Stalin, but had asked Churchill that his consent should be kept confidential during his ' election year '. Thus it was Churchill who went ahead with the task of putting pressure privately and publicly on the Poles to capitulate to Soviet demands, while Roosevelt, though secretly committed to the same course, could affect an attitude of detachment and assume the posture of Poland's best friend. This was a matter of the greatest importance for Roosevelt in his campaign for re-election to a fourth term as President. There were more than six million Polish-American voters and their geographical distribution made them of crucial significance in several key states. The bulk of them normally voted Democrat but they were under the influence of an organization called the Polish-American Congress, led by a certain Rozmarek, which was deeply concerned about the future of Poland and capable of swinging votes to the Republicans if Roosevelt were known to be involved in an international deal adverse to Poland and if the Republican candidate for the Presidency were to challenge it. Hence Roosevelt's extreme anxiety to conceal his involvement in the Teheran deal, to show himself Poland's friend and to convince Rozmarek that he could be relied on to defend Poland's sovereign rights in an international conference if he were re-elected. He accomplished this by inviting Mikolajczyk to Washington and receiving him with the greatest warmth and consideration. The Polish Prime Minister was in Washington from 5 to 14 June and Ciechanowski notes that, although

[1] J. Ciechanowski, *Defeat in Victory*, p. 290.

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he arrived on the eve of D-Day, 'when the entire American Government was wholly concentrated on this momentous event and the President was under the greatest pressure of work', Roosevelt found time to give him four long interviews. Mikolajczyk came away convinced that Roosevelt really understood Poland's situation and was genuinely willing to do everything possible to help Poland during the war and restore her independence after it was over.

Even then, perhaps, had Mikolajczyk approached Roosevelt in a more suspicious frame of mind, he might have wondered whether the President's enthusiasm for the Polish cause was to be taken at its face value. At one point in their conversation, according to Ciechanowski, in referring to the Russian pressures on Poland, Roosevelt declared that 'when a thing becomes unavoidable, one should adapt oneself to it'—a formula which could, of course, be used to counsel any submission to superior power. But Mikolajczyk appears to have overlooked such warning remarks in the context of so much encouragement and sympathy, and left Washington with a firm belief in Roosevelt's wish to help. Moreover, he had a definite commitment on arms for Poland, for in response to his complaint about the recent cessation of airborne supplies from the West for the Polish Home Army, 'the President expressed his complete agreement and promised to give instructions to the proper authorities'.[2] There was a full discussion of the needs of the Home Army and of the possibility of supplying them by shuttle flights between Italy and Russia already used by American bombers. There was no specific reference to the project of a rising in Warsaw, but Mikolajczyk was surely justified in assuming that the promise of supplies would be applicable to any operation against the Germans in which the main force of the Home Army was engaged.

IT must be remembered with reference to Mikolajczyk's dealings with the British and American Governments that the Polish Government-in-Exile and its supporters inside Poland had not only been without any official contacts with the Soviet Union since the rupture of diplomatic relations by Moscow in April 1943, but were also continually being assailed by all media of Soviet propaganda (including publicity by communists and fellow-travellers within Britain and the United States) as disguised collaborators with Nazi Germany. This had begun when the Soviet Government, in its embarrassment at the discovery of the corpses at Katyn, had denounced the Polish appeal for an investigation by the International Red Cross as a pro-German intrigue and had used the charge as justification for the rupture of diplomatic relations. Neither the British nor the American Government accepted the accusation of deliberate collusion with Germany, but in their intense desire for unity among the major Allies in the

[2] Ciechanowski, op. cit., pp. 312 and 320.

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war they tended to be irritated with the Poles for their complaints against Russia and to blame them rather than the Russians for the continuing conflict. On the press and public opinion in Britain and America the effect of the Soviet propaganda was much greater and in the mood of 1944, with the general admiration and gratitude for the great Russian victories, there was a disposition to heed suggestions that the 'London Poles', if not actually pro-German, were merely a bunch of reactionary politicians and officers out of touch with the situation in Poland and more anxious to impede the Russian advance than to assist it. If the Home Army in the Polish capital were to do nothing until the city was captured by Soviet troops, it would be taken as proof of the charge that it had no will to fight against the Germans, or alternatively was too small and weak to do so. This consideration undoubtedly weighed heavily with Mikolajczyk, and rightly so, for it was only reasonable to expect that, whereas failure to strike a blow at the retreating Germans would be extremely hard to explain to the governments and peoples of the Western Allies, the striking of such a blow would gain substantial support from them for the cause of Polish national independence.

General Sosnkowski and other Polish military leaders who opposed the project for a rising in Warsaw did so not merely on immediate military grounds. In their estimate of the local military situation they were necessarily dependent for the most part on reports from the Home Army; they got very little information from their British and American colleagues and, of course, none at all from the Russians. But they were less influenced than were the commanders of the Home Army by the itch to get at the Germans and the impatience to hit out at a cruel military occupation. Taking a longer view, they were fully aware of the need to provide for future resistance to Russia after the defeat of Germany if Poland was not to be subjected to the rule of Muscovite puppets. For this purpose they considered that the forces of the Home Army should be preserved as far as possible intact and underground, and not risked in anti-German operations in which they were bound to suffer heavy losses, whatever the outcome. Poland had already suffered enough in nearly five years of war; it could be argued that it was now best to let the Russians do the job of driving the Germans out of Poland and husband Polish military man-power for the post-war task of restoring Polish independence.

The argument on the other side, and the one that carried greater weight with Mikolajczyk as political leader of the Polish nation, was that for Poles to leave the liberation of their country to the Russians without themselves taking part in it—for the part played by the Polish troops in the Allied campaigns in Italy and France would not adequately be seen by the world as such a liberation—would lose for Poland that sympathy and support of the West without which it would not avail simply to keep the Home Army in being. This meant that the Home Army in Warsaw must act on its own when the Soviet

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army approached. It was in any case impossible to co-ordinate operations beforehand with the Soviet forces in the absence of any official contacts, political or military, between the Polish and Soviet Governments. Nor were there any illusions about Soviet goodwill after the atrocious treatment which had already been meted out to units of the Home Army in eastern Poland. But it could be anticipated that if the Home Army could seize key areas of Warsaw and receive airborne arms from the West, the Russians would not dare to attack it in the Polish capital in the full view of the world and would find it in their own interest advantageous to co-operate with it in order to continue their own offensive westward across the Vistula towards Germany.

KORBONSKI is very severe on what he regards as the imprudence of the Home Army in ordering the Uprising without sufficient information about the military situation in the fighting between the Russians and Germans east of the Vistula. But in the nature of things the intelligence resources of an underground resistance organization in an occupied country cannot be compared with those of a regular army in the field. The Polish Underground leaders could not know the battle order, plans or available reinforcements of either the German or Russian armies; they could only go by their knowledge of the actual advances made by the Russians and observations of the condition of the retreating Germans. The Germans had in fact taken a terrific beating in the Eastern Front summer campaign of 1944 and a fairly correct knowledge of what was going on seems sufficient to account for the change of assessment of the prospects of a rising which took place between 14 and 21 July. At the very end of July the Russians suffered a setback due to the arrival of German reinforcements from Italy, where the relaxation of Ango-American pressure due to the withdrawal of troops for the 'Anvil' operation in the south of France enabled the Germans to transfer forces for strengthening their fronts in Lorraine and Poland. The arrival of these fresh troops meant that the Germans on the eve of the Warsaw Uprising were in a better position both to repel the Russian thrust towards the Vistula and to suppress any outbreak in their rear. It can perhaps be argued that the Polish Underground ought to have known all about the scale and direction of the German reinforcements, but this would have involved a penetration of German army security which was beyond its capacity. In the circumstances it was reasonable to expect a Russian arrival in Praga in the first few days of August.

In any case it was not on Russian aid that either Mikolajczyk or Bor-Komorovski counted for the success of the insurrection. It was on airborne arms from the West, which it was quite possible to supply provided there was a will to do it and that the shuttle service between Italian and Russian airfields already used by American bombers was available for the flights. This is the crucial issue with regard to the

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Warsaw Uprising, and no criticism of the decisions taken by the Polish leaders in the launching of the Uprising can avoid the question what would have happened if the insurgents had received the aid which, after Roosevelt's promises to Mikolajczyk in June, they were entitled to expect. Korbonski clearly regards the Uprising as doomed to failure from the outset. But how could an insurrection which was as hopeless as he thinks it was have lasted for 63 days? If the Home Army held out as long as it did with the meagre resources which it had, what might it not have accomplished if it had received a substantial supply of arms within the first fortnight. Both the British and American Governments were provided with full information about the Uprising from the first day, yet it was not until 20 August that Churchill and Roosevelt jointly requested the use of Soviet airfields for the shuttle flights essential for effective aid to the Warsaw insurgents, only to meet with a flat refusal from Stalin. The Soviet veto was accepted until 18 September, when Stalin relaxed it in the knowledge that after 48 days of grinding German suppression there was no longer any danger of Polish success. It cannot be maintained that the Western governments showed either the sense of urgency or the will to help which the Poles had a right to expect from their alliance with Britain and from the assurances given personally to the Polish Prime Minister by the President of the United States.

ON a survey of all that happened between Mikolajczyk's journey to Washington and the decision to start the Uprising it is hardly possible to agree with Korbonski's thesis that it is just 'a tale of personal intrigue and misunderstanding in Warsaw and London, of human naïveté and even stupidity, of lack of clear thinking and of willingness to sacrifice lives for a hopeless cause'.

It was a calculated risk—in which the taking of the risk can be regarded as reasonable in relation to Poland's international political situation, the military information available at the time and the Polish faith in the promises of the American President. If the military intelligence information was inadequate, it cannot be blamed on personal defects or negligence in the Home Army leaders, since it was a deficiency inherent in the character of an underground organization in an occupied country, and the decision to start the Uprising will bear comparison with unfortunate strategic moves made by the Western Allies in the same year with a far greater apparatus of military intelligence. With regard to the Polish expectation of aid from the West, this is a question which goes to the root of the whole Polish policy from 1939 onwards and cannot be limited to the Warsaw Uprising. For Poles whose attitude to the West has very naturally been one of cynical disenchantment ever since Yalta, it cannot but seem that the faith which the Polish war-time leaders placed in their Western Allies, first in France, then in Britain, and then in America,

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was a romantic folly in which they persisted in spite of repeated experiences which should have cured them of their illusions.

But if the Poles had had the prudent caution and distrust of their allies which Korbonski seems to think they ought to have had, it would not have been a question of applying these qualities of mind in July 1944, because they would not then have been any longer in the war at all. They might well indeed have given up the struggle already after their experience in September of 1939 when their Western allies remained completely passive both on the ground and in the air while Germany flung her main forces against Poland; the enormity of the 'phoney war' has recently been well brought out by Jon Kimche in his book *The Unfought Battle*. Yet Poland fought on and had faith in the promises of France and Britain to restore her independence. Then France fell and Reynaud offered to include the Polish forces in negotiations for the French armistice; he received in reply Zaleski's declaration that 'we are a nation that does not capitulate'. Sikorski and Zaleski took the decision to bring the Polish forces to Britain, and the RAF received that crucial reinforcement of trained fighter pilots without which it is unlikely that the Battle of Britain could have been won. But the decision of 1940 was in the circumstances more of an act of faith than the decision to launch the Warsaw Uprising four years later. If the Poles had had as little faith in themselves and their allies as by Korbonski's standards they should have had, they would have been more prudent in 1940 and there would have been no 'willingness to sacrifice lives for a hopeless cause'; the Poles would have been good *vichyssois*.

Of course we know now that the Germans did not win the war and that the Warsaw Uprising was a failure. But the decisions of individuals who have to bear in great crises responsibility for the destinies of the nations they lead cannot be judged solely by hindsight; they have to be related to what was known and believed at the time. Perhaps the Poles had too much faith, but if it led them to disaster in 1944, it may well be that in 1940 it saved Europe from the total victory of Hitler's Germany.

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A REJOINDER

Andrzej Korbonski

MR. GEOFFREY HUDSON chastizes me for not doing full justice to Polish leaders in London and Warsaw who launched the Warsaw insurrection in August 1944 (cf. my article, 'The Warsaw Uprising Revisited', *Survey*, No. 76, 1970). He also childes me for criticizing the decisions taken by these individuals without relating them 'to what was known and believed at the time'.

Before answering these and other more specific charges I would like to register my surprise that in taking me to task Mr Hudson does not dispute any of the facts which formed the basis of my article nor does he come up with any new information which could weaken my case. The only source cited by him, J. Ciechanowski's *Defeat in Victory*, was published in 1947 and can hardly be considered as 'a full account of Polish-American relations in 1944'. Thus the disagreement between Mr Hudson and myself concerns not the facts but their interpretation. Because of this I do not intend to argue my case all over again and I shall restrict myself to pointing out certain inconsistencies and occasional lapses of logic in Mr Hudson's *apologia* of the Polish leadership.

Mr Hudson claims, for example, that Prime Minister Mikolajczyk, having visited President Roosevelt in June 1944, 'came away convinced that Roosevelt really understood Poland's situation and was genuinely willing to do everything possible to help Poland during the war' . . . and thus he, Mikolajczyk, 'was surely justified in assuming that the promise of supplies would be applicable to any operation against the Germans in which the main force of the Home Army was engaged'.

How Mr Hudson managed to arrive at this conclusion is beyond me. There is absolutely no evidence to support this view either in the numerous memoirs and secondary sources or in the United States State Department files which I had the opportunity to peruse recently at the National Archives in Washington. If, as Mr Hudson asserts, Mikolajczyk was really convinced of FDR's strong backing, then the Polish Prime Minister was guilty, if not of wishful thinking, then of total want of insight and even I would not accuse him of the latter.

On the other hand there is plenty of evidence that the Western Allies made it very plain to the Poles long before the Uprising became a possibility that they should not count on large-scale military aid under any circumstances.

Mr Hudson further asserts that 'if the Home Army in the Polish capital were to do nothing until the city was captured by Soviet troops, it would be taken as proof of the charge that it had no will to fight against the Germans . . .' He also claims that 'whereas failure to strike a blow at the retreating Germans would be extremely hard to

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explain to the governments and peoples of the Western Allies, the striking of such a blow would gain substantial support from them for the cause of Polish national independence'.

I find this reasoning somewhat strange, tortuous and inconsistent. Earlier in his piece Mr Hudson himself states that after February 1944 'relations between the Polish and British governments were extremely strained'. Does he mean to imply that an uprising in Warsaw would, some five months later, suddenly 'gain substantial support' from the British and that a failure to act 'would lose for Poland that sympathy and support of the West without which it would not avail simply to keep the Home Army in being'. What sympathy? What support? Surely Mr Hudson cannot be serious. The Allied support for the Polish resistance was minimal and the sympathy for the Poles evaporated long before the summer of 1944. The Underground Army in Poland had to continue to engage the Germans regardless of Allied help. As for the Uprising itself it is hard to imagine that it was in fact desired and supported by the West. At worst it was likely to complicate Churchill's and Roosevelt's relations with Stalin, and at best it made no difference at all insofar as Allied diplomacy and strategy were concerned. Besides, if a proof of Poland's willingness to fight was required, there was plenty of evidence available ever since September 1939—as correctly pointed out by Mr Hudson.

With regard to the actual decision to start the Uprising Mr Hudson makes a number of *obiter dicta* which simply cannot be substantiated. First, he states that the Polish command in Warsaw had to 'act on its own when the Soviet army approached', but he never says why. Then he also asserts that 'it was in any case impossible to co-ordinate operations beforehand with the Soviet forces . . .'—again one could ask why it was impossible in the closing days of July but possible later in September 1944 when radio and courier contacts were apparently easily established between the insurgents and Marshal Rokossovsky's headquarters.

On top of this Mr Hudson agrees that 'there [were no] illusions about Soviet goodwill . . .' If that were the case what was the point in staging the Uprising? Mr Hudson answers this by saying that 'the Russians would not have dared to attack [the insurgents] in the Polish capital in the full view of the world and would find it in their own interest to co-operate with [them]'.

I wonder what evidence is there to support this assertion. Ever since the early spring of 1944 Polish resistance units which offered to co-operate with the Red Army had been gradually wiped out and this fact was well known in both Warsaw and London, as well as in Washington. The Western Allies certainly did not shed any tears over the fate of these Poles and to assume, as Mr Hudson does, that either the Russians would suddenly change their attitude and 'co-operate' with the resistance, or that the West would just as suddenly take up and fight for the Polish cause, strikes me as somewhat naive.

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Mr Hudson goes on to claim that the Polish leaders 'could not know the battle order, plans or available reinforcements of either the German or Russian armies'. I agree, but if that were the case they should have been extremely cautious in making the ultimate decision. The fact remains that whereas after the middle of July there was real panic in Warsaw reflected in long columns of German civilian and military personnel crossing the Vistula to the West, toward the end of the month all the panic ceased and everybody in Warsaw, including the undersigned, could easily observe the many tanks and self-propelled guns of the Hermann Goering Division distributed throughout the outskirts of the city. These were the troops that according to Mr Hudson were transferred by the Germans 'for strengthening their fronts in Lorraine and Poland'. Apparently this made no impression on the Polish leadership although it was clear even to a 17-year-old youth that something had happened and that the Germans were no longer fleeing in disorder.

But then, Mr Hudson says, the Poles did not expect Soviet aid anyway: they counted on 'airborne arms from the West'. Again, why should they have done so is not clear. As I pointed out in my article the Polish military leaders in London had been warning the resistance in Poland against any such expectations for some time. A courier from London made it very clear on the eve of the Uprising. Nothing in the past history indicated that a large increase in deliveries was possible. As mentioned earlier, the Western military leaders made no promises whatsoever. If, despite all this, the Polish command in Warsaw still counted on massive Allied aid—then they were guilty of 'striking naiveté'. Going back to a previous point made by Mr Hudson, one could also ask how much of an impression would the Uprising have made if it depended so critically on the aid of the very allies it was meant to impress?

Mr Hudson also raises the question 'how could an insurrection which was as hopeless as [Korbonski] thinks it was have lasted for 63 days?' I think the answer is simple. The Uprising, although clearly a nuisance for the Germans, did not create undue problems and there was no compelling need to suppress it immediately; the Germans had not enough troops to do it early anyway; the quality of the troops at their disposal left much to be desired, and there was, initially at least, lack of unified German command. Had the Uprising really presented a serious obstacle for the Germans I have little doubt that it could have been liquidated in a few days. Whenever the Germans needed to seize a strategic thoroughfare or district they were able to accomplish it rather easily despite tremendous heroism of the defenders. The 'airborne arms from the West', even if dropped, would not have made that much difference.

The final point in Mr Hudson's exegesis is that had the Poles been more realistic in July 1944 'they would not then have been any longer

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in the war at all'. This strikes me as a *non sequitur* and its meaning escapes me completely. I for one feel that a nation or its leaders do not have to commit foolish acts to show that they are at war. The Czechs did not do it and neither did the Belgians, Dutch, Greeks and Norwegians—and yet I doubt that Mr Hudson would lump them all together as *vichyssois*.

I really fail to see the logic of this. Mr Hudson apparently sees no middle ground between total resistance and total collaboration. I find this rather strange coming from an historian who should know that history is not all black or white but mostly grey.

In conclusion I cannot help being somewhat amused by Mr Hudson's overall attitude. Among other things he chastizes me for being emotional and bitter, and thus, presumably, unable to look at the Uprising objectively. And yet even a brief glance at his paper clearly shows the highly emotional character of his own criticism. Thus the tables have been turned, and the traditional images have been reversed: a cold, unemotional Pole being castigated by a warm, emotional Englishman. That in itself is worth something.

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CUBA: A VIEW FROM THE LEFT

David Buchan

THE note of doubt in the title in René Dumont's new book *Is Cuba socialist?* * will seem unjustified to those who think of socialism purely as an economic system. For Cuba has had a socialist economic system since 1961. But Dumont is an idealist for whom socialism is far more than a matter of economics. 'Collective property and economic planning' is not enough. 'The disappearance of all injustices' is the hallmark of true socialism. 'This means liberty, in the economic field, but especially in the dissemination of information and freedom of speech'.[1] To these high standards Cuba, according to Dumont, does not measure up. More than anything else Dumont urges greater participation in all sectors and at all levels. In a letter to Fidel Castro in July 1969, he claimed that what was needed was 'effective participation by everyone in decisions which concern them. This would rouse more enthusiasm, combining with the enthusiasm which you yourself know how to whip up so well in your speeches'.[2]

'Dumont on Cuba' is something of an event. Although Dumont is primarily an agricultural economist, he has had closer contact with Castro than any other Westerner (except Herbert Matthews of the *New York Times*). He was in at the start of the revolution, then an ardent sympathiser. At Castro's invitation he has studied Cuban agricultural problems at first hand in 1960, 1964 and finally last year. This book is the result of last year's visit. The fact that his advice, consistently sympathetic yet critical, has been continually sought (though not always taken) by Castro shows the high regard the Cuban leader has for him.

Dumont's book is particularly timely because the Cuban revolution has just failed to reach its greatest goal so far—10 million tons of sugar in the 1970 harvest. This target had been set as long ago as 1964 by Castro and on its attainment he had pledged the honour of the revolution. It was to have been an example of how much better a people could do when charged with revolutionary fervour. The previous harvest record was indeed broken, but with a so much larger work force and in a so much longer harvest as to discount the new record. For many Cubans the Year of Decisive Endeavour has become the Year of Derisive Endeavour. On July 26 Castro frankly announced that the 10 millions had not been reached. He also catalogued a long list of failures in other sectors where production was down because of the diversion of manpower into the sugar campaign. Besides technical difficulties with the sugar mills, Castro blamed increasing labour indiscipline, absenteeism, dawdling among the workers and inefficiency

* *Cuba est-il socialiste?* Editions du Seuil 1970.
[1] Ibid. p. 14.
[2] Ibid. p. 245.

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in the higher ranks. He promised more 'participation' to encourage the workers, and also that the heads of the more inefficient leaders would roll. There have been a few ministerial changes; but there is still no indication of what form 'greater participation' will take. The July 26 speech was an exercise in *mea culpa* and the crowd loved Castro for it. He rhetorically offered to resign and admitted that 'we the leaders of the revolution, have cost the people too much in our process of learning'. But as the crowd roared its approval of Castro, there is little incentive for a drastic change of course.

Dumont's book is the more valuable because he digs deeper than Castro has done in his speeches for the causes of the failure of the 1970 sugar harvest. Dumont elaborates on the admissions by Castro that neither the sugar mills nor the transport system were capable of dealing with the huge bulk of cut cane. More important he points out the very low productivity of the 'volunteers' in the sugar fields—a point on which Castro did not dwell. The average 'volunteer' cut '1,150–1,350 kilograms of cane a day while a professional *machetero* cuts about 4 tons a day, and a champion 7 tons'.[3] These volunteers would have been more valuable in their normal professions, and Dumont advocates a drastic curtailment of 'voluntary' work. However, Dumont also points out that there is a real shortage of professional *macheteros* or cane cutters. Many have left for the towns in search of higher pay. Dumont suggests that the basic agricultural wage be doubled to attract them back.

Dumont deplores, as do most foreign observers, the sugar monomania of the past year. And it does seem as though Castro has taken the point. Jorge Risquet, the Minister of Labour, implied in a speech in August that never again would the economy be so distorted in favour of one product. In future 100,000 fewer people will be mobilised for sugar harvests. So the students and those in important industries will not be routed out and sent to the sugar plantations again. The optimum level for sugar harvests is probably about 7 million tons. This amount could be cut without having to rely on the wasteful efforts of 'volunteers', transported and processed without undue strain, and sold on the communist and world markets without overloading those markets. But Castro would not be Castro if he did not set fantastical and unrealistic targets like the '10 million tons of sugar'.

One of the main obstacles to rational economic planning is, Dumont points out, Castro himself—his love of grand projects, his unwillingness to listen to advice and his supreme position which allows him not to listen. There have been other mad targets besides the sugar one. In July 1969 Castro promised that from 1970 on he would build 100,000 houses a year. At the end of 1968 he promised that milk production would quadruple within two years. These promises were of the same order as the sugar one, less disastrous but equally impossible. Certainly

[3] Ibid. p. 108.

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such targets are a spur to production; but they also tend to dislocate other sectors in the Plan. And in the end by continual underfulfilment they discredit themselves. As an expert who has had his moderating advice ignored in the past, Dumont comments rather bitterly: 'Fidel thinks he knows better, in all fields, than other people; and it is this pride which one day may destroy him'.[4] Indeed in the past Castro has behaved rather like a drunken speculator. In 1960 his fantasy then was to breed crocodiles on a vast scale in the marshes of Cuba, and so corner the world market in crocodile skin. Luckily no such target as '10 million crocodile skins' was announced and the fantasy passed.

Castro's spontaneous style of government often does more harm than good by continually upsetting the central plans. Central planning is difficult in any country. But it is doubly so in Cuba which has lost most of its managerial class to the United States. But even when these plans are finally worked out, Castro's desire to settle all details himself is disruptive. His countryside tours, in jeep and battledress, are well typified by Dumont. 'Let us follow him on a journey. Here he comes across a bridge in bad repair; he orders it to be repaired at once. Fifty kilometres further his jeep bogs down in a badly rutted road: 'Kindly make me a proper asphalt road'. Another time (for example in the dry season) where crops are visibly suffering from drought, he will say 'Make me a dam near here'. Where crops seem more neglected than elsewhere, he will say 'I want an agricultural school in this sector' . . . . His slightest words are swallowed with deference, his orders noted down by his entourage, often with the help of a tape recorder'.[5] These orders are to be carried out immediately. This disrupts the Plan which, when rearranged, often provides for bulldozers to be in two places at the same time. Part of the trouble, according to Dumont, is that Castro is surrounded by 'yes' men, courtiers and that he is never contradicted. The fault is largely with Castro who choses compliant men as his closest companions.

Dumont sees the low productivity in agriculture largely as a result of the divorcing of the peasants from the land by their absorption into state farms. Until 1968 peasants with 67 hectares or under (a large proportion of the agricultural community) retained their land; although the sale of produce, credit, and tools was organised through the organisation ANAP. But this left them free to work for themselves. In 1968, in the 'Cultural Offensive' of that year when there was a purge on all forms of private property, these peasant holdings were amalgamated into the state plan. There were also various co-operatives which, because they were of a 'family' character and smacked of private property, were also incorporated into the state plan. Most of these peasants now work as landless labourers on state

[4] Ibid. p. 67.
[5] Ibid. p. 157.

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farms. As Dumont complains, not only was the giving of land back to the peasants part of Castro's revolutionary programme in 1959, but the present system is less productive. The peasant has no incentive to work harder unless he has control, in some form, over his produce.

ABSENTEEISM, slackness, irresponsibility—the reasons cited on the human side for the failure to reach the sugar target—are still regarded by Castro as survivals of Cuba's capitalist past which will disappear in time. Of course such vices are part of human nature and as such will never disappear completely. But the only effective way to reduce them is to introduce economic incentives. Dumont approves of this. Agricultural wages should be doubled to bring the *macheteros* back into the fields, and productivity bonuses should be added on top. But Dumont, the good socialist, balances this by claiming that socialists cannot live by bread alone. 'To believe that the Cuban peasant is entirely attached to his salary is to despise him. That would not have made the revolution worthwhile, as Fidel has rightly said'.[6] So participation by the workers and peasants in economic decision-making is another part of Dumont's solution to the Cuban problem of low productivity.

Castro has indeed promised more participation by Cuba's mass organisations—the trade unions, the women, the students and the Committees for the Defence of the Revolution. If this participation is real, it will mean radical changes in the present political set-up in which orders descend from above. More probably, Castro will encourage these mass organisations to take it upon themselves to discipline their own members and to enforce a new, tougher law against absenteeism which Castro has up his sleeve. The idea would be to spread the odium of enforcing discipline beyond the Party and the army. For tighter discipline, and not economic incentives, remains Castro's main policy tool to achieve the greater productivity and efficiency he so desperately wants. This would not be 'participation' as Dumont sees it.

Dumont's recipe for pulling Cuba out of the economic doldrums is a 'printemps de l'Havane'—a liberalization like that of Czechoslovakia in 1968. More use should be made of the market mechanism. For Cuba drastically needs a more rational price structure. Otherwise, Dumont warned Castro in his July 1969 letter, the Cuban economy will lose its competitive edge in world trade. Interest charges should be introduced on loans because they penalize the inefficient who are slow to show a profit. He also advises an end to night work which has been a regular and inefficient feature of the 1970 sugar campaign, an end to 'volunteer' work, less emphasis on sugar and more on the advice of foreign experts like himself—all of which are thoroughly sound suggestions.

[6] Ibid. p. 207.

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WHAT shocks Dumont most about Cuba, 11 years after the revolution, is the growing militarization of the country. Understandably, for it is now the most striking feature of the revolution. The army has moved into almost all civilian sectors—from the National Library to the sugar fields. It is now the most sought-after profession in Cuba. Where once the law or politics was the road to power, now the ambitious Cuban gets himself a commission. Most officers are Party members and increasingly they are getting Party jobs, replacing civilians. Of officers commissioned this year, nearly 90 per cent are members of the Party or of the Young Communist League. Indeed for the ambitious the army has more to offer than the Party. For in addition to having access to all the Party has, the army has taken under its wing most of the higher technical courses, and it is now the road to qualifications of any kind.

The military can be a force for good. Dumont recognizes this. 'From Sudan to Libya, to Peru, even Mali and Bolivia, the military has shown that it can lead the Third World in a progressive direction.'[7] What Dumont objects to is the increasing authoritarianism and stifling of open discussion that the military brings in its wake. On the economic side, soldiers carry out the central plans like automatons and they are less likely to urge their superiors to reconsider errors on the ground. This does not make for good planning. Dumont rightly regards constant re-adjustment as essential to successful planning. On the political side the army, being naturally authoritarian, will influence Castro in this direction as its considerable power grows. This will and, Dumont claims, has curtailed freedom of speech. He cites an example of a Cuban poet blacklisted because of an unfavourable review in an army magazine.

Dumont complains about the state of the press: the only daily newspaper now is *Granma*, the official organ of the Party. The monthly magazine *Cuba Socialista*, which used to print lively discussions between Guevara and Charles Bettelheim, was suppressed in 1967 'while the Central Committee defines the theoretical line of the Party'. It is still suppressed and nothing has taken its place.

'Neo-stalino-militarization' is the ugly word Dumont uses to define the phase through which Cuba is now passing; and he is pessimistic about the future. If Castro were toppled, only greater chaos would follow. On this practically everyone would agree, even those disenchanted with Castro. Equally there is little chance of palace revolution against Castro. For a start there is no rival with a comparable power base, except Raul Castro. And Raul, though strategically placed as minister of the armed forces, has not the personality to be able to emerge from his brother's shadow. By combining the posts of first secretary of the Party, commander-in-chief and prime minister, Fidel Castro has made his position almost unassailable. He is Brezhnev, Grechko,

[7] p. 141.

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and Kosygin rolled into one. He also has the unique advantage of having both the Party and the army owe their existence to him. He has kept the Party at the top weak; the Central Committee hardly ever meets now and the Congress never. The army has infiltrated most of the top Party and administrative jobs. But its very success in infiltrating so far keeps it happy. It also remains conscious of its origins in the guerrilla war under Castro's leadership. A more general movement against Castro, outside the Party and the army, could arise. But it is not yet on the horizon.

Because of Castro's absolute position, it seems that the 'constitutional monarchy' which Dumont would like to see evolve is highly unlikely. Dumont urges restraint on Castro, not only to keep him from some of his worst follies, but also to let the people participate. He urges 'an effective control of the Party by the workers, of the Central Committee by the Party, and of Castro by the Central Committee'.[8] Not only is this unlikely, but it also omits the problem of the army. And never has a way been devised of democratically controlling an army from the bottom.

[8] p. 236.

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LETTERS TO THE EDITOR

Dear Sir,

Glancing through the article by David Luck, 'Soviet and Chinese Political Development', in your Winter-Spring issue, I chanced to come upon a reference to myself. Discussing the role of Mao's 'paranoia' in the Cultural Revolution, Mr Luck classifies me among those attaching particular stress to this factor. In ordinary circumstances it would surely be regarded as a manifestation of paranoid behaviour to take exception to a reference to oneself in a footnote. The terms of Mr. Luck's note are, however, so extraordinary as to justify some comment. Note 20, on page 41, reads in fact:

> Analysts attaching far more significance to this motivation than I include Philip Bridgham, 'Mao's Cultural Revolution', *China Quarterly*, January-March 1967, and Stuart R. Schram, 'Comments', *China in Crisis*, p. 787, who regards Mao as senile. I doubt it.

Mr Bridgham and his co-worker, Arthur Cohen, who has repeatedly denounced me as an apologist for Mao, will no doubt be amused to see us thus bracketed together. It is, however, the latter part of the note that has provoked my reaction. Turning to page 387 of *China in Crisis* (787 is a misprint) I sought in vain there, or anywhere else in my comment on Benjamin Schwartz's paper, a reference to Mao's 'senility'. I have written a good deal about Mao in the course of the past four years, and used a variety of adjectives, but if Mr Luck chooses to suggest that my interpretation of the Cultural Revolution can be summed up in the proposition that Mao is senile, then he is either exceedingly dishonest or exceedingly obtuse.

As for the substance of his own contribution, I will only remark that his statement on page 29 about the lack of national tradition in Chinese political culture betrays a crass ignorance which totally disqualifies him as a commentator on any aspect of Chinese affairs.

Yours very sincerely,

Stuart R. Schram,
Contemporary China Institute,
University of London.

Dear Sir,

Professor Schram is completely correct in pointing out the error in my footnote 20, page 41. The original draft of my paper was written nearly two years ago, and in the revisions it has since undergone, several footnotes were scrambled, and I overlooked the error in footnote 20. Professor Schram does not refer to Mao's 'senility' anywhere in his 'comments', and his analyses are not to be bracketed with those of

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Bridgham. I greatly admire Professor Schram's work and he has my sincere apologies for this regrettable misquote.

However, Professor Schram also attacks the substance of my paper and my intellectual capacities. According to him I am 'exceedingly dishonest or exceedingly obtuse' (thanks for small favours: an 'and' instead of an 'or' would be truly devastating), 'crass(ly) ignor(ant)', and 'totally disqualif(ied) . . . as a commentator on any aspect of Chinese affairs'. All of which may be true, though how Professor Schram can arrive at such vitriolic condemnations without, as he admits, having read my essay is rather mystifying. Name-calling does seem to be coming back into fashion in the social sciences, and it is frightening to find a scholar of Professor Schram's reputation engaged in it.

As for the one substantive criticism advanced by Professor Schram, my point about the relative lack of a tradition of mass nationalism in Chinese political culture, this is an open issue. Certainly many Chinese urban intellectuals and students were highly nationalistic long before the formation of the CCP; but I do not believe that the village-oriented peasant mass had, until the mobilizing combination of Communist organization and ideology with Japanese aggression and atrocity, any large sense of identity with a Chinese nation. Now I may also be mistaken about this. But my holding this opinion, which is not an uncommon one, does not 'disquali(fy)' me 'as a commentator on any aspect of Chinese affairs'.

Quite the contrary, as Professor Schram might have realized had he taken the time to read my article instead of 'glancing through (it)'. It was written at the height of the Cultural Revolution, during the latter months of 1968, when many China 'experts' were unable to explain the Revolution except in terms of Mao's personal idiosyncrasies and openly predicting either the collapse of communism in China or the victory of the more 'rational-bureaucratic' factions. My paper attempted a systematic comparative historical explanation and from that explanation derived a completely contrary prediction, a prediction that has since been borne out by Chinese political developments. I ask only that those who would evaluate my paper and my capacities actually read it, and not accept the assertions of someone who has evidently not done so.

Sincerely,

David Luck,
184 Cosey Beach Ave.,
East Haven, 06512, Conn.,
U.S.A.

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ALEXANDER KERENSKY

Lord Stow Hill

WE are met * to say goodbye to a great man whose spirit is moving from us to a kinder world than ours, a man who toiled ceaselessly for his fellow men, with selfless devotion, high purpose and boundless courage. Eighty-nine heroic years have drawn to their close, years of prodigious achievement, splendid adventure, often, indeed mostly, years of peril, 'with darkness and with danger compassed round', years that span far back into the struggle for the soul of Russia, a struggle in which he played such a momentous role. It is a miracle that Alexander Kerensky lived physically unscathed through the manifold hazards that they brought, with his contemptuous disregard for his personal safety, a disregard which became almost legendary. Morally unscathed, he of course came through it all, as even his severest critics would admit. Known throughout Russia as quite a young man, for his fearless championship in the courts of those politically oppressed, as an orator able to sway vast multitudes to his will, as a brilliant young member of the Duma, as an inspired writer full of fire and imagination, as a statesman labouring ceaselessly with his brave colleagues and friends to guide his fellow citizens to a new democracy and a new era of reform in the challenge of the opening years of this century, as we all know, destiny carried him at the age of 37 to the leadership of his mighty country in a maelstrom of warring human passions, unparalleled in the long tempestuous history of human struggle.

It is the fate of big men who have played great parts in the shaping of world events to have their motives and achievement criticised and assessed by little men in armchairs who have never turned their hand to the task or been called upon to take great decisions. In this Alexander Kerensky has been no exception. But when the serious pages of history come to be written, it will be remembered to his undying fame, that in those fateful months of 1917 his government under his firm leadership as Prime Minister, against an agonising background of world war, hampered on every side by disloyalty and undermined by treachery around him, nevertheless laid the groundwork for massive social reform, remained unswervingly loyal to the ideal of civilised democratic behaviour, and never for a moment condescended to the methods of the ruthless despots who came after him, and that the people of Russia continued to take their full share in the destruction of German aggressive militarism. Civilisation must always be grateful to him and his Ministers and if, in the end, they could no longer stand, almost alone, against the blizzard, that should

* This is an oration delivered by Lord Stow Hill at Kerensky's funeral on 17 June 1970 at Putney Vale Cemetery, London. Kerensky died in New York on 15 June.

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not be accounted failure, but rather they should be honoured for their iron will and dauntless courage, a shining beacon light for the future conflicts between the rule of reason and the yoke of dictatorship which may yet afflict mankind. And now he is gone to his rest and we are left with his memories. Many of those present were close to him as members of his family, or personal friends.

It is my pride that my own father served under him in the critical months of 1917, and that in later years he honoured me with his friendship, I hope I may say, even his intimate friendship. Among my most precious memories are hours of conversation with him stretching far into the night with coffee cups in front of us and dying embers in the grate. As I knew him and I am sure as we all knew him, he was desperately sad and angry at the sufferings of his people under their present rulers, and impatient and bitter at the turn of fate which made it impossible for him to be there on the spot in the front line to lead them back to their freedom. But withal, he retained a freshness of spirit and buoyancy of outlook which made him a gay and lovable companion. And behind it, there lay a deep wisdom and understanding of the aspirations, motives, needs and fears of men and women individually and *en masse,* that made it an unforgettable experience to travel, in discussion with him, in the stillness of the evening, across the countries and continents that make up the earth, and to build a new vision of a changing new world on his ordinary conversation, easy modest and unconstrained, which made it obvious to the listener why destiny had selected him as a natural leader of men and women.

To those to whom his memory is precious, apart from his brilliant talents, and stupendous courage and willpower, perhaps the quality in him on which they would think with most pleasure was his perfect integrity, his utter inability, as his public career demonstrates, ever to stoop to a mean or underhand action. He had the natural graciousness and dignity of a truly good man. He was generous, almost to a fault, in his assessment of his opponents, even those who had most wronged him, and always only too ready to ascribe his own successes to his friends. To a man whose spirit was as active at all times as his, who was so intensely alive, and so passionately convinced that life is given not just as something to hold in your hand, but, as it were, on trust for the pursuit of noble aims, the enforced limitations of old age were perhaps more irksome than to others of more peaceable and equable disposition.

But I hope he felt, as in his later years I sometimes ventured to urge upon him, that the real Alexander Kerensky, the Kerensky of his youth, of his young manhood, of his prime, of the full maturity of his strength and genius, will always be alive and intensely alive with us and those that come after us, decades and centuries after this day, so long as men and women remember their own annals and themselves belong to time. He will live because he has become part

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of the life current of evolving human history. His name and epoch will remain a milestone, well-marked and measured along the steep and uphill path that traces the stages of the ever unfolding human spirit. It is so that we would like to think back on him, when in future we read his thoughts in his own words in his books or in the words of the historians who write about him. It is so that I would now like, in your presence, and I hope and believe with your assent, for the last time to say goodbye to him.

Richard Pipes

I FIRST met Kerensky in the spring of 1955 in Cambridge, Massachusetts, in the home of my teacher Michael Karpovich. The two men were friends, I believe. Karpovich first came to the United States in 1917 at the request of Bakhmetev who was going to the United States on the behalf of Kerensky to open a new embassy and invited Karpovich to come along. It was to have been a very brief expedition, and there was no need to bother with an overcoat for he would be back before the winter set in. As it turned out, the Bolshevik came to power and Karpovich remained abroad. There, Kerensky, the unwitting cause of his emigration, joined him. Neither was destined to see another Russian winter.

The first impression which Kerensky made on me was one of cat-like agility and lightness; there was nothing ponderous or pretentious about him, and that surprised me because public figures, out of self-defence, usually assume airs. As he talked, he moved about the sparsely furnished room, rapidly and noiselessly, and responded without a moment's hesitation. Our brief conversation centred on Central Asia on which I was then studying. Kerensky told me that the Uzbeks were Mongols; I assured him they were not; he said that his father had served for a time in Central Asia and he was certain of his facts. He was very charming. I understood why he liked the company of women and why he was surrounded by them in the tensest moments of the Revolution.

At the time of my first encounter with Kerensky I was giving at Harvard a course of lectures on modern Russian history. I asked him if he would be willing to speak to my class on the Dumas. He readily consented. The next day I introduced him to the students and yielded the platform. I watched him with curiosity, interested more in how he spoke than in what he had to say, in order to learn what had given him such a hold over Russian troops in 1917. The instant he began to speak, he withdrew within himself and seemed to lose sight of the audience. His talk was an inner dialogue made vocal. As he went on, he heated up and became very excited, raising his voice to a shout. What had begun as an academic discourse on the achievements and failures of the Third Duma soon evolved into a harangue.

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The students watched with fascination, but my own feelings turned to embarrassment. I had the impression that Kerensky was putting on a performance, that passion was something he could turn on and off at will, that the display of emotion was not genuine.

I met him subsequently several times in Stanford, California where he had taken up residence while editing a collection of documents on the Provisional Government. We discussed the events of 1917, and he agreed that the obsession of Russian intellectuals with the French Revolution had had a fatal effect on democratic politics in Russia. He spoke with remarkable detachment and even optimism about Khrushchev's reforms which were then in progress (the year was 1959), ascribing them to pressures of managers and technocrats. He gave me advice on how to attain healthy old age (never take a nap after eating but take a brisk walk, never eat freshly-baked bread, drink a couple of Martinis each day). I never discerned in him any bitterness or regrets. He spoke as if aware of his place in history but also conscious that the historic episode in which he had played a part was irretrievably over. I believe he was at peace with himself.

There is one more impression which I would like to convey. In his whole manner Kerensky was a Russian *barin*, a squire. His charm, his openness and ease, his unconcern with the opinion of others, his detachment, were at bottom aristocratic qualities. Observing him, I became aware how much the Russian intelligentsia, of which he was a not untypical representative, owed to the gentry from which it descended. Both the positive qualities of the *intelligenty* and their faults (above all, their contempt for everything mundane—money, discipline, comforts) were inherited from the old Russian gentry. Maurice Baring wrote in 1911 that Russians enjoyed greater *liberté de moeurs* than any other people in the world, and saw in this freedom (which he admired) a major obstacle to the democratization of Russia. I suspect that this quality derived not from ideology but from the example set by the well-to-do gentry who from the reign of Catherine II onwards created Russian public opinion. The example exerted so powerful an influence that even intellectuals from non-noble background adopted it, bringing an aristocratic spirit to a movement dedicated to democracy.

This *liberté de moeurs* Lenin, Kerensky's vanquisher, totally lacked. His personality was petty bourgeois through and through. Perhaps that was why he won; for the twentieth century is the age of the petty bourgeoisie, which exploits socialist slogans for its own purposes as the *grande bourgeoisie* had once exploited democratic ones. The leaders of the Russian intelligentsia simply could not cope with this flood. Awareness of this fact, perhaps, underlay Kerensky's serenity. There was in it a touch of aristocratic scorn for the mob.

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